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The journal investigates a broad spectrum of matters and issues related to governance, development, policy research and implementation, and leadership and management in the public sector in Africa. These include discipline-based and inter-disciplinary research, with a focus on both theoretical and practical approaches and experiences relevant to development and governance in Africa.

The journal publishes peer-reviewed research articles, discussion papers, policy papers, interviews with eminent persons, and book reviews on major issues related to public sector development and governance in Africa.

The journal's target audience is students, specialists, practitioners, consultants, politicians, policy makers, members of legislatures and those interested in African affairs.

In order to ensure that articles are relevant and of a high quality, all submissions are peer-reviewed (or refereed) by at least two experts. This is done completely anonymously and with the utmost confidentiality. A standard peer-review report template is used. Based on feedback from referees, as well as structure and content aspects, the editors reserve the right to make minor adjustments to submitted articles before publication.

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EDITORIAL

EXPLORING AFRICAN SOLUTIONS TO AFRICAN PROBLEMS

Thean Potgieter

The phrase "African solutions to African problems" gained prominence after the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) transformed into the African Union (AU) in 2001. Due to the desire to revive a continent that was marginalised and exploited for centuries owing to slavery, colonialism, neo-colonialism, destabilisation, oppression, war and hunger, poor governance and socio-economic development, it has become a mantra for policymakers in Africa (AU 2013: 34). Concern about the challenges the continent faces have contributed towards "African solutions to African problems ... to show that Africa has both the capability and determination to solve problems" (Lobakeng 2017:1). It is relevant to wide-ranging issues, from development, education and health to peace and security. It conjures amalgamating politics with action; placing emphasis on pride, indigeneity, self-reliance, taking ownerships and responsibility (Nathan 2013: 48-49). As a result, consensus on continental integration as part of the solution is also growing amongst policymakers, academics, analysts, and civil society.

However, the emphasis on African solutions, and that it is imperative for African nations to forge an independent path to prosperity and economic well-being, is not a recent idea and was a strong motivating force behind early Pan-African movements. In 1897, Henry Sylvester-Williams (Trinidadian law student in Britain), Alice Kinloch (from Kimberley, South Africa) and Thomas J. Thompson (a law student in Britain from Sierra Leone) founded the African Association (later the Pan-African Association), seeking to stimulate unity amongst Africans and those of African descent. In July 1900 the first Pan-African Conference was hosted in the Westminster Town Hall, London (Killingray 2012:394 and 401). It could be regarded as a significant initial use of the term Pan-African and an early effort to unite the voice of people from all over Africa and in the diaspora. As an early success for modern Pan-Africanism, it became a blueprint for many anti-colonialist movements during the 20th century (Anyoku and Anani-Isaac 2019). During the twentieth century, the quest for independence from colonial authorities continued and in 1958, the newly independent Republic of Ghana hosted the All-African Peoples' Congress in Accra. It was a great success and inspired further struggles for independence and self-determination in Africa. However, in the Cold War context of the post-Second World War world era, the ideals of non-aligned independent African states that were politically and economically united, were quickly usurped by great power politics and neo-colonial relationships (Mbeki 1998; Anyoku and Anani-Isaac 2019).

The dreams of progressive African visionaries from more than a century ago endured, and after the end of the Cold War their ideas received new impetus. Sadly, though, in the 1990s it was also stimulated by the inability of the content and the failure of the international community to effectively deal decisively with violent conflicts, in the aftermath of the devasting genocide in Rwanda as well as the collapse of the state in Somalia. African leaders resolved to develop indigenous solutions to problems emerging on the continent and end the reliance on being rescued by the UN in calamitous situations (Apuuli 2012; and Nathan 2013:49). With the creation of the AU in 2001, the idea of African solutions to African problems gripped policymakers as African leaders acknowledged that the scourge of conflicts “constitutes a major impediment to the socio-economic development of the continent” and the need to “promote peace, security and stability as a prerequisite” for development and integration (AU 2000: 3). This was based on the recognition that due to is non-interventionist approach, the OAU failed in the area of conflict resolution and a culture of indifference was cultivated in international relations among African countries. With the establishment of the AU, a much more interventionist stance was taken, and meaningful institutions and regulatory frameworks were created to tackle peace and security challenges, with some states and leaders effectively contributing to seeking ways to end crises (Lobakeng 2017:7). The AU is more robust than its predecessor, with improved mandates for coordinated solutions to continental challenges and a focus on respect of democratic principles, human rights, the rule of law and good governance (Apuuli 2012; and Ani 2018).

By the beginning of the 21st century, ideas around an African Renaissance were strongly articulated. This emanated from Thabo Mbeki, a former South African president, who emphasised that Africa has a “legitimate right to expect that it has the capacity to set itself free from the oppressive historical legacy of poverty, hunger, backwardness and marginalization” and the efforts “to ensure the restoration … of peace, stability, prosperity, and intellectual creativity, will and must succeed!” (Mbeki 1998). He placed much emphasis on establishing and maintaining democracy, good governance, transparency and accountability to limit corruption and the abuse of power. Of relevance is the discrepancy between holding elections and perpetuating authoritarian rule, as some elections may not necessarily lead “to liberal democracy”. Elected governments have abused “individual rights and deprived people of liberty” (Solomon 2015:46-47), or as the case of Côte d’Ivoire showed in 2010, leaders might refuse to accept election outcomes. After the subsequent AU mediation failed, international involvement effected an outcome (Lobakeng 2017:3).

In his thinking on the African Renaissance, Mbeki also highlighted regional security, peace and stability, the prevention and resolution of conflicts and the building of regional peace-making and peacekeeping capacity; stating that stability and sound economic policies will stimulate economic growth (Mbeki 1998). Although Africa is plagued by various traditional and non-traditional security threats, the AU’s security architecture has contributed towards promoting peace and security on the continent (Solomon 2015:45). Again, as Mbeki already indicated more than two decades ago, regional economic integration, equitable global trade agreements, a future free-trade area and the development of infrastructure will together contribute towards reducing poverty and unemployment, access to good education, adequate healthcare, decent housing, as well as clean water and sanitation. Mbeki placed emphasis on creating a non-racial and non-sexist society (“the genuine and all-round emancipation of women") and the defence and promotion of human rights; indicating that in Africa we must "discharge our responsibilities to ourselves" and in the process cooperate "with all nations to meet … common challenges" (Mbeki 1998).

Within the African geopolitical context, these ideas led to the creation of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) in 2001. This is an ambitious multilateral development initiative to give impetus to Africa's inclusive growth and development in a globalising world, close the existing gap between developing and developed countries, and eradicate poverty, NEPAD personified the notion of African solutions to African problems (Anyoku and Anani-Isaac 2019). In short, it is time for Africans to take things into their own hands and make use of their resources to solve Africa's troubles.

The notion of African solutions to African problems resulted in considerable debate amongst specialists, civil society and students of African affairs. Opinions range from pessimistic views that the continent faces too many challenges compared to its limited capacity and financial restrictions to be able mobilise sufficient resources to solve problems, that African leaders often do not act with one voice when responding to crises, and that leaders often ignore unacceptable behaviour by fellow leaders (Lobakeng 2017:5). As a result, some analysts are of the opinion that "appropriate solutions to African problems" should instead be the focus. Be that as it may, it is important to not contribute towards marginalising continental efforts and to appreciate that problems are complex, cross-cutting and varied, and could not be separated from a specific context (Fiquremariam 2008). In our quest for solutions we therefore need to always keep the context in mind and develop a thorough understanding of the nature of problems. In developing ideas on the best way to address specific problems, we need to appreciate which actions are both acceptable and practical, taking cognisance of financial realities and the African context.

As some problems are not only African problems, greater global involvement would be required to share the burden of responsibility, mutual obligation and accountability. The COVID-19 experience as well as the challenges many African countries experienced with the acquisition and roll-out of vaccines is a pertinent recent case in point. Although COVID-19 infections were not as high in Africa as in many other parts of the world, the socio-economic impact of the pandemic on Africa will reverberate for some time to come and is disproportionate to its impact on public health (World Bank 2020). However, besides COVID-19 and despite the best efforts of African governments, the international community and non-governmental role-players, Africa continues to suffer high infection rates from other deadly diseases (including HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis). Together, these will inhibit socio-economic development, pose governance challenges and threaten peace and security – challenges that will remain with the continent for decades to come.

In finding solutions, good governance matters, just as the determination to promote and protect human and peoples' rights, consolidate democratic institutions and culture, and ensure the rule of law. Governance is not only concerned with the quality of public administration, professionalism, bureaucratic efficiency and effectiveness in service delivery, but is also about cooperation between different role players at all levels to address problems by thrashing out appropriate solutions (Everatt 2019). In the coming decades, Africa will experience momentous times associated with issues such as the enduring impact of COVID-19, high population growth, urbanisation, economic development, climate change, and competition for scarce resources. As this could result in the substantial reconfiguration of socio-economic and political landscapes, we need to understand problems, rethink challenges, consider new approaches and implement solutions that are appropriate to Africa. For this, we need quality evidence to enhance understanding and inform capacity-building. But quality evidence requires quality research, in other words: take care to learn from the past and the current reality to devise actions aimed at resolving future problems.

As Mbeki indicated decades ago, in Africa we must "discharge our responsibilities to ourselves" and in the process cooperate "with all nations to meet … common challenges" (Mbeki 1998). 'African solutions for African problems' is certainly an inspiring maxim, but in the context of our time it applies to a large extent to the youth of Africa, who will be driving Africa's destiny. We need to inspire them with confidence and by doing the right thing. We need to arm them with knowledge to face the continent's challenges, but more importantly, we must contribute towards making it possible for them to make the most of the opportunities lying in wait.

The contributions published in this edition of the *Africa Journal of Public Sector Development and Governance* (AJPSDG) discusses various unique issues within the African context as well as African responses to these challenges. These voices will hopefully provide some insight into problems and possible solutions to a few challenges.

Democracy is a good starting point. In the interrogation of democratic deficits and elections in Nigeria's Fourth Republic by Al Chukwuma Okoli, Chigozie Joseph Nebeife and Markus Arum Izang, the authors indicate that the essence of government is encapsulated in the fulfilment of public good. A democratic government is acclaimed to be most suited to the determination and implementation of such a mandate. However, this has not been the general experience across the world, and more specifically in emerging democracies. For instance, successive democratic administrations in Nigeria's Fourth Republic have left a lot to be desired in relation to fulfilling their democratic mandate through proper representation and good governance. A series of elections has produced different crops of supposed people's representatives. Yet, the existential conditions of the people have not been met in a manner that justifies the fact that these representatives rule at the instance of the people, let alone represent their interests and aspirations. The gaping deficits of democracy in this regard has warranted analysis of the effect of electoral democracy in Nigeria's Fourth Republic as it has not brought about the needed democratic dividends in terms of efficient governance and effective representation.

The contribution of T.M. Ramodula and K.K. Govender is on a framework for developmental local government. The authors content that the successful establishment of the vision of developmental local government in South Africa depends on the quality of strategies adopted by municipalities. A framework for strategy implementation is proposed to assist municipalities towards realising developmental local government. Among other aspects, the framework discusses organisational dynamics, public policy, strategy formulation and execution, organisational structure and performance management. Local government strategy is examined as a means towards the effective establishment of developmental government as a long-term vision. Political tenure often ends while municipal administrations are still grappling with strategic planning and implementation, which impacts on success.

Governance arrangements of public enterprises are contrasted with the management of their performance in Namibia, by Ntelamo Ntelamo. Poor governance and poor performance are associated with public enterprises in the country due to the inadequacy of legislation intended to regulate the governance of public enterprises. For instance, the Namibian Public Enterprises Governance Act, 2006 of 2006 (as amended in 2015), does not provide for the punishment of poor performance. In order to correct the cause and effects of poor governance, the Namibian Ministry of Public Enterprises commenced with a drive to overhaul the 2006 Act; resulting in the 2019 Public Enterprises Governance Act. It introduced changes aimed at improving the governance of public enterprises, such as giving powers to the relevant minister to remove a board or a board member due to non-compliance with relevant governance provisions or performance agreements. Chief executive officers and senior managers could also be dismissed if they fail to perform in accordance with their performance agreements. The 2019 Act, however, does not address consequences if the relevant minister fails to perform in terms of the prescribed agreements.

The article by Collin Kamalizeni, Mohammad Hoque, Abdullah Kader and Hatikanganwi Mapudzi analyses the extent to which women leadership affects organisational effectiveness, using the case of public enterprises in Eswatini. It raises fundamental questions about the prospects for female leadership and organisational effectiveness in public enterprises, and the factors influencing women leaders in their achievement of goals. Based on the responses of selected respondents on organisational effectiveness, the article highlights the fact that women leadership is effective if female leaders apply a combination of transformational and transactional leadership styles, adopt inclusive leadership approaches, add informality to counteract some of the traditional cultural barriers, and create strategic partnerships with their male counterparts. The authors suggest, among others, that more female leaders should be appointed in strategic positions within public enterprises in Eswatini.

Two contributions focus on building a better future and environments. The first, by Izimangaliso Malatjie, is an assessment of the capabilities of facilitators at the South African National School of Government (NSG) to build the capacity of civil servants for the effective implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). In 2015, the UN General Assembly adopted its Vision 2030, comprising the global goals that are widely known as SDGs. The United Nations' Vision 2030 represents a new and coherent way of thinking in terms of how issues as diverse as poverty, education and climate change fit together. The vision entwines socio-economic and environmental targets into 17 SDGs. The achievement of the global goals intends to promote a sustainable development by helping UN member states to secure a better future for all their citizens. The SDGs address crucial issues such as poverty, hunger, inequality, climate change, education, peace, justice and strong institutions. It is essential that countries give a particular attention to the inclusion of the SDGs in education and training programmes of schools and Institutes of administration as well as other institutions that offer higher education. This article examines the history, context, and significance of SDGs, explains the manner in which SDGs have gained saliency among the public service, and is an effort to determine the extent to which facilitators within the NSG are equipped to promote the implementation of the SDGs through training programmes.

Peter Nyakalale and Clever Madimutsa discuss the challenges that are relevant to implementing the green movement in residential areas in Lusaka, Zambia. The Zambian government launched the Make Zambia Clean and Healthy Campaign in 2007 to curb the indiscriminate disposal of waste. The campaign was then re-branded in 2018 to become Keep Zambia Clean, Green and Healthy Campaign. This meant that citizens and institutions were not only expected to keep the environment clean and healthy, but also to make it green by planting trees and grass. Despite the adoption of this campaign, residential areas in Zambia are still not green. The article aims to identify the challenges that have hampered successful implementation of the green movement in residential areas in Zambia. The research findings indicate that both government and community members face challenges in implementing the green movement. On the one hand, the government lacks resources to sensitise people and supply enough water to residential areas. On the other hand, residents are too poor to afford the payment of water services used to maintain their green areas.

The final article is a normative contribution. Jan Tlade discusses the application of the African ontological value of ‘ubuntu’ in corporate governance. Worldwide, the corporate governance phenomenon has grown exponentially as a favoured corporate management approach to curtail governance deficiencies. Advancing contemporary corporate governance phenomena, scholars have, over the years, developed an array of frameworks to improve the nucleus of corporate governance practices and principles. Given the shortfalls of some of the dominant frameworks, the ‘ubuntu’ perspective is offered as an alternative framework for the application of corporate governance underpinned by African ontological and philosophical perspectives. This article explores the conception, scope, and content of ‘ubuntu’ to guide African organisations in executing corporate governance arrangements.

The final contribution to this edition is a review of a relevant discussion of a publication by Dan W.Nabudere (of the Marcus Garvey Pan-African Institute, Uganda) on *The Global Capitalist Crisis: Way forward for Africa* (Seatini Books), that appeared a few years ago. The author discusses the “roots and consequences of the global capitalist crisis triggered by the excesses of the American economy.” The reviewer reiterates the author’s strong calls for the reform of the capitalism-driven global system of economic governance as the only viable long-term strategy for achieving a fair and people- friendly globalisation. The way forward for Africa is to continue with the struggle for a global society with economic growth and management focusses on a pro-people approach to “ensure prosperity for all and human security including effective solutions for climate change, mitigation and adaptation.”

ARTICLE DE SYNTHÈSE

EXPLORER LES SOLUTIONS AFRICAINES AUX PROBLÈMESAFRICAINS

Thean Potgieter

L'expression «Des solutions africaines aux problèmes africains» a pris de l'ampleur après la reconversion de l'Organisation de l'unité africaine (OUA) en Union africaine (UA) en 2001. Motivée par l'intention de faire revivre un continent qui a été marginalisé et exploité pendant des siècles à cause de l'esclavage, le colonialisme, le néocolonialisme, la déstabilisation, l'oppression, la guerre et la famine, la mauvaise gouvernance et le sous-développement socio-économique, cette expression est devenue un mantra pour les décideurs politiques en Afrique (UA 2013 : 34). Les préoccupations relatives aux défis auxquels est confronté le continent ont contribué à «trouver des solutions africaines aux problèmes africains ... pour montrer que l'Afrique a à la fois la capacité et la détermination de résoudre ses problèmes» (Lobakeng 2017 :1). Elle s'applique ainsi à des questions très diverses, allant du développement, l'éducation et la santé, à la paix et la sécurité. Elle associe la politique à l'action, en mettant l'accent sur la fierté, le caractère autochtone, l'autonomie, l'appropriation et la responsabilité (Nathan 2013 : 48-49). En conséquence, le consensus sur l'intégration continentale comme élément de solution se développe également parmi les décideurs politiques, les universitaires, les analystes et la société civile.

Toutefois, l'accent mis sur les solutions africaines et sur le fait qu'il est impératif que les nations africaines s'engagent sur la voie de la prospérité et du bien-être économique en toute indépendance, n'est pas une idée récente et a, en fait, servi d'importante motivation aux premiers mouvements panafricains. En 1897, Henry Sylvester-Williams (étudiant trinidadien en droit en Grande-Bretagne), Alice Kinloch (originaire de Kimberley, en Afrique du Sud) et Thomas J. Thompson (étudiant en droit Grande-Bretagne, originaire de la Sierra Leone) ont fondé l'Association africaine (plus tard l'Association panafricaine), dans le but de stimuler l'unité entre les Africains et ceux d'origine africaine. En juillet 1900, la première conférence panafricaine a été organisée au Westminster Town Hall, à Londres (Killingray 2012 :394 et 401). Elle peut être considérée comme la première utilisation significative du terme «panafricain» et le premier effort visant à unir la voix des africains à travers le continent et ceux de la diaspora. En tant que premier succès du panafricanisme moderne, il est devenu un modèle pour de nombreux mouvements anticolonialistes au cours du 20e siècle (Anyoku et Anani-Isaac 2019). Au cours du XXe siècle,la quête de l'indépendance vis-à-vis des puissances coloniales s'est poursuivie et, en 1958, la République du Ghana, nouvellement indépendante, accueillit la Conférence panafricaine des peuples à Accra. Ce fut un grand succès qui inspira de nouvelles luttes pour l'indépendance et l'autodétermination en Afrique.

Toutefois, dans le contexte de la guerre froide, après la Seconde Guerre mondiale, les idéaux des États africains indépendants non alignés qui étaient unis politiquement et économiquement, ont rapidement été usurpés par la politique des grandes puissances et les relations néocoloniales (Mbeki 1998 ; Anyoku et Anani-Isaac 2019).

Les rêves des visionnaires africains progressistes d'il y a plus d'un siècle avaient perduré, et après la fin de la guerre froide, leurs idées reçurent un nouvel élan. Malheureusement, dans les années 1990, elles ont également été stimulées par l'incapacité du contenu et l'échec de la communauté internationale à traiter efficacement les conflits violents, au lendemain du génocide dévastateur au Rwanda ainsi que de l'effondrement de l'État en Somalie. Les dirigeants africains décidèrent d'élaborer des solutions locales aux problèmes qui se posent sur le continent et de ne plus dépendre du secours des Nations unies en cas de catastrophe (Apuuli 2012 ; et Nathan 2013 :49). Avec la création de l'UA en 2001, l'idée de solutions africaines aux problèmes africains saisit les décideurs politiques, les dirigeants africains reconnaissant que le fléau des conflits «constitue un obstacle majeur au développement socio-économique du continent» et la nécessité de «promouvoir la paix, la sécurité et la stabilité comme condition préalable» au développement et à l'intégration (UA 2000 : 3). Cette reconnaissance se fondait sur le fait qu'en raison de son approche non-interventionniste, l'OUA avait échoué dans le domaine de la résolution des conflits et qu'une culture de l'indifférence avait pris vie dans les relations internationales entre les pays africains. Avec la création de l'UA, une position beaucoup plus interventionniste fut adoptée, et des institutions et cadres réglementaires significatifs furent créés pour relever les défis de la paix et de la sécurité, certains États et dirigeants contribuant effectivement à la recherche de moyens de mettre fin aux crises (Lobakeng 2017 :7). L'UA est plus solide que son prédécesseur, avec des mandats améliorés pour des solutions coordonnées aux défis continentaux et un accent sur le respect des principes démocratiques, des droits de l'Homme, de l'État de droit et de la bonne gouvernance (Apuuli 2012 ; et Ani 2018).

Au début du XXIe siècle, les idées autour d'une Renaissance africaine ont été fortement articulées. Elles émanent de Thabo Mbeki, ancien président sud-africain, qui souligne que l'Afrique a «le droit légitime d'avoir foi en sa capacité à se libérer de l'héritage historique oppressif de la pauvreté, de la faim, du retard et de la marginalisation» et que les efforts «pour assurer le rétablissement ... de la paix, de la stabilité, de la prospérité et de la créativité intellectuelle, vont et doivent réussir ! " (Mbeki 1998). Il a beaucoup insisté sur l'établissement et le maintien de la démocratie, de la bonne gouvernance, de la transparence et de la responsabilité pour limiter la corruption et l'abus de pouvoir. Il convient de noter l'importance de l'écart entre la tenue d'élections et la perpétuation d'un régime autoritaire, car certaines élections ne conduisent pas nécessairement à une «démocratie libérale». Des gouvernements élus ont abusé «des droits individuels et privé les populations de liberté» (Salomon 2015 :46-47), ou comme l'a montré le cas de la Côte d'Ivoire en 2010, les dirigeants pourraient refuser d'accepter les résultats des élections. Après l'échec de la médiation ultérieure de l'UA, l'intervention internationale a permis d'obtenir des résultats (Lobakeng 2017 :3).

Dans sa réflexion sur la Renaissance africaine, Mbeki a également mis l'accent sur la sécurité, la paix et la stabilité régionales, la prévention et la résolution des conflits et la mise en place d'une capacité régionale de rétablissement et de maintien de la paix ; il a déclaré que la stabilité et des politiques économiques saines stimuleront la croissance économique (Mbeki 1998). Bien que l'Afrique soit confrontée à diverses menaces traditionnelles et non traditionnelles pour la sécurité, l'architecture de sécurité de l'UA a contribué à promouvoir la paix et la sécurité sur le continent (Solomon 2015 :45). Là encore, comme Mbeki l'a déjà indiqué il y a plus de deux décennies, l'intégration économique régionale, les accords commerciaux mondiaux équitables, une future zone de libre-échange et le développement des infrastructures contribueront collectivement à réduire la pauvreté et le chômage et permettront l'accès à une bonne éducation, à des soins de santé adéquats, à un logement décent, ainsi qu'à une eau propre et à des installations sanitaires. Mbeki met l'accent sur la création d'une société non raciale et non sexiste («l'émancipation véritable et complète des femmes») et sur la défense et la promotion des droits de l'homme ; il indique qu'en Afrique, nous devons «nous acquitter de nos responsabilités envers nous-mêmes» et, ce faisant, coopérer «avec toutes les nations pour relever ... les défis communs» (Mbeki 1998).

Dans le contexte géopolitique africain, ces idées ont conduit à la création du Nouveau partenariat pour le développement de l'Afrique (NEPAD) en 2001. Il s'agit d'une initiative de développement multilatérale ambitieuse visant à donner un élan à la croissance et au développement inclusifs de l'Afrique dans un monde en voie de mondialisation, à combler le fossé existant entre les pays en développement et les pays développés, et à éradiquer la pauvreté. Le NEPAD a personnifié la notion de solutions africaines aux problèmes africains (Anyoku et Anani-Isaac 2019). En bref, il était temps pour les Africains de prendre les choses en main et d'utiliser leurs ressources pour résoudre les problèmes de l'Afrique.

La notion de solutions africaines aux problèmes africains a donné lieu à un débat considérable entre les experts, la société civile et les étudiants en affaires africaines. Les avis sont divers, d'aucuns partent d'une perspective pessimiste selon laquelle le continent est confronté à trop de défis par rapport à ses capacités limitées et à ses restrictions financières de pouvoir mobiliser des ressources suffisantes pour résoudre ses problèmes, d'autres indiquent qu'il arrive très souvent que les dirigeants africains n'agissent pas d'une seule voix lorsqu'ils répondent aux crises et qu'ils ferment les yeux sur les comportements inacceptables de leurs homologues (Lobakeng 2017 :5). En conséquence, certains analystes sont d'avis qu'il faudrait plutôt se concentrer sur des «solutions appropriées aux problèmes africains». Quoi qu'il en soit, il est important de ne pas contribuer à la marginalisation des efforts continentaux et de comprendre que les problèmes sont complexes,transversaux et variés, et qu'ils ne peuvent être séparés d'un contexte spécifique (Fiquremariam 2008). Dans notre recherche de solutions, nous devons donc toujours garder le contexte à l'esprit et chercher à mieux comprendre la nature des problèmes. En cherchant des idées sur la meilleure façon d'aborder des problèmes spécifiques, nous devons apprécier quelles actions sont à la fois acceptables et pratiques, en tenant compte des réalités financières et du contexte africain.

Vu que certains problèmes ne sont pas seulement des problèmes africains, une plus grande implication mondiale serait nécessaire pour partager le fardeau en termes de responsabilité, d'obligation mutuelle et de redevabilité. L'expérience de la COVID-19 ainsi que les difficultés rencontrées par de nombreux pays africains quant à l'acquisition et au déploiement de vaccins en sont un exemple récent et pertinent. Bien que les infections par la COVID-19 n'aient pas été aussi élevées en Afrique que dans de nombreuses autres régions du monde, l'impact socio-économique de la pandémie sur le continent se fera sentir pendant un certain temps encore et est disproportionné par rapport à son impact sur la santé publique (Banque mondiale 2020). Toutefois, outre la COVID-19 et malgré les efforts des gouvernements africains, de la communauté internationale et des acteurs non gouvernementaux, l'Afrique continue de souffrir de taux d'infection élevés d'autres maladies mortelles (notamment le VIH/SIDA, le paludisme et la tuberculose). Ensemble, ces maladies continueront d'entraver le développement socio-économique, poseront des problèmes de gouvernance et menaceront la paix et la sécurité - des problèmes qui persisteront sur le continent pendant les décennies à venir.

Une bonne gouvernance est essentielle pour trouver des solutions, tout comme la détermination à promouvoir et à protéger les droits de l'homme et des peuples, à consolider les institutions et la culture démocratiques et à garantir l'État de droit. La gouvernance ne se limite pas seulement à la qualité de l'administration publique, au professionnalisme, à l'efficience bureaucratique et à l'efficacité de la prestation de services, elle s'étend aussi sur la coopération entre les divers acteurs à tous les niveaux, afin de résoudre les problèmes en dégageant des solutionsappropriées (Everatt 2019). Dans les décennies à venir, l'Afrique connaîtra des moments importants liés à des questions telles que l'impact perdurant de la COVID-19, la forte croissance démographique, l'urbanisation, le développement économique, le changement climatique et la concurrence pour des ressources rares. Du fait que cela pourrait entraîner une reconfigurationsubstantielle des paysages socio-économiques et politiques, nous devons comprendre les problèmes, repenser les défis, envisager de nouvelles approches et mettre en œuvre des solutions adaptées à l'Afrique. Pour cela, nous avons besoin de données probantes de qualitépour améliorer la compréhension et éclairer le renforcement des capacités. Mais des preuvesde qualité exigent une recherche de qualité, en d'autres termes : prendre soin de tirer les leçons du passé et de la réalité actuelle afin de concevoir des actions visant à résoudre les problèmes futurs.

Comme l'a indiqué Mbeki il y a plusieurs décennies, en Afrique, nous devons «nous acquitter de nos responsabilités envers nous-mêmes» et, ce faisant, coopérer «avec toutes les nations pour relever ... des défis communs» (Mbeki 1998). L'expression «des solutions africaines aux problèmes africains» est certainement une maxime inspirante, mais dans le contexte de notreépoque, elle s›applique dans une large mesure à la jeunesse africaine, qui sera le moteur dudestin de l'Afrique. Nous devons les inspirer avec confiance et en faisant ce qu'il faut. Nous devons les armer de connaissances pour faire face aux défis du continent, mais surtout, nousdevons contribuer à leur permettre de tirer le meilleur parti des possibilités qui s'offrent à eux.

Les contributions publiées dans ce numéro de la *Revue africaine du développement du secteur public et de la gouvernance* (AJPSDG) abordent diverses questions uniques dans le contexte africain ainsi que les réponses africaines à ces défis. Nous espérons que ces voix donneront un aperçu des problèmes et des solutions possibles à certains défis.

La démocratie est un bon point de départ. Dans l'interrogation sur les déficits des mécanismes et instruments démocratiques sous la Quatrième République du Nigéria, soulevée par Al Chukwuma Okoli, Chigozie Joseph Nebeife et Markus Arum Izang, les auteurs indiquent que le gouvernement, par essence, doit veiller sur le bien public. Un gouvernement démocratique est perçu comme étant le plus apte à déterminer et à remplir un tel mandat. Cependant, à travers le globe, le ressenti n'est pas le même, et plus particulièrement dans les démocraties émergentes. Par exemple, les administrations démocratiques successives de la Quatrième République du Nigéria ont fortement laissé à désirer en termes d'accomplissement de leur mandat démocratique par une représentation appropriée et une bonne gouvernance.Une série d'élections a donné lieu à un vivier de prétendus représentants du peuple. Et pourtant, les conditions existentielles du peuple n'ont pas été remplies de manière à justifier que ces représentants gouvernent au nom du peuple, ou même représentent ses intérêts et ses aspirations. Les déficits flagrants de la démocratie à cet égard ont justifié la présentation de ce document, selon lequel la démocratie électorale sous la Quatrième République du Nigéria n'a pas apporté les dividendes démocratiques nécessaires en termes d'efficience de la gouvernance et d'efficacité de la représentation.

La contribution de T.M. Ramodula et K.K. Govender porte sur un cadre de mise en œuvre en faveur du gouvernement local développementaliste. Les auteurs estiment que le succès de la mise en place d'une vision du gouvernement local développementaliste en Afrique du Sud dépend de la qualité des stratégies adoptées par les municipalités. Un cadre pour la mise en œuvre de la stratégie est proposé pour aider les municipalités à réaliser l'objectif ultime d›un gouvernement local développementaliste. Entre autres aspects, le cadre aborde la dynamique organisationnelle, la politique publique, la formulation et l'exécution de la stratégie, la structure organisationnelle et la gestion des performances. La stratégie du gouvernement local est examinée comme un moyen de parvenir à la mise en place effective d'un gouvernement développementaliste comme vision à long terme. Le mandat politique prend souvent fin alors que les administrations municipales sont encore aux prises avec la planification et la mise en œuvre stratégiques, ce qui a un impact sur la réussite.

En Namibie, Ntelamo Ntelamo compare les modalités de gouvernance des entreprises publiques avec la gestion de leurs performances. La mauvaise gouvernance et les mauvaises performances sont associées aux entreprises publiques dans le pays, en raison de l'inadéquation de la législation destinée à réglementer la gouvernance des entreprises publiques. Par exemple, la loi namibienne de 2006 sur la gouvernance des entreprises publiques (telle que modifiée en 2015) ne prévoit pas de sanction en cas de mauvaises performances. Afin de corriger les causes et les effets d'une mauvaise gouvernance, le ministère namibien des Entreprises publiques a commencé à réviser la loi de 2006, ce qui a abouti à la loi de 2019 sur la gouvernance des entreprises publiques. Elle a introduit des changements visant à améliorer la gouvernance des entreprises publiques, comme le fait dedonner au ministre compétent le pouvoir de révoquer un conseil d'administration ou un membre du conseil en raison du non-respect des modalités de gouvernance ou des accords de performance pertinents. Les directeurs généraux et les cadres supérieurs peuvent également être licenciés en cas de non-respect de leurs accords de performance. La loi de 2019, cependant, ne prévoit pas de conséquences au cas où le ministre concerné ne respectait pas les accords prescrits.

L’article de Collin Kamalizeni, Mohammad Hoque, Abdullah Kader et Hatikanganwi Mapudzi analyse à travers le cas des entreprises publiques à Eswatini, dans quelle mesure le leadership féminin joue sur la performance organisationnelle. Elle soulève des questions fondamentales sur les perspectives de leadership féminin et d’efficacité organisationnelle dans les entreprises publiques, et sur les facteurs qui influencent les femmes dirigeantes dans la réalisation de leurs objectifs. Sur la base des réponses de certaines personnes interrogées sur l’efficacité organisationnelle, l’article souligne le fait que le leadership féminin est efficace si les dirigeantes appliquent une combinaison de styles de leadership transformationnel et transactionnel, adoptent des approches de leadership inclusives, ajoutent un caractère informel dans l’utilisation de la numérisation pour contrecarrer certaines des barrières culturelles traditionnelles. Enfin, et surtout, les femmes dirigeantes doivent conclure un partenariat stratégique actif avec leurs homologues masculins dans le but de promouvoir les initiatives en matière d’égalité des genres. Les auteurs suggèrent, entre autres, que davantage de femmes dirigeantes soient nommées à des postes stratégiques dans les entreprises publiques d’Eswatini.

Deux contributions portent sur la construction d’un avenir et d’un environnement meilleurs. Lapremière, par Izimangaliso Malatjie, est une évaluation des aptitudes des facilitateurs de l’École nationale de formation des agents de la fonction publique (NSG) d’Afrique du Sud à renforcer les capacités des fonctionnaires en vue de la mise en œuvre efficace des objectifs de développement durable (ODD).En 2015, l’Assemblée générale des Nations unies a adopté sa Vision 2030, constituée des objectifs mondiaux largement connus sous le nom d’objectifs de développement durable (ODD). La Vision 2030 représente une façon, nouvelle et cohérente de penser la manière dont des questions aussi diverses que la pauvreté, l’éducation et le changement climatique s’articulent les unes avec les autres. Cette vision regroupe des objectifs socio-économiques et environnementaux en 17 ODD. La réalisation des objectifs mondiaux vise à promouvoir un développement durable en aidant les États membres des Nations unies à assurer un meilleur avenir à tous leurs citoyens. Les ODD abordent des questions cruciales telles que la pauvreté, la faim, l’inégalité, le changement climatique, l’éducation, la paix, la justice et des institutions fortes. Il est essentiel que les pays accordent une attention particulière à l’inclusion des ODD dans les programmes éducatifs et de formation des écoles et des instituts d’administration, ainsi que des autres institutions qui proposent un enseignement supérieur. Cet article vise à examiner dans un premier temps l’histoire, le contexte et l’importance des ODD ; ensuite, il explique la manière dont les ODD ont gagné du terrain au sein de la fonction publique, et enfin, il entend déterminer dans quelle mesure les facilitateurs au sein du NSG sont équipés de manière à promouvoir la mise en œuvre des ODD par le biais de programmes de formation.

Peter Nyakalale et Clever Madimutsa discutent des défis posés par la mise en œuvre du mouvement vert dans les zones résidentielles de Lusaka, en Zambie. Le gouvernement zambien a lancé la campagne « Rendons la Zambie propre et saine « en 2007 pour mettre un frein à l’élimination inconsidérée des déchets. La campagne a ensuite été rebaptisée en 2018 “Gardons la Zambie propre, verte et saine”. En d’autres termes, les citoyens et les institutions ne sont pas simplement censés garder l’environnement propre et sain, mais ils doivent aussi le rendre vert en plantant des arbres et de l’herbe. Malgré l’adoption de cette campagne, les zones résidentielles en Zambie ne sont toujours pas vertes. L’article vise à identifier les défis qui ont entravé la mise en œuvre réussie du mouvement vert dans les zones résidentielles en Zambie. Les résultats indiquent que le gouvernement et les membres de la communauté ont été confrontés à de nombreux défis dans la mise en œuvre du mouvement vert. D'une part, le gouvernement manque de ressources pour sensibiliser la population et fournir suffisamment d'eau aux zones résidentielles. D'autre part, les résidents sont trop pauvres pour payer les services d'eau utilisés dans l'entretien de leurs espaces verts.

L'article final est une contribution normative. Jan Tlade discute de l'application de la valeur ontologique africaine de l'Ubuntu dans la gouvernance d'entreprise. À travers le monde, le phénomène de gouvernance d›entreprise a connu une croissance exponentielle en tant qu›approche privilégiée de la gestion des entreprises en vue de réduire les déficits de gouvernance. En vue de promouvoir le phénomène contemporain de gouvernance d'entreprise, les chercheurs ont, au fil des ans, mis au point un ensemble de cadres visant à améliorer le noyau des pratiques et des principes de gouvernance d'entreprise. Étant donné les lacunes de certains des cadres dominants, la perspective Ubuntu est proposée comme un cadre alternatif pour l›application de la gouvernance d›entreprise, étayé par des perspectives ontologiques et philosophiques africaines. Cet article explore la conception, la portée et le contenu de l'Ubuntu avec l'objectif de guider les organisations africaines dans l'exécution des dispositions de la gouvernance d'entreprise.

La dernière contribution à cette édition est un examen d'une discussion pertinente d'une publication de Dan W. Nabudere (de l'Institut panafricain Marcus Garvey, Ouganda) sur la *crise capitaliste mondiale : Perspective d'avenir pour l'Afrique (The Global Capitalist crisis : Way forward for Africa)* (Seatini Books), qui est parue il y a quelques années. L'auteur discute des «causes fondamentales et des conséquences de la crise capitaliste mondiale déclenchée par les excès de l'économie américaine». L'auteur réitère ses appels pressants à la réforme du système mondial de gouvernance économique axé sur le capitalisme comme seule stratégie viable à long terme pour parvenir à une mondialisation équitable et favorable aux populations. La voie à suivre, dans le contexte de l'Afrique, est de poursuivre la lutte en faveur d'une société mondiale avec une croissance et une gestion économiques axées sur une approche favorableaux populations, afin de «garantir la prospérité pour tous et la sécurité humaine, ainsi que des solutions efficaces en vue de l'atténuation et de l'adaptation aux changements climatiques».

EDITORIAL

EXPLORAR SOLUÇÕES AFRICANAS PARA OS PROBLEMAS AFRICANOS

Thean Potgieter

A frase “Soluções Africanas para os problemas Africanos” ganhou proeminência depois da Organização de Unidade Africana (OUA) se ter transformado na União Africana (UA) em 2001. Devido ao desejo de reanimar um continente que foi marginalizado e explorado durante séculos em virtude da escravatura, colonialismo, neocolonialismo, desestabilização, opressão, guerra, fome, má governação e desenvolvimento socioeconómico, a supracitada frase, tornou-se num mantra para os decisores políticos em África (UA 2013: 34). A preocupação com os desafios enfrentados pelo continente tem contribuído para “soluções Africanas para os problemas Africanos para mostrar que a África tem simultaneamente capacidade e determinação para resolver problemas” (Lobakeng 2017:1). Isto é relevante para questões abrangentes, desde o desenvolvimento, educação e saúde até à paz e segurança. Isto conjuga a política de amálgama com ação; colocando ênfase no orgulho, indignidade, autossuficiência, apropriação e responsabilidade (Nathan 2013: 48-49). Consequentemente, o consenso sobre a integração continental como parte da solução está também a crescer entre os decisores políticos, académicos, analistas e a sociedade civil. No entanto, a ênfase nas soluções africanas, e o facto de ser imperativo para as nações africanas forjar um caminho independente para a prosperidade e o bem-estar económico, não é uma ideia recente e constituiu uma forte força motivadora por detrás dos primeiros movimentos panafricanos. Em 1897, Henry Sylvester-Williams (estudante de direito de Trinidad e Tobago na Grã-Bretanha), Alice Kinloch (de Kimberley, África do Sul) e Thomas J. Thompson (estudante de direito da Serra Leoa na Grã-Bretanha) fundaram a Associação Africana (mais tarde a Associação Pan-Africana), com o objetivo de estimular a unidade entre os Africanos e os de descendência Africana. Em Julho de 1900, a primeira Conferência Pan-Africana foi organizada na Câmara Municipal de Westminster, Londres (Killingray 2012:394 e 401). Isto poderia ser considerado como uma utilização inicial significativa do termo Pan-Africano e um esforço inicial para unir a voz de pessoas de toda a África e da diáspora. Como um sucesso inicial do Pan-Africanismo moderno, a iniciativa tornou-se um projeto para muitos movimentos anticolonialistas durante o século XX (Anyoku e Anani-Isaac 2019). Durante o século XX, a busca da independência das autoridades coloniais continuou e, em 1958, a então recém- independente República do Gana acolheu em Acra o Congresso de Todos os Povos Africanos. Este foi um grande sucesso e inspirou mais lutas pela independência e autodeterminação em África. Contudo, no contexto da Guerra Fria da era mundial após a Segunda Guerra Mundial, os ideais dos Estados Africanos independentes não-alinhados que estavam unidos política e economicamente, foram rapidamente usurpados por grandes políticas de poder e relações neocoloniais (Mbeki 1998; Anyoku e Anani-Isaac 2019).

Os sonhos dos visionários Africanos progressistas de há mais de um século resistiram, e após o fim da Guerra Fria as suas ideias receberam um novo ímpeto. Infelizmente, porém, nos anos 90 foram também fomentados pela incapacidade do conteúdo e pelo fracasso da comunidade internacional em lidar eficazmente com conflitos violentos, no rescaldo do genocídio devastador no Ruanda, bem como do colapso do Estado na Somália. Os líderes Africanos decidiram desenvolver soluções indígenas para os problemas emergentes no continente e acabar com a dependência de serem resgatados pela ONU em situações calamitosas (Apuuli 2012; e Nathan 2013:49). Em 2001, com a criação da UA, a ideia de soluções Africanas para os problemas Africanos cativou os decisores políticos à medida que os líderes Africanos reconheciam que o flagelo dos conflitos "constitui um grande obstáculo ao desenvolvimento socioeconómico do continente" e de que era necessário "promover a paz, segurança e estabilidade como pré-requisito" para o desenvolvimento e a integração (UA 2000: 3). Isto foi baseado no reconhecimento de que, devido à sua abordagem não intervencionista, a OUA falhou na área da resolução de conflitos e uma cultura de indiferença foi cultivada nas relações internacionais entre países Africanos. Com o estabelecimento da UA, foi adotada uma posição muito mais intervencionista, e foram criadas instituições e quadros regulamentares significativos para enfrentar os desafios da paz e da segurança, com alguns Estados e líderes a contribuírem efetivamente para a procura de formas de pôr fim às crises (Lobakeng 2017:7). A UA é mais robusta do que a sua antecessora, com mandatos melhorados para soluções coordenadas aos desafios continentais e um enfoque de respeito pelos princípios democráticos, direitos humanos, Estado de direito e boa governação (Apuuli 2012; e Ani 2018).

No início do século XXI, as ideias em torno de uma Renascença Africana foram fortemente articuladas. Isto emanou de Thabo Mbeki, um ex-presidente Sul-Africano, que salientou que a África tem o "legítimo direito de pensar que tem a capacidade de se libertar da opressiva herança histórica de pobreza, fome, atraso e marginalização" e os esforços "para assegurar a restauração … de paz, estabilidade, prosperidade, e criatividade intelectual, irão e deverão ser bem-sucedidos!" (Mbeki 1998). Ele colocou muita ênfase no estabelecimento e manutenção da democracia, boa governação, transparência e responsabilidade para limitar a corrupção e o abuso de poder. De relevância é a discrepância entre a realização de eleições e a perpetuação de um regime autoritário, uma vez que algumas eleições podem não conduzir necessariamente "a uma democracia liberal". Os governos eleitos abusaram dos "direitos individuais e privaram as pessoas de liberdade" (Solomon 2015:46-47), ou como o caso da Costa do Marfim demonstrou em 2010, os líderes podem recusar-se a aceitar os resultados eleitorais. Após a subsequente mediação da UA ter falhado, o envolvimento internacional produziu um resultado (Lobakeng 2017:3).

Nas suas reflexões sobre a Renascença Africana, Mbeki também destacou a segurança regional, a paz e a estabilidade, a prevenção e a resolução de conflitos e a criação de capacidades regionais para o estabelecimento e manutenção da paz; afirmando que a estabilidade e políticas económicas sólidas estimularão o crescimento económico (Mbeki 1998). Embora a África seja flagelada por várias ameaças tradicionais e não tradicionais à segurança, a arquitetura de segurança da UA tem contribuído para promover a paz e a segurança no continente (Solomon 2015:45). Mais uma vez, como Mbeki já tinha indicado há mais de duas décadas, a integração económica regional, acordos de comércio global equitativos, uma futura zona de comércio livre e o desenvolvimento de infraestruturas contribuirão em conjunto para reduzir a pobreza e o desemprego, o acesso a uma boa educação, cuidados de saúde adequados, habitação decente, bem como água potável e saneamento. Mbeki colocou ênfase na criação de uma sociedade não racial e não sexista ("a emancipação genuína e generalizada das mulheres") e na defesa e promoção dos direitos humanos; indicando que em África devemos "cumprir as nossas responsabilidades para connosco próprios" e no processo cooperar "com todas as nações para enfrentar desafios comuns" (Mbeki 1998). No contexto geopolítico Africano, estas ideias conduziram à criação da Nova Parceria para o Desenvolvimento de África (NEPAD) em 2001. Trata-se de uma ambiciosa iniciativa multilateral de desenvolvimento na qual a NEPAD personifica a noção de soluções Africanas para os problemas Africanos, por impulsionar o crescimento e desenvolvimento inclusivo da África num mundo globalizado, fechar o fosso existente entre países em desenvolvimento e os desenvolvidos, e erradicar a pobreza (Anyoku e Anani-Isaac 2019). Em suma, é tempo de os Africanos pegarem nas coisas com as suas próprias mãos e fazerem uso dos seus recursos para resolver os problemas de África.

A noção de soluções Africanas para os problemas Africanos resultou num debate considerável entre especialistas, sociedade civil e estudantes de assuntos Africanos. As opiniões vão desde perspetivas pessimistas de que o continente enfrenta demasiados desafios em comparação com a sua capacidade limitada e restrições financeiras para ser capaz de mobilizar recursos suficientes para resolver problemas, que os líderes Africanos muitas vezes não agem com uma só voz quando respondem a crises, e que os mesmos ignoram frequentemente comportamentos inaceitáveis por parte de outros líderes (Lobakeng 2017:5). Em resultado disso, alguns analistas são da opinião de que "soluções apropriadas para os problemas Africanos" devem ser o foco. Seja como for, é importante não contribuir para a marginalização dos esforços continentais e reconhecer que os problemas são complexos, transversais e variados, e não podem ser separados de um contexto específico (Fiquremariam 2008). Na nossa busca de soluções, precisamos portanto de ter sempre em mente o contexto e desenvolver uma compreensão profunda sobre a natureza dos problemas. Ao desenvolver ideias sobre a melhor forma de abordar problemas específicos, precisamos de reconhecer quais as ações que são aceitáveis e práticas, tendo em conta as realidades financeiras e o contexto Africano.

Uma vez que alguns problemas não são apenas problemas Africanos, seria necessário um maior envolvimento global para partilhar o fardo da responsabilidade, obrigação mútua e responsabilidade. A experiência da COVID-19, bem como os desafios que muitos países Africanos enfrentaram com a aquisição e implementação de vacinas, é um caso recente pertinente ao ponto. Embora as infeções COVID-19 não fossem tão elevadas em África como em muitas outras partes do mundo, o impacto socioeconómico da pandemia no continente reverberará durante algum tempo e é desproporcional ao seu impacto na saúde pública (Banco Mundial 2020). Contudo, para além da COVID-19 e apesar dos melhores esforços dos governos Africanos, da comunidade internacional e dos atores não-governamentais, a África continua a sofrer elevadas taxas de infeção por outras doenças mortais (incluindo o VIH/SIDA, malária e tuberculose). Juntos, estes inibirão o desenvolvimento socioeconómico, apresentarão desafios de governação e ameaçarão a paz e a segurança - desafios que permanecerão com o continente durante décadas. Na busca de soluções, a boa governação importa, tal como a determinação de promover e proteger os direitos humanos e dos povos, consolidar as instituições democráticas e a cultura, e assegurar o Estado de direito. A governação não se concentra apenas na qualidade da administração pública, profissionalismo, eficiência burocrática e eficácia na prestação de serviços, mas também na cooperação entre diferentes atores a todos os níveis para resolver os problemas através da procura de soluções adequadas (Everatt 2019). Nas próximas décadas, a África viverá momentos importantes associados a questões relacionadas ao impacto duradouro da COVID-19, elevado crescimento populacional, urbanização, desenvolvimento económico, alterações climáticas, e competição por recursos escassos. Uma vez que isto poderia resultar numa reconfiguração substancial das paisagens socioeconómicas e políticas, precisamos de compreender os problemas, repensar os desafios, considerar novas abordagens e implementar soluções apropriadas para a África. Para tal, precisamos de provas de qualidade para melhorar a compreensão e o desenvolvimento de capacidades de informação. Mas a prova de qualidade requer investigação qualificada, ou seja: tomar o cuidado de aprender com o passado e a realidade atual para conceber ações destinadas a resolver problemas futuros.

Tal como indicado por Mbeki há décadas atrás, em África devemos "cumprir as nossas responsabilidades para connosco próprios" e no processo cooperar "com todas as nações para enfrentar desafios comuns" (Mbeki 1998). " Soluções Africanas para os problemas Africanos" é certamente uma expressão inspiradora, mas no contexto do nosso tempo, ela aplica-se em grande medida à juventude Africana, que irá dirigir o destino do continente. Precisamos de inspirar esses jovens com confiança e por fazer o que é correto. Temos de os armar com conhecimentos para poderem enfrentar os desafios do continente, mas mais importante ainda, temos de contribuir para que possam aproveitar ao máximo as oportunidades esperadas.

As contribuições publicadas nesta edição do Jornal Africano de Desenvolvimento do Sector Público e Governação {Africa Journal of Public Sector Development and Governance (AJPSDG) discutem várias questões únicas no contexto Africano, bem como as respostas Africanas a estes desafios. Esperamos que estas vozes forneçam alguma visão dos problemas e possíveis soluções para alguns desses desafios.

A democracia é um bom ponto de partida. No interrogatório dos défices democráticos e eleições na Quarta República da Nigéria por Al Chukwuma Okoli, Chigozie Joseph Nebeife e Markus Arum Izang, os autores indicam que a essência do governo está encapsulada na realização do bem público. Um governo democrático é aclamado como o mais adequado à determinação e implementação de um tal mandato. No entanto, esta não tem sido a experiência geral em todo o mundo, e mais especificamente nas democracias emergentes. Por exemplo, as sucessivas administrações democráticas na Quarta República da Nigéria deixaram muito a desejar em relação ao cumprimento do seu mandato democrático através de uma representação adequada e de uma boa governação. Uma série de eleições resultou em diferentes colheitas de supostos representantes do povo. No entanto, as condições existenciais do povo não foram satisfeitas de uma forma que justifique o facto de estes representantes governarem em nome dos cidadãos e muito menos representarem os seus interesses e aspirações. Os enormes défices da democracia a este respeito justificaram uma análise do efeito da democracia eleitoral na Quarta República da Nigéria, uma vez que esta não produziu os dividendos democráticos necessários em termos de governação eficiente e representação eficaz.

A contribuição de T.M. Ramodula e K.K. Govender encontra-se num quadro para o desenvolvimento do governo local. Os autores consideram que o estabelecimento bem-sucedido da visão do governo local para o desenvolvimento na África do Sul depende da qualidade das estratégias adotadas pelos municípios. É proposto um quadro para a implementação da estratégia para ajudar os municípios a implementar uma administração local de desenvolvimento. Entre outros aspetos, o quadro discute a dinâmica organizacional, políticas públicas, formulação e execução de estratégias, a estrutura organizacional e a gestão de desempenho. A estratégia do governo local é examinada como um meio para o estabelecimento efetivo de um governo de desenvolvimento como uma visão a longo prazo. O mandato político termina frequentemente durante o período em que as administrações municipais ainda se debatem com o planeamento estratégico e a implementação, algo que tem um impacto sobre o sucesso.

As disposições de governação das empresas públicas são contrastadas com a gestão do seu desempenho na Namíbia, por Ntelamo Ntelamo. A má gestão e o fraco desempenho estão associados às empresas públicas no país devido a uma legislação inadequada destinada a regular a administração dessas instituições. Por exemplo, a Lei Namibiana de Governação das Empresas Públicas, 2006 de 2006 (tal como alterada em 2015), não prevê a punição do mau desempenho. A fim de corrigir a causa e os efeitos da má governação, o Ministério das Empresas Públicas da Namíbia iniciou um processo de revisão da Lei de 2006; do qual resultou a Lei de Governação das Empresas Públicas de 2019. A nova lei introduziu alterações destinadas a melhorar a governação das empresas públicas, tais como a atribuição de poderes ao ministro competente para remover um conselho de administração ou um membro do conselho por incumprimento das disposições relevantes em matéria de governação ou de acordos de desempenho. Diretores executivos e gestores principais também podem ser demitidos se não cumprirem os seus acordos de desempenho. A Lei de 2019, no entanto, não aborda as consequências de incumprimento por parte do ministro competente em relação aos termos dos acordos prescritos.

O artigo de Collin Kamalizeni, Mohammad Hoque, Abdullah Kader e Hatikanganwi Mapudzi analisa até que ponto a liderança feminina afeta a eficácia organizacional, com base nos casos das empresas públicas em Eswatini. Isto levanta questões fundamentais sobre as perspetivas de liderança feminina e eficácia organizacional nas empresas públicas, e os fatores que influenciam as mulheres líderes na realização dos seus objetivos. Com base nas respostas de inquiridos selecionados sobre eficácia organizacional, o artigo destaca o facto de que a liderança feminina é eficaz se as líderes femininas aplicarem uma combinação de estilos de liderança transformacional e transacional, adotarem abordagens de liderança inclusivas, adicionarem informalidade para contrariar algumas das barreiras culturais tradicionais, e criarem parcerias estratégicas com os seus homólogos masculinos. Os autores sugerem, como exemplo, que mais líderes femininas deveriam ser nomeadas em posições estratégicas dentro de empresas públicas em Eswatini.

Duas contribuições centram-se na criação de um futuro melhor e de ambientes propícios. A primeira, de Izimangaliso Malatjie, é uma avaliação das capacidades dos facilitadores da Escola Nacional de Administração Pública da África do Sul (NSG) para desenvolver a capacidade dos servidores públicos para a implementação efetiva dos Objetivos de

Desenvolvimento Sustentável (ODS). Em 2015, a Assembleia Geral da ONU adotou a sua Visão 2030, que inclui os objetivos globais que são amplamente conhecidos como ODS. A Visão 2030 das Nações Unidas representa uma nova e coerente forma de pensar em termos de como questões tão diversas como a pobreza, a educação e as alterações climáticas se encaixam entre si. A visão entrelaça objetivos socioeconómicos e ambientais em 17 ODS. A realização dos objetivos globais pretende promover um desenvolvimento sustentável, ajudando os Estados Membros da ONU a assegurar um futuro melhor para todos os seus cidadãos. Os ODS abordam questões cruciais tais como pobreza, fome, desigualdade, alterações climáticas, educação, paz, justiça e instituições fortes. É essencial que os países deem uma atenção especial à inclusão dos ODS nos programas de educação e formação das escolas e Institutos de administração, bem como de outras instituições que oferecem ensino superior. Este artigo examina a história, contexto e significado dos ODS, explica a forma como os ODS ganharam relevo entre o serviço público, e é uma tentativa para determinar até que ponto os facilitadores dentro do NSG estão equipados para promover a implementação dos ODS através de programas de formação.

Peter Nyakalale e Clever Madimutsa discutem os desafios que são relevantes para a implementação do movimento verde em zonas residenciais em Lusaka, Zâmbia. O governo da Zâmbia lançou a Campanha Make Zambia Clean and Healthy (Tornar a Zâmbia Limpa e Saudável) em 2007 para conter a eliminação indiscriminada de resíduos. A campanha foi então renomeada em 2018 como a Campanha para Manter a Zâmbia Limpa, Verde e Saudável. Isto significava que os cidadãos e as instituições não só deveriam manter o ambiente limpo e saudável, mas também torná-lo verde, através da plantação de árvores e relva. Apesar da adoção desta campanha, as zonas habitacionais na Zâmbia ainda não estão verdes. O artigo visa identificar os desafios que têm dificultado a implementação bem- sucedida do movimento verde nos bairros residenciais da Zâmbia. Os resultados da investigação indicam que tanto o governo como os membros da comunidade enfrentam desafios na implementação do movimento verde. Por um lado, o governo carece de recursos para sensibilizar as pessoas e fornecer água suficiente às áreas residenciais. Por outro lado, os residentes são demasiadamente pobres para poderem pagar os serviços de água utilizada para manter as suas áreas verdes.

O artigo final é uma contribuição normativa. Jan Tlade discute a aplicação do valor ontológico Africano do 'ubuntu' na governação corporativa. A nível mundial, o fenómeno deste tipo de administração tem crescido exponencialmente como uma abordagem favorecida de gerência corporativa para reduzir as deficiências administrativas. Ao longo dos anos, os estudiosos têm desenvolvido uma série de quadros para melhorar o núcleo de práticas e princípios de governação corporativa. Dadas as carências de alguns dos quadros dominantes, a perspetiva 'ubuntu' é oferecida como um enquadramento alternativo para a aplicação dessa governação, sustentada por aspetos ontológicos e filosóficos Africanos. Este artigo explora a conceção, âmbito e conteúdo do 'ubuntu' para orientar as organizações Africanas na execução de acordos de governação corporativa.

A contribuição final para esta edição é uma resenha de uma discussão relevante acerca de uma publicação de Dan W.Nabudere (do Instituto Pan-Africano Marcus Garvey, Uganda) sobre The Global Capitalist Crisis (A Crise Capitalista Global): O caminho em frente para a África (Seatini Books), que surgiu há alguns anos. O autor discute as "raízes e consequências da crise capitalista global desencadeada pelos excessos da economia Americana". O resenhador reitera os fortes apelos do autor à reforma do sistema global de governação económica impulsionado pelo capitalismo como a única estratégia viável a longo prazo para alcançar uma globalização justa e amistosa para os povos. O caminho para a frente para a África é continuar a luta por uma sociedade global com crescimento económico e gestão centrada numa abordagem pró-pessoal para "assegurar prosperidade para todos e segurança humana, incluindo soluções eficazes para as alterações climáticas, mitigação e adaptação".

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THE DEFICITS OF DEMOCRATIC MECHANISMS AND INSTRUMENTS IN NIGERIA'S FOURTH REPUBLIC

Al Chukwuma Okoli[1], Chigozie Joseph Nebeife[2] and Markus Arum Izang[3]

INTRODUCTION

The contemporary global appreciation of people's participation in the determination of who governs the affairs of the state in the overall interest is observably the underpinning factor for the global celebration of democracy as a system of government (Igbokwe-Ibeto, Osakede, Nkomah and Kinge 2016). Cardinal to all democracies is public participation, at least at the leadership selection level by the instrumentality of election. This is essentially because democracy is a government designed to serve the interests of the public. Political scientists associate elections with democratic governance by arguing that election is the machinery that provides an avenue for the emergence of a constituted government. Also, elections have become an acceptable mode of legitimate political succession (Omotola 2014).

Separating election from democracy is nearly impossible due to their organic functional relationship. Extant scholarship recognises this nexus by affirming that it is through elections that the formal transfer of power occurs in all democracies. Besides, it is also through the medium of election that legitimacy is conferred on a government. Election depicts the social contract between representatives and the represented. This is to the effect that the electorate reserves the right to vote a government in or out at any instance of election (David, Manu and Musa 2014).

In effect, election has remained indispensable to the practice of democracy. It also constitutes a yardstick for determining and measuring democratic consolidation and progress (Powell 2000; Berouk 2008). Incidentally, while election is universally acclaimed as the quintessence of democracy, Nigeria's experience with elections has been rather disheartening. In fact, elections in Nigeria have passed for a veritable de-democratising factor in its democratic experience. First, rather than providing an avenue for the smooth and legitimate transfer of power, elections have been associated with untoward occurrences that have often vitiated the prospect of a seamless transition. Second, instead of bridging the gap between the electorate and their

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elected representatives, elections in Nigeria have largely lost their essential democratic essence and ingredients: (i) they are often compromised to the extent that the outcome does not reflect the will or wishes of the electorate; (ii) even when they are credible, elected representatives do not feel that they hold their mandate at the instance of the electorate; (iii) there is hardly any meaningful synergy between the electorate and their representatives in the aftermath of the election; and (iv) elected representatives conduct themselves in government with little or no regard to the yearnings and aspirations of the electoral populace.

It is in the light of this that this study examines the democratic deficits in Nigeria's Fourth Republic. The essence of this research paper is to interrogate the seemingly ironic reversals of democratic tenets in the processes of politics and governance, even as the country democratises. The article contends that Nigeria's experience with democracy has resulted in mixed results, since the country has not been able to establish systems and mechanisms that would promote and sustain democracy.

CONCEPTUALISING DEMOCRACY, DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT AND ELECTIONS

The term democracy is derived from the Greek word '*democratia*', basically designating a political system in which political power rests with the voting populace (see Adejumobi 2004). It is a form of government in which people willingly and freely choose their leaders through a free and fair direct or indirect election process (Osabiya 2014). In this system of government, the people enjoy the fundamental freedoms of speech, association, assembly and conscience, among others. In it also are such institutions as an independent judiciary, a free press, a competitive party system and an active civil society (Shivji 1991; Ognonna 2012).

Democracy could be used to describe a government that is based on the ideas of majoritarian rule and popular representation of the true interests of the public (Huntington 1991; Moore 1996; Roller 2005). It has its essence in a free and open society where individuals are free to develop themselves and where those in power are kept in check by a combination of civil institutions and procedures. Some of the fundamental attributes of democracy include: the rule of law, periodic elections, and a civic political culture. There is a popular expectation that democracy is a prerequisite for good governance: it should provide the material conditions for the improvement of society in terms of literacy, security of life and property, better health, employment, food security, portable water and rural development, as well as ensure political stability. The inability of a democratic system to guarantee the above is herewith conceived as democratic deficit.

Democratic deficit has to do with the inadequacies of the democratic practice compared to the ideals of democracy. The lack of democratic institutions and the poor capacity of existing ones to optimally discharge legitimate responsibilities translate into failures and hinder democratic efficiency. Democratic deficit implies that the values of democracy are lacking in a democracy (Dahl 1999). Democratic deficit entails the disparities between perceived democratic performance and public aspirations (Russell 2004). Roller (2005) states that democratic deficit can be the consequence of a regime whose rules, procedures, and institutions are unable to provide what citizens look for and aspire to.

Norris (2011) also notes that democratic deficit depicts a situation where the electoral system fails to satisfactorily channel the preferences of the voters. It has to do with instances where democratic institutions are falling short of the principles of responsiveness and accountability in their operations. It is this lack of responsiveness to popular preferences and democratic oversight that is known as 'the democratic deficit' (Dahl, 1999). Democratic deficit may be linked to democratic illegitimacy or irresponsibility occasioned by the distorted flow of influence from citizens to government through popular mandate, mediated by periodic elections.

The concept of elections refers to the process through which qualified citizens can participate in determining who pilots the affairs of a particular state or organisation, either by voting or by standing as candidates (Bratton and Van de Walle 1997). It is a process that begins with political campaigning and ends with the emergence of an individual or group to represent the public in government. Ibeanu (2007) states that elections entail the process by which citizens choose preferred candidates to run their government at all levels in an episodic framework for a specific tenure of office. It entails the process of selecting the people who would be saddled with the responsibility of determining who gets what, when and how in a polity through balloting, which entails making choices between alternatives (Lasswell 1936). This is to say, therefore, that an election is a formal group decision-making process whereby a population chooses an individual or group to hold public office in its collective interests. Elections are a major ingredient of modern democracies in the world.

THEORETICAL PREMISE: FROM ELITE CONTROL TO ELITE CAPTURE

This study derives its theoretical anchor from the elite capture theory as pioneered by Bardhan and Mookhariee (2000), as well as D'Exelle and Reidl (2008). The earlier versions of the theory emphasised the personal attributes of leaders, which aided their hold or dominance in power positions, while the new versions dwell more on the institutional framework of society. The political elite are usually located within the mainstream power structures of any nation-state and are responsible for managing its political and administrative affairs (Platteau 2004). The elite capture theory is anchored in the assumption that most societies are dominated by elites that are free of popular control and pursue their own peculiar interest defined in terms of power and self-aggrandisement. It entails a situation where a fraction of society has the power to make decisions which affect society, and these decisions usually reflect the interests of the elites rather than the wishes of the majority. General elite theory argues that the elite possess some qualities necessary for their accession to political power, such as consciousness, coherence, conspiracy and organisation (D'Exelle and Reidl 2008). Members of the elite are thus not only aware of their status but work determinedly to protect it with the use of exclusionary factors in leadership.

Platteau (2004) notes that elites perpetuate their dominance through land-holding practices, family networks, employment status, wealth, political and religious affiliation, as well as personal history and personality. This suggests that what makes elite capture so powerful and dominant is that elites exert their influence less often by coercion, and more often by moral claims and symbolic power (Dasgupta and Beard 2007). The dynamics of elite domination and manipulation are sustained and reproduced via the process of elite circulation. This mechanism ensures 'elite continuity, transformation and replacement' through which elites cooperate, compete and reconcile their differences from time to time (Higley and Burton 2006).

The elites in Nigeria's Fourth Republic tend to have kept virtually the state apparatus hostage through skewed electoral process and undemocratic governance. Democratic institutions in Nigeria, such as the legislature, executive, judiciary, and regulatory agencies, have been captured by the elite; thereby weakening the capacity of the state to ensure rule of law. This has resulted in a lack of accountability, unprecedented abuse of power for selfish pursuits, and personal aggrandisement, as well as crass misrule. The elites focus on control of political and state power to protect and promote the interests of their members at the expense of the masses. The consequence is antithetical to democracy for it negates the salient attributes thereof, such as accountability, responsiveness and transparency. This is a threat to democratic consolidation in Nigeria.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF ELECTIONS ON DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION AND CONSOLIDATION IN NIGERIA

Since the democratic transition of the Fourth Republic of Nigeria in 1999, elections have been aggressively contested. This is owing to the strategic place of such elections as a means of gaining access to the control of state power, which is considered by many politicians as a veritable source and/or sustainer of material wealth and livelihood security (Fadakinte 2013). This thinking has, over the years, informed a pattern of politicking that involves desperate competition for power; making the pursuit of state power a matter of 'a do or die affair' where the winner takes all, and the loser loses all. This situation is complicated by the character of Nigeria's political class, which is not in tune with the ideology of liberal democracy. To be sure, the dominant political class does not possess the requisite democratic ethos, such as tolerance, discipline and democratic temper, to engage in credible elections (Fadakinte 2013). Due to the desperate desire by politicians to win elections at all costs in order to enjoy the perquisites of power, elections in Nigeria have often been characterised by violent confrontations; bringing about outcomes that negate democratic consolidation and sustainability. In the process, the country, at every turn of elections, becomes crisis-ridden and prone to instability. It is important to note that Nigeria is ethnically diverse, and ethnic diversity constitutes one of the major sources of socio-political turmoil in the country. The situation becomes volatile particularly during elections, since communities pay allegiance to leaders based on their ethnical identity rather than their political ideology. As a result, communities easily condone corrupt practices, which ends up compromising the promotion of democratic processes.

The crisis of electoral democracy in Nigeria is endemic. Over the years, it has manifested in the form of excessive manipulation, monetization and structural emasculation of the electoral processes, with widespread irregularities and violence (Ademola and Adenuga 2015). This tendency has persisted across all elections in the Fourth Republic and has taken the form of widespread and illegitimate use of state power (abusive incumbency advantage) as well as money (vote buying/vote selling) to influence a preferred outcome in an election. This has found expression in heavy monetisation and militarisation of the electoral process whereby the electioneering experience assumes the complexion of a 'market' as well as a 'war' scenario.

Furthermore, elections in Nigeria appear to have been characterised by poor administration; often defined by a seemingly week and inefficient electoral umpire. The Nigerian 1999 Constitution as amended, and the 2010 Electoral Act as amended, have empowered the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) as the electoral umpire to organise and conduct elections into various political offices in the country. However, each election conducted by INEC has been flawed by the INEC's poor organisation, lack of accountability and transparency (Edet 2016). The weakness of election-mediating institutions such as the police, the INEC, courts, etc. has effectively reduced Nigeria's elections to mere periodic rituals; yielding little or no meaningful democratic outcomes. This affirms the position of Dudley (1982), to the effect that Nigeria parades weakly institutionalised political institutions which are incapable of handling pressures from the political system. Hence, successive elections in Nigeria have been generally poor as the electoral umpire (INEC) seems to have been heavily influenced and manacled by the vested interests of the powers that be (the forces of incumbency). This has vitiated the prospect of delivering on the task of conducting free, fair and credible elections in Nigeria.

By the above indices, elections in Nigeria can be said to have amounted to a contradiction of the traditional theoretical postulations that they are the fulcrum of democracy, which carries a premium of political representation as well as legitimising a government through popular mandate. This gross negation of the cardinal democratic principles in relation to electioneering in Nigeria holds critical implications for the country's democratic representation and consolidation. Thus, the achievement of the essence of democratic representation and consolidation seem to have remained utopian. Nwanegbo (2015) has observed that the manipulative nature of electioneering instantiated by massive riggings, diabolic politicking, violent electioneering, and vote selling/buying, among many other irregularities, explains why elections seem not have resulted in true democratic representation and consequent consolidation in Nigeria.

Elections in a democracy are not a simple transfer of decision-making powers onto the political representatives. This is because the mere possession of political autonomy and subjectivity by a voter does not always determine his or her credible participation in the elections. By this token, democratic representation entails people's government or popular rule. Popular rule entails a governmental process of defining, collecting, harmonising, promoting and protecting the general interests of the people for the betterment of life in the entire society. Here, it is the general concern and responsibility of all to manage the affairs of their society to bring about improvement in the quality of life through increased general access to the basic needs of life. But since people cannot do this all together at once, they do it through a freely "democratically" elected few called the representatives. Democratic representation can be regarded as a system of government that is underpinned by the perception that the people in any society should be free to determine their own political, economic, social, and cultural systems. Therefore, democratic representation simply refers to a political system where governance is rooted in the basic principles of democracy and carried out by individuals who are willingly and freely chosen by the people (Ogbonna 2012).

The system of government in a democracy is one under which the people exercise the governing power, either directly or through representatives periodically elected by them (Appadorai 2004). Thus, representation is widely seen as the pillar of contemporary democratic leadership. The implication is that the only government which can fully satisfy all the exigencies of collective civic life is one in which a majority of the citizens take active part. However, direct inclusive participation is only achievable in a small populated community and not in a highly populated and complex modern society; hence the necessity of representation in government. Simply put, representation implies the indirect presence of people in the management of their public or state affairs.

The above corroborates the assertion of Fairlie (1940), that democratic representation depicts that system of government where the powers are delegated to elected representatives, who exercise them for the benefit of the whole nation. Suggestively, democratic representation is the activity of making citizens' voices, opinions and perspectives 'present' in public policy-making processes. It occurs when political actors speak, advocate, symbolise and act on behalf of their electorate in the political arena. Several renowned political philosophers and theorists (such as Plato, Hobbes, Rousseau and Mill amongst others) contributed much towards laying the philosophical foundations for democracy and representative governments, advancing notions that public decision-making could be the responsibility of a few members of the community.

According to Lincoln's (1858) famous perspective that democracy is government of the people, by the people and for the people, the democratic regime provides a platform for selected individuals to represent their people because it is only by courtesy of such an arrangement that government can hope to attain the status of people's rule. It is to be observed that the essence of democratic representation is to enable the people to not only have a say in the management of their society, but to also effectively control how the state is run and what policy is implemented for their general good. Incidentally, there are indications that electorates have not been able to determine the quality of their lives as well as the fate of their state through democratic representation in Nigeria's Fourth Republic.

Democratic consolidation means an identifiable phase in the process of transition from authoritarian to democratic systems that are critical to the establishment of a stable, institutional and lasting democracy. Democratic consolidation entails strengthening, entrenching and institutionalising democratic ideals, values and virtues in a political system. It has to do with the avoidance of authoritarian regression; particularly through the institutionalisation of a credible electoral administration process. This is in tune with Linz and Stepan (1996:10), who assert that "democracy is consolidated when under given political and economic conditions, a democratic system expressed in periodic and regular elections becomes the only game in town; when no one can imagine acting outside the democratic norms and values." Democratic consolidation, therefore, involves the strengthening of certain institutions, such as the electoral system, revitalised or newly created parties, judicial independence and respect for human rights, which have been created or recreated during the course of the transition (Carothers 2007). Thus, democratic consolidation revolves around making new democracies secure and extending their life expectancy beyond the short term by creating immunity against the threat of authoritarian regression and building dams against eventual reverses to authoritarianism (Carothers 2007; Fawole, 2005; Przeworski 1997; Zakaria 1997). The implication of this is that election serves as a critical framework for democratic consolidation with ultimate regard for the rule of law (Frempog 2006; Sha 2005).

According to Diamond (1999), creating a "stable, democratic, effectively governed politics" is an enormous challenge for any developing country that has experienced predominantly political instability, democratic failures and institutional decay since independence. It implies a series of continuous actions and changes geared toward the replacement of an existing system of authoritarian and undemocratic rule (Yagboyaju 2007). Some other scholars view democratic consolidation as the process by which a new democracy matures in a way that means it is unlikely to revert to authoritarianism without an external shock or a process of democratisation that resists the tendencies of reversing or regressing back to the dark days of authoritarian military regime (Linz and Stepan 1996; Asiwaju 2000; Mottiar 2002; Jega 2007; Yagboyaju 2007). More specifically, democratic consolidation "implies the internalization of democratic culture and the institutionalization of democratic best process" by a polity that has successfully embarked on a democratic transition (Asiwaju 2000). Thus, consolidating democracy means reducing the probability of breaking to a point where they can feel reasonably confident that democracy will persist in the near future (Egbegbulem 2011).

Linz and Stepan (1996) posit that the key indicators of democratic consolidation include credible elections, and the rule of law, a free and active civil society, a relatively autonomous and valued political society, a functional bureaucracy as well as an institutionalised economy. Democratic consolidation prevails in societies where many of the prominent democratic principles largely constitute positive political culture. Democracy is consolidated when, under given political and economic conditions, a particular system of institutions becomes the only game in town (Mortiar 2002). It is when no one can imagine acting outside the democratic institutions, when all losers want to do is to try again within the same institutions under which they lost (Mottier 2002). As Jega (2007:6) argues democratic consolidation is a term which describes "a vital political goal for new democracies" and is about overlapping behavioural, attitudes and constitutionality through which democracy becomes routine and is internalised socially, institutionally, and even psychologically life. It is also relevant to political calculations for achieving success. Linz and Stepan (1996) earlier provided further explanation on behavioural, attitudinal and constitutional aspects of democratic consolidation. They explained that behaviourally, a democracy is consolidated when no significant national, social, economic, political or institutional actors spend significant resources attempting to achieve their objectives by creating a non-democratic regime or by seceding from the state.

Democratic consolidation could also be viewed from the standpoint of stability of the democratic processes with emphasis on regular and credible elections (Igbuzor 2005; Akinsanya 2006). Thus, it is important to state that elections are the foundation for any successful democracy and indeed its consolidation. However, emphasis on elections as a steppingstone towards consolidating democracy seems to be questionable, especially when taking cognisance of Nigeria's experience, which is so far mainly characterised by electoral malfeasance and structural infractions that detract from the merit of electoral democracy. And besides the question of electioneering, the outcome of electoral processes in Nigeria's Fourth Republic has left much to be desired in terms of the essence of the social contract between the electorate and their elected representatives, which is serviced by way of routine elections. The question, then, is whether successive electoral dispensations in that context have engendered substantive outcomes that leverage democratic dividends. The following subsections would attempt to proffer relevant insights in that regard.

CONTEXTS AND INDICATORS OF DEMOCRATIC DEFICITS IN NIGERIA'S FOURTH REPUBLIC

Nigeria's democracy is running on weak foundations (Adeniyi 2018). This is because the enabling structures and culture required to effectuate and consolidate the practice are either non-existent or inefficient. In effect, therefore, the practice has been characterised by both structural and functional deficits. For the purpose of our discourse in this article, democratic deficits could be seen in three different dimensions; *normative*, *empirical* and *functional* (Ogbonna 2012). From the normative perspective, democratic deficit occurs when political arrangements and institutions fail to satisfy public expectation and aspiration; this defies the expectation that popular political participation (mostly through elections) makes government responsive to the needs and aspirations of the people. The empirical perspective sees democratic deficit in a government in terms of citizens' ability or otherwise to utilise their civic stake in governance to make their government amenable to their wishes or interests. In the functional perspective, a government is democratically deficient when it is unable to generate appreciable popular legitimacy from the people. These three dimensions of democratic deficit have generally manifested in Nigeria's Fourth Republic.

The political elites and democratic institutions have failed to provide the enabling civil infrastructure for sustainable and profitable democratisation. Instead, cycles of civilian governments have been characterised by false starts, failed transitions, and recurring challenges to stable rule. Elected regimes have faltered over precarious institutions, factionalism among elites and pervasive corruption (Osaghae and Larry 1995). With reference to Nigeria's Fourth Republic, democratic deficits have been variously made manifest by virtue of the indicators considered hereunder.

Alarming poverty rate

The trajectory of Nigeria's poverty level from 1999 has maintained an unfortunate increase. In 2018, the World Poverty Clock ranked Nigeria top in terms of countries of the world with the largest concentration of people living under extreme poverty, as captured in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Nigeria's Poverty Level (2018)



Source: Sahara Reporters, 2019.

The above indicates that about 46.5 per cent of the country's population reportedly lives below poverty line of a dollar per day (Sahara Reporters 2019). This is unfortunate when considered against the backdrop of the country's huge material and human endowments. It only explains the inability of the various democratic governments in the country over the years to improve the general living conditions by way of proper needs-based authoritative allocation of values and resources.

Security debacle

Burton (2019), having empirically studied incidences of security threats across the globe, placed Nigeria as the fifth most threatened or dangerous country in the world in terms of safety and security indices. Table 1 is instructive in this regard.

This is also a glaring indicator of democratic deficit in Nigeria's Fourth Republic. Ensuring the safety and security of the people is the essence of government generally, but more fundamentally in a democracy, being people's government. However, the democratic institutions in control of the state's coercive apparatuses have by and large failed to maximally secure human lives and resources, hence the prevalence of insecurity in the country. This is instantiated by incidences of Boko Haram insurgency, armed banditry, militancy and a host of other security threats in the country.

Table 1: Most Dangerous Countries in the World

Rank	Country	Ranking (2018)
1	Central African Republic	149
2	D.R. Congo	148
3	Iraq	147
4	Afghanistan	146
5	Nigeria	145
6	Sudan	144
7	Pakistan	143
8	Colombia	142
9	Philippines	141
10	Yemen	140
11	Cameroon	139
12	Libya	138
13	Kenya	137
14	Burundi	136
15	India	135
16	Ukraine	134
17	Mexico	133
18	Uganda	132
19	Chad	133
20	Mali	134

Source: Burton 2019.

Infrastructural and industrial deficits

Infrastructural deficits include the collapse of basic amenities and public facilities in the country. This is amply exemplified in the near extinction of railways, as well as the colossal dilapidation of road networks, public schools, health and water facilities. Public power has been at its lowest ebb, with less than 5000MW generation capacity alongside intractable distribution and transmission challenges. Allied to the problem of infrastructure is that of Nigeria's poor industrial base.

The Nigerian industrial sector is virtually comatose. The Nigerian textile industry, steel rolling mill, rubber, woods, cement, fertiliser, ceramics and publishing industries were vibrant and internationally competitive in the 1970s and 1980s. Currently, their operational capacities are being dwarfed by the high cost of production caused by epileptic power supply, high interest and exchange rates, the influx of inferior and substandard products, a multiplicity of taxes and levies, and poor sales, partly as a result of low purchasing power of consumers, delays in clearing consignments due to existence of multiple inspection agencies at the ports, etc. The national refineries are struggling to maintain nominal serviceability, while the mega Ajaokuta iron and steel project has suffered generational neglect.

Heightened unemployment

Nigeria's unemployment records are colossal (Figure 2). The situation holds critical implications for human security in Nigeria. An integral facet of Nigeria's unemployment palaver is the issue of youth unemployment and unemployability. More than a half of the unemployed population of Nigeria are youth, most of whom are educated to tertiary level.

Figure 2: Unemployment rate in Nigeria from 2016 to 2018



Source: National Bureau of Statistics 2018.

The non-engagement of the majority of the country's youth in gainful employment has led to dire collateral consequences, including youth bulge, youth restiveness, and associated vices and crimes. The prevalence of these existential situations in the country speaks ill of the success of democratic governance in Nigeria.

Brain-drain and human capital depreciation

There has been a persistent exodus of Nigeria's best brains who seek better livelihood opportunities (Figure 4) outside the shores of the country. This brain-drain critically affects the country's human resource development index, as Nigerian professionals in diverse fields, especially in the health and education sectors, daily exit the country for Europe, America and Canada, among other developed countries, in search of greener pastures. About 5,405 Nigerian trained doctors and nurses currently work with the British National Health Service

(NHS) in the United Kingdom. This has aggravated Nigeria's physician-patient ratio from 1:4000 to 1:5000; negating the WHO's recommended 1:600. The irony of the situation is that Nigeria incidentally ranks so highly in terms of patronage of international medical and educational tourism.

Figure 3: Reasons for the brain-drain in Nigeria

Source: Isbell and Ojewale 2018.

Associated with the issue of brain-drain is the crisis of the education sector. The sector has suffered enormous neglect; yielding dysfunctional outcomes. This has pushed many Nigerians into seeking to study abroad. Hence, the number of Nigerians pursuing schooling in universities in the West has been alarming (Figure 4).

Figure 4: Number of Nigerian students in America, 2005 – 2016

Number of Nigerian Students in the United States					
YEAR	UNDERGRADUATE	GRADUATE	OPT	OTHER	TOTAL
2015/16	5,424	3,803	1,231	216	10,674
2014/15	4,770	3,339	1,198	187	9,494
2013/14	4,038	2,771	997	115	7,921
2012/13	3,707	2,551	953	105	7,316
2011/12	3,577	2,522	819	110	7,028
2010/11	3,772	2,454	799	123	7,148
2009/10	3,498	2,327	646	97	6,568
2008/09	3,513	2,153	516	74	6,256
2007/08	3,745	1,968	438	71	6,222
2006/07	3,569	1,820	483	71	5,943
2005/06	4,102	1,819	N/A	271	6,192

Source: IIE Open Doors

Source: WES 2017.

Incidence and prevalence of corruption

Corruption has remained a prominent national issue in Nigeria. Several rankings have placed the country among the top-most in terms of the incidence of corruption globally, especially within the Fourth Republic. Transparency International (Figure 5) indicates how corruption has persistently threatened to endanger the collective destiny of the nation from 2010 to 2018.

Figure 5: Level of corruption in Nigeria from 2010 to 2018



Source: Transparency International 2018.

From the foregoing, it is evident that years of democratic practice in Nigeria's Fourth Republic have not really translated into prospects of good governance. Concrete dividends of democracy appear not to have been sustainably realised. It should be pointed out that the whole essence of democracy is to determine and implement the will of the citizens in governance. The government is contracted through elections to carry out the functions of the authoritative allocation of resources at the instance of the people. Fulfilling this mandate requires the government to not only harness but generate resources to bringing about the greatest happiness for the greatest number of the citizenry. Where this is not feasible, democracy can be said to be non-existent, or at best, deficient.

DEMOCRATIC DEFICITS IN NIGERIA'S FOURTH REPUBLIC: SUNDRY IMPLICATIONS

Democracy is a system of popular control over governmental policies and decisions. For this to happen, a government needs to be responsive and accountable to popular control (Dahl 1989). However, there are instances where democratic institutions are falling short of fulfilling the principles of responsiveness and accountability in their practice or operations. This lack of responsiveness to the popular preferences and democratic oversight is known as 'the democratic deficit' (Dahl 1989). Democratic deficit is a great big gap where public engagement with political processes should be. To reiterate, a democratic deficit occurs when ostensibly democratic organisations or institutions (particularly governments) fall short of fulfilling the principles of democracy in their practices or operations (Rohrschneider 2002).

In Nigeria, the return to democratic governance on May 29, 1999 provided citizens with the opportunity to overturn the widespread developmental and political problems associated with prolonged military rule. At the same time, it brought hope for the improved quality of life and governance in the country. However, many years after the advent of democratic rule, the betterment of the living conditions of many Nigerians has been largely undermined by poor governance, along with its attendant socio-economic and political challenges. For instance, the Nigerian economy is currently characterised by the absence of economic growth and development; resulting in poverty, widening income inequality between the rich and the poor, disinvestment, inflation, de-industrialisation, mass unemployment and a debt crisis. Transparency International in its annual rankings placed Nigeria as the third, fourth and fifth most corrupt nation in the world in 2003, 2004 and 2005 respectively. Thus, the manifestation of corruption in all its forms has eaten deep into the fabric of the nation and has shaken it to its foundation and tends to turn efforts of democratic consolidation into a mere mirage. There has always been the use of violence or the threat of violence in the context of party politics (Jega 2014). The ultimate prize is the capture and retention of political power at all costs.

More worrisome is the trajectory of party politics, which has been associated with syndromes such as the phenomenon of 'godfatherism'. 'Godfatherism' is one of the biggest dangers to democracy today, and paradoxically, it only survives with government support (Gambo 2006). It has come to assume a dangerous dimension as a consequence of the systematic entrenchment of money politics in the country. It produces an unresponsive leadership and tends to negate all tenets of democratic process by obstructing candidate selection and even executive selection once a government has been installed. The activities of the godfather tend to reduce the legitimacy of government and void the electoral value of the citizens (Edet 2016; Odigbo 2015). In addition, the inordinate culture of profligacy arising from low levels of accountability, characterises governmental processes, led to abysmal economic performance and culminated into serious developmental misfortunes. The country's road, rail, electricity, water infrastructure, health and education institutions have been in a state of decay and total collapse. Other signifiers of democratic deficits in Nigeria's Fourth Republic include over-politicisation of governance and insecurity, the securitisation and militarisation of electioneering, electoral malfeasance, political impunity that smacks of disregard for the constitution and the rule of law, human rights violations, and the emasculation of civil society and the judiciary, to mention but a few. These indicators point to a bleak future for the country, especially as they relate to democratic survival and consolidation.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Democratic government is acclaimed to be most suited to determine and implement such a mandate. Incidentally, this has not been the general experience across the world's democracies. Successive democratic administrations in Nigeria's Fourth Republic have left a lot to be desired in relation to fulfilling their democratic mandate through proper representation and good governance. A series of elections has produced different crops of supposed people's representatives. Yet the existential conditions of the people have not been touched in a manner that justifies the fact that these representatives' rule at the instance of the people, let alone represent their interests and aspirations. Mitigating democratic deficit in Nigeria fundamentally requires an all-inclusive approach burgeoning from individual character re-orientation to institutional re-structuring based on the earnest determination to have a functional democracy where the greatest good of the greatest number is sacrosanct.

Going forward, elections should be free and fair in order that the public is enabled to select in or out the candidates of their choice into the country's leadership. To attain this, it is essential that nation-building and social cohesion become part of the key priorities. It is only then that the people will be able to consciously vote for their leaders and determine who occupies what position and who does not through the power of the ballot so that they can hold non-performing leaders accountable through same. This is because the essence of democracy is the joint participation of the members of society in selecting, usually through free, fair and competitive elections, those whom they wish to have as their representatives in government. In this regard, political accountability and popular participation are promoted to the extent that the public feel a sense of an inclusive polity where their views and opinions are respected, and their interests protected.

Furthermore, there should be adherence to the democratic principles of rule of law and to checks and balances. A state is democratic if there is devolution of governmental powers such that no single individual or institution has the opportunity to abuse power. It is therefore recommended that the rule of law alongside the supremacy of the constitution should be upheld at all times, in order to avoid abuse of power and all forms of impunity. Additionally, the empowerment of anti-corruption agencies such as the Independent

Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC) and the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) is also recommended. This will curb corrupt anti-democratic practices in the country. Similarly, a public re-orientation on the ills of corruption is necessary so as to breed, from Nigerian homes, a people grounded in patriotism. By the same token, the leadership and followership arms of the polity should be given some civic orientation designed to inculcate a progressive political culture capable of breeding up a viable and consolidated democratic entity. To say the least, there is a need for a strategic reformation of the key institutional frameworks of democracy. In other words, the INEC, the legislature, the judiciary, the police, the Constitution and civil society should be reconfigured in line with global democratic best practices to ensure credible elections as well as effective democratic representation and consolidation.

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DEVELOPMENTAL LOCAL GOVERNMENT: A FRAMEWORK FOR IMPLEMENTATION

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INTRODUCTION

Local governments in the twenty-first century have become centres for developmental agendas. This implies that they are now required to go beyond the basics of service delivery. For example, the South African vision of a developmental state which mainly focuses on economic development has automatically became a local government agenda (Koma 2012). The idea of developmental local government has been boosted by the emergence of municipalities as primary actors in global economic integration. This situation compels municipalities to develop their own economic development policies towards the promotion of the social wellbeing, growth and prosperity of local communities.

In recent years, South Africa has seen pressure mounting against municipalities for improved performance in service delivery issues as well as local economic development endeavours. Section 156 of the South African Constitution bestows both executive and legislative authority to the local government, an independent sphere of government. In this way, a municipality is allowed to determine its destiny and develop, implement and monitor strategies to accomplish its constitutional mandate or vision. This vision is often hamstrung by a definite five-year term of political office. This scenario, to some degree, confines the practice of strategy within a municipality to a political leadership and administration function during a five-year term of office and imposes limitations on the conventional approach to strategy, namely, prescribing a step-by-step approach of what ought to be done. Though the five-year political term of municipal leadership is a legislative prescript, allowing the local communities the opportunity to elect their representatives, it should not be allowed to interrupt focus on the long-term vision of a developmental local government. Political tenure often ends while the municipal administration is still grappling with outlining the strategic intent or vision and adapting it to institutional norms and values in the ever-changing environment (Dunlop, Firth and Lurie 2013). This short-term traditional approach to strategy results in more institutional capacity problems for municipalities. Subsequently, visions and programmes are deferred from one political term to another. It is against the above context that this study attempts to address what appears to the researchers as a distressing gap created by the short-term approach in planning. This article, therefore, examines key elements of a dynamic strategy ideal for realising the ultimate goal of a developmental local government. It then seeks to develop a framework for improving the interconnection between the strategy and vision of developmental local government.

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LITERATURE REVIEW

The meaning of the concept of strategy has not changed from its military origins to modern practice, including municipal domains. Its definition and practice hinge on the actualisation of the vision of an institution concerned. Both vision and strategy are organisational phenomena providing a sense of direction with regard what organisations intend to achieve and how (Vaara and Lamberg 2016). This section therefore discusses the application of strategy in of the pursuance of developmental local government.

Strategy applied to local government

The implementation of strategy involves a wide range of efforts aimed at the realisation of a vision. In local government, vision is often expressed through public policies. For example, the White Paper on Local Government (1998) indicates that a developmental local government is seen as the ultimate form of local government envisaged for South Africa, which can only be shaped through the best practice of strategy (McKeown 2016). However, literature on public policy tends to elevate public policy processes, and little attention is paid to the much-needed strategy ideal for the conversion of such policies into reality (Matheson 2009:1148). The irony of this omission is that the concept 'strategy' originates in the public sector, though mainly in the military domain (Vaara and Lamberg 2016). Although the business sector later dominated the scene in the strategy discourse, the meaning of strategy from military origins remains intact across multiple domains. Hence, the practice of strategy, even in municipalities, is always centred on the means towards the realisation of a vision or political ends (Nickols 2016). However, having a strategy in place is not enough; the issue is its successful implementation in bridging the gap between the current state and the future of the organisation (Hourani 2017). The municipal strategy has to be crafted such that it enables local communities to redress both colonial and apartheid legacies.

Fukuyama (2014) characterises the legacy of colonialism in Africa as unique compared with other former colonies globally. For example, in Latin America the colonisers (Spain and Portugal) managed to replace indigenous systems of governance with "authoritarian, mercantilist political systems", while in Africa the "colonial rulers succeeded in undermining existing traditional sources of authority while failing to implant anything like a modern state that could survive the transition to independence" (Fukuyama 2014:291-292). This left the African continent with weak political institutions that lacked capacity after decolonisation. The historical factors that shaped local governance, especially local authorities created for blacks, are classic examples of the legacy which Fukuyama (2014) refers to. Becoming aware of historical factors may not be difficult, however, a strategy to redress matters most.

The discernment of critical factors defining organisational strategy such as history is not taken lightly by military strategists. This is because there are underlying risk factors that are not so obvious and the ability to detect them is critical in "subduing the enemy without fighting" (Sun Tzu as cited by Pars 2013:330). Applied to local governance, to subdue the enemy without a fight implies achieving big results with minimal resources. This would require local government 'generals and troops' including the political elites and bureaucrats, to master historical and current underlying risks and future related challenges (war against poverty, unemployment and inequality) or complex governance issues in general. Such deployment should be explored with a conviction that the colonisers were serious about their vision of local government, hence they deployed highly skilled human capital (magistrates) at municipalities, as seen during Dutch rule in South Africa (Tsatsire, Raga, Taylor and Nealer 2009). However, this depends on the quality of skills possessed by those involved. Understanding this context places decision-makers or strategists in a position to make the right choices at the right time (Lake and Drake 2014).

In terms of policy provisions, the Integrated Development Plan (IDP) and a developmental local government have been prescribed as the strategy (or strategic plan) and the ultimate goal or vision, respectively. As military strategists would do with the effective deployment of troops, the same acuity is expected from political elites; including their administration when deploying the scarce resources at their disposal. Regarding such deployment, "the essence of strategy is choosing what not to do" (Porter as cited in Lake and Drake 2014:19). This particular emphasis on 'what not to do' should not be construed as a form of antagonism in the strategy discourse. Instead, choices involving 'what not to do' follow strategic assessments and deliberate actions to be avoided, as they may lead to the demise of the institution. The IDP process provides for thorough institutional analysis and this type of analysis should ideally provide answers involving progress made, underlying challenges, and areas that still need some improvement. Applied to the current municipal practice of strategy, the term 'strategy' is used to refer to the third phase of the IDP process, meaning a project phase which focuses on the issues that are ideal for the realisation of a vision or all items approved during the second phase called strategies (HSRC 2010).

In terms of the provisions of Section 152 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, five performance areas have been identified which guide municipal strategy-making, execution and evaluation, namely, democratic and accountable government for local communities; provision of services to communities in a sustainable manner; promotion of social and economic development; promotion of a safe and healthy environment; and encouraging the involvement of communities and community organisations in matters of local government.

Once strategies are in place, the deployment of resources takes place according to institutional strength. For municipalities, the Medium-Term Strategic Framework (MTREF) budget is developed and aligned with the IDP and budget costs and budget estimates. Legislation, such as the Municipal Finance Management Act (MFMA) and the Municipal Systems Act, places the role of the political elite at the centre of monitoring and evaluation, with a particular focus on the legislative oversight function.

Developmental states

Studies on developmental states tend to prioritise the national sphere of government, while paying less attention to its conceptualisation and contextualisation at local government level (Ricz 2014; Tshishonga and De Vries 2011; Caldentey 2009). Thus, to address this, the concept of 'state' is considered in its broader sense, embracing all spheres of government; namely, central, local and/or provincial. Since a state exists to promote the general welfare of a specific community within a clearly defined jurisdiction (Masca, Vaidean and Golgut 2011). A developmental state, by definition, applies generically to all spheres of states. Development, on the other hand, is considered a "social process by which humans enhance their wellbeing and assert their dignity while creating the structural conditions for the sustainability of the process of development itself" (Castells and Himanen 2014:29). The developmental state is becoming a frontier issue in developing countries (Tshishonga and De Vries 2011). Thus, the developmental state runs parallel with a new political order or development; a political order embraced as the best alternative to conflict and the oppressive systems of colonialism and apartheid. Rizc (2014:3) highlights critical issues to be addressed by the developmental state, including global economic restructuring, domestic policy direction (deciding whether to democratise or not), the human-capabilities approach (ideational and epistemic shift), and environmental justice. Erwin (2008:129) posits that in the process of development, a developmental state is neither a "stage in state formation [nor] a blueprint of governance." Critical technicalities that should not be construed as defining a developmental state which imply that there are terms and conditions for the successful translation of a developmental state's vision into reality (Erwin 2008). The state and its institutions are the primary actors in this process, which is predominantly state-led economic development (Musamba 2010).

There are three inherent actors in community development involving individual citizens, who, when acting collectively, are often referred to as the public or stakeholders when organised as interest groups: the market, the state, and all state institutions. Historically and currently, political ideologies are built on the basis of the degree to which either of these are embedded; namely, the community, the market or the state, in the development of society. A developmental state does not narrowly follow state-led economies or industrialisation, but addresses state capacity wholly, including its autonomous agencies (Arnold and Naseemullah 2014).

The concept of the 'developmental state' resonates with the advent of democracy in South Africa in 1994 and the term 'developmental local government' is used at local government level in terms of the policy provisions including the Constitution of the Republic of South African and the White Paper on Local Government (1998). Irrespective of whether emphasis is placed on national or local government, the term 'developmental' denotes that a concerned sphere of government must provide leadership towards "…rapid transformation … in economic and/or social conditions through active, intensive and effective intervention in the structural causes of economic or social underdevelopment" (The Presidency, 2011). From the perspective of the Presidency (2011), it also becomes quite evident that the desire to establish a developmental local government is triggered by the prevalence of both economic and social underdevelopment. Any intervention aimed at defeating underdevelopment has to provide for rapid transformation. Realising this, "…powerful, autonomous, and yet socially embedded state institutions" need to be established (Arnold and Naseemullah 2014:122).

In this way, improved state capacity is considered a catalyst for economic growth – a central theme of the developmental state. Notably, emphasis on state capacity as a key feature of the developmental state is not analogous to a state monopoly of developmental efforts. The effective role of the private sector depends on the state's capacity to manipulate private access to scarce resources through, among others, financial sector re-engineering, subsidies, taxes, concessions and high levels of lending (Swilling, Musango and Wakeford 2015:3). Strategies employed by the state will determine the productivity of the public-private partnership (PPP).

The characteristics of a developmental state, as examined by Leftwich (1996), highlight the terms of reference for those countries that aspire to follow the development model of East Asian and Southern-East Asian countries. Johnson (1962) concludes that "a state attempting to match the economic achievements must first adopt the same priorities as Japan. It must first of all be a developmental state – and only then a regulatory state, a welfare state, an equality state, or whatever kind of functional state a society may wish to adopt" (Musamba 2010:13).

There are other models of developmental state, such as in Latin American (Brazil) and Africa (Botswana), which propagated an "import substitution-led industrialisation and trade in natural resource commodities, aimed not at inclusive and sustainable development" (Woo-Cummings as cited in Kuye and Ajam 2012:52). This model is critiqued for having benefited the urban elite more than ordinary local citizens (Kuye and Ajam 2012). The success story of the early developmental state transcends political ideologies and dispositions which often dominate economic development debates. These range from a purely market-orientated economy to moderate and state-led economic development (Bharadwaj 2018). These dilemmas are well captured in the seminal works of developmental state scholars such as Leftwich (1996) and Johnson (1982), on market-conforming intervention and the notion of embedded autonomy, Leftwich (1996) propagating the significance of politics, Chang (2002) on the institutionalist political economy (IPE), and Weiss on the effects of globalisation on developmental states (Musamba 2010:13-20). These scholars premised their research on the role of the state in development, with particular reference to building a developmental state.

Critical to the evolution of the developmental state is Evans' 1989) concept of 'embedded autonomy', sometimes referred to as a 'dual dimension' as it strikes a balance between the retention of state autonomy (against state capture, corruption or any other illicit influences of elites in society) and embeddedness in society for soliciting opinions (and necessary resources) towards establishing a developmental state (Musamba 2010). To aspire towards state-led economic development in Africa is inescapable, as all colonial and apartheid atrocities were equally state-led. Hence, the idea of a state-led (economic) developmental state stemmed, among others, from the general quest for an alternative state to colonial and apartheid rule. Long before Johnson (1982), the father of the developmental state concept, could coin the term properly and popularise it, a developmental state was envisaged through the Freedom Charter (1955), later in the ANC's *Ready to Govern* document (1992) and the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) (1994). While the Freedom Charter is today embraced as a (public) policy framework guiding a democratic state in South Africa, the RDP went a step further by providing a blueprint, or action plan or programme of action, for a democratic state.

The six principles of the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) are pro-development and include an "integrated and sustainable programme; people-driven (embedded) process; peace and stability for all (political stability); nation-building; and development-orientated reconstruction and democracy" (ANC 1994). Guided by these principles, the RDP provided for five major programmes aimed at reconstructing and developing post-apartheid South Africa. Thus, building a democratic state, committed to a skilled labour force and economic development, promotes a form of state that is developmental in character. The programmatic action, as envisaged above, inspired hope and confidence for an alternative state to the apartheid regime and proclaimed its readiness to govern (ANC 1992). In pursuit of the development discourse, the White Paper on Local Government (1998) prescribes four guiding characteristics involving the maximisation of social development and local economic development, integration and co-ordination, leading and learning, and democratising development. Along with the principles adopted by the early developmental states, the latter policy framework propagates the significance of political will (commitment), local government specialised skills, and embeddedness in local communities and other community-based groups as some of the prerequisites in realising a developmental local government (Tsatsire *et al*. 2009). In reality, the transformation of municipalities to assuming a developmental role has not been easy. Pessimists questioned whether a developmental local governmental is feasible, especially with regard to readiness and municipal institutional capacity.

There are three possible root causes for the mismatch between policies and expectations; namely, as legitimate public hearings in truly soliciting public opinion may have been compromised; policies may be clear but hamstrung by poor institutional capacity to implement; and political interference. Sceptics base their arguments on both external and domestic factors of the international political economy (including the Asian financial crisis, 1997); questions the credibility of the developmental state model (especially the conventional Asian model); doubt as to whether USA foreign aid guided the political development of Korea and Japan or whether it emerged from their developmental state vision; state that the developmental state model propelled developing countries to liberalise their economies; while referring to the prevalence and impact of poor institutional capacity (weak bureaucracy), the lack of policy coherence, democratic regimes negate repression, and dilemmas of land reform (Butler 2010; Deen 2011; Fine 2010; Swilling 2008; Terreblanche 2009; Von Holdt 2010 cited in Kuye and Ajam 2012:55-56). Notably, the centricity of strategic industrial policy in the success of the original developmental state model mainly involving countries of East Asia has been overemphasised and settled in the past three decades (Booth 2018; Sen 2018). The big challenge facing those states and municipalities still aspiring to emulate the East Asian model of a developmental state is to develop institutional capacity at three levels, namely, the soundness of their policies; the quality of the prevailing policy processes; and the underlying political settlement (Booth 2018:14).

The reasons for the emergence of developmental states in Asia, Latin America and Africa (for example, Botswana), are not totally different from what inspires South Africa to explore a similar development trajectory. Where these states were successfully developed, it was not under static, but extremely challenging, environments (Masumba 2010). Hence, scholars do not agree on a 'one-size-fits-all' approach for those countries aspiring to the developmental state paradigm. Learning from the early developmental states, especially the East Asian countries, is not analogous to playing the catch-up game as per the principles of the flying geese paradigm. What is required is for municipalities to adopt an appropriate learning mindset (Tovstiga 2010:152). According to the few examples of the developmental state mentioned above, there was clearly an integration of governance and economic development, since Levy and Fukuyama (2010) postulate that dimensions of development, economic, social and politics need to be integrated in development strategies. Municipalities that are willing to employ the principles of a learning organisation will have to identify their learning needs, adapt accordingly in terms of knowledge acquisition, and apply new lessons pertaining to the developmental model (Viitala 2013). Hence, the meaning of developmental local government requires further clarification in terms of policy directives. Notwithstanding the lack of consensus on the definition of the concepts 'developmental state' and 'developmental local government', the researcher analysed the vision of a developmental local government through the prism of local government-led socio-economic development, using, but not limited to, Leftwich's (1996) six main features of a developmental state and the developmental outcomes as outlined in the White Paper on Local Government, to discern elements of the vision as a blueprint. Ideally, a developmental state is characterised by a determined developmental elite, relative autonomy, a powerful, competent and insulated economic bureaucracy, a weak and subordinated civil society and effective management of non-state economic interests (Leftwich 1996). Thus, the dynamic nature of the concept of developmental local government requires a non-quantitative method in order to ascertain validity and methodological precision and diligence (Glinka and Hensel 2018:245; Welch 2018).

METHODOLOGY

The research methodology for this study was purely qualitative; using a multi-site case study. The study followed an exploratory path, since according to Ritchie and Ormston (2014) it constitutes contextual research that enabled the researcher to investigate and capture research phenomena in accordance with independent interpretations by participants. Three municipalities, namely, Mangaung Metropolitan Municipality (MMM), Rustenburg Local Municipality (RLM) and Orania, were selected on basis of their competitive advantages. The sole reason why the MMM was considered for participation in this study was due to its community-based planning model. Forging partnerships with the private sector in developing local economies influenced the participation of the RLM as the home of the world's largest platinum mines. Finally, community empowerment and redistribution triggered an interest in the vision of Orania regarding Afrikaner self-determination. This study is concerned with inductive theory due to its exclusive association with qualitative research methodologies (Lapan, Quartaroli and Riemer 2012). It is important to note that 'genuine supporting evidence' drawn empirically does not necessarily constitute conclusions or findings, but 'can only lead to highly probable conclusions' (Mouton and Marais 1993:112). The meaning of the research phenomena was constructed by the researcher after genuine supporting evidence was drawn empirically from the participants who were not treated as subjects of the study, but participants with the capacity to make valuable inputs to the meaning(s) underpinning this study. This simply implies that the supporting data collected during the inquiry was used to craft conclusions or meanings.

Research sampling

The researcher employed non-probability sampling, which provides for the selection of research participants based on key features (Ritchie, Lewis, Nicholls and Ormston 2013). The population of the study comprised three municipalities, namely: Rustenburg Local Municipality (category B), Mangaung Metropolitan Municipality (category A) and the independent local government of Orania. Cases were carefully selected as to the researcher they seemed ideal to illuminate the research questions of the study (Yin 2014). A purposeful sampling, commonly used in qualitative research for the identification and selection of information-rich cases (Palinkas, Horwitz, Green, Wisdom, Duan and Hoagwood 2013:2), was drawn from key individuals and stakeholders who were actively involved in the municipal strategic planning process, the IDP and/or the growth and development strategy (GDS). These included politicians (mayors, councillors and chairperson of Orania) and officials. Data presented and analysed include the nine transcripts of the semi-structured interviews, and two written replies from the participants, who requested not be interviewed but demonstrated willingness to respond in writing.

Data collection and analysis

The researcher used semi-structured interviews for data collection as it accorded him the opportunity to unearth the information that was known in the past (O'Keeffe, Buytaert, Mijic, Brozovi and Sinha 2016). To ensure rigour and trustworthiness in data analysis, the researcher used a thematic analysis method (Braun and Clarke 2006). The secondary sources of data presented and analysed included the nine transcripts of the semi-structured interviews, and two written replies from the participants, who requested not be interviewed but demonstrated willingness to respond in writing. Guided by the principles of a thematic data analysis, the researcher became instrumental in the meticulous application of the six-phase method of thematic analysis, namely: becoming familiar with the data; generating initial codes; searching for themes; reviewing themes; defining and naming themes; and producing the report (Nowell, Norris, White and Moules 2017). From the initial web-like illustrations that summarise the main themes, themes were further reconfigured in accordance with the objectives of the study, as illustrated in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Reconfiguration of the themes



Source: Authors

Since this study followed an inductive reasoning approach, which entailed qualitative research data analysis (Costa, Breda, Pinho, Bakas and Durao 2016), this enabled the researcher to funnel text data from all data sources, as per the research questions and objectives of the study, with a view to uncovering possible solutions to current distressing local governance issues which are constraining the establishment of a developmental local government. In this study, the social existence, or reality, is represented by the cases selected. By using specific facts drawn from these cases, the researcher draws overall conclusions on the principle or theory of strategy as practiced within a municipal system (O'Leary 2017). The notion 'case' in the expression 'case study' denotes 'an expression' and constitutes the core content of research design (Rose, Spinks and Canhoto 2015:1). The premises, or a case within a particular case, do not provide generalisation as it focuses on a particular case (Thomas 2014). Despite the geographical factors involving distances between selected case studies, the researcher preferred face-to-face interviews (Morgan and Harmon 2001). In this way, for the purposes of more in-depth data collection, the researcher predominantly used unstructured interviews (Thomas 2016). Throughout the data collection process, the research participants were allowed to dominate the discussions in sharing their stories. All interviews were audio-taped and transcribed. With the vision of a developmental local government clearly outlined by the relevant policy prescripts, the researcher, therefore, perused relevant policy documents, reports and speeches as secondary sources of data to investigate whether municipal strategy interacts with vision. These secondary sources of data were juxtaposed with the relevant literature to enhance the constructs of internal validity, external validity, and reliability. In the main, these accuracies and feasibilities were verified during the interviews with the participants. Therefore, the key findings of the study took as the form presented in Figure 1.

KEY FINDINGS

Vision

In all three cases, there is a corporate vision describing a desired future state. The participants of the study attested that the vision of their respective institutions provides a sense of direction to all elements of the local community. These include multi-party democracies in two of the cases (RLM and MMM) under the auspices of the same ruling party (ANC), and a one-party system (Orania Movement) in the other case (Orania). Despite their differences in terms of political orientation, another critical dimension involving the visions of the case study municipalities is that they are founded upon certain provisions of the Constitution of Republic of South Africa (1996). Although Chapter 7 of the Constitution provides a template for an ideal local government or municipality (including RLM and MMM) in South Africa, it is specifically Section 235 that gives effect to the right to self-determination, or the legitimacy of the 'Whites only' case in propagating Afrikaner self-determination. It is a widely accepted norm within the public sector that the notion 'vision' is subject to a thicket of legislation. The participants confirmed the constitutionality of their institutions' visions as follows:

> "Consideration of municipality's role in terms of its constitutional powers and functions in the interest of socio-economic development" (RLM1).

> "…constitution was adopted to see that the idea of self-determination should be part of it" (Orania1).

> "…fulfilling their [municipalities] constitutional mandate in ensuring that through an inclusive economic growth and shared prosperity…" (MMM).

Regarding Orania's stance on the vision of a developmental local government, one participant (Orania2) believed they are the best model to be followed by other municipalities. However, to avoid a simplistic approach and narrow comparisons between the cases in relation to their developmental local government status, Leftwich's (1996) six defining features of a developmental state were revisited.

This is because, at surface level, it may seem quite simple to discern the incorporation of the key elements of the vision of developmental local government in municipal strategies, although with noticeable similarities and variations. The similarities and variations in terms of the state of the three cases in relation to the key features of developmental state are summarised in Table 1.

Table 1: Features of the development state in selected cases

Features of aspired developmental state	RLM	Orania	MMM
Determined developmental elite	Determination shown through initiatives such as Mayoral Stakeholder Engagement Committee (MSECO), promoting private sector involvement in community development.	Highly determined political leadership striving for total self-substance, owning almost everything including own currency (ora - Orania money).	Socio-economic development is characterised as everybody's business, hence the leadership pioneered community-based planning.
Relative autonomy	Concerns of political interference raised	Relative autonomy providing for a free-market system	Political interference compromises the autonomy of the administration
A powerful, competent and insulated economic bureaucracy	No form of economic bureaucracy initiated, or municipal entity established to promote local economic development. This gap is filled by the LED unit.	Albeit the *Spaar and Kredit Bank* (OSK) – largest cooperative bank in South Africa, is a form of economic bureaucracy, it is not established by the independent local government of Orania. It is rather community-based.	No form of economic bureaucracy initiated, though there is a suggestion to re-establish an LED unit this way
Weak and subordinated civil society	A strong, highly politicised civil society with an inherent legacy of defiance (non-payment of municipal services, civil unrest)	The one-party political system of Orania epitomises a form of weakened and subordinated civil society	A strong, highly politicised civil society with an inherent legacy of defiance, manifested in the form of episodic civil unrest and non-payment of municipal services

Features of aspired developmental state	**RLM**	**Orania**	**MMM**
Effective management of non-state economic interests	Power (executive and legislative) and autonomy is enshrined in the Constitution and related local government statutes – this particular attribute is there but what is not clear is effective management of private economic interests.	Operates as an independent state for Afrikaners (Volkstaat) which always for a free-market system – that is, the role of the municipality is minimal in managing private economic interests	Power (executive and legislative) and autonomy is enshrined in the Constitution and related local government statutes – however, allegations of a distorted property market presupposes poor management of private economic interests.
Repression, legitimacy and performance	While repression becomes obsolete in a free and democratic society, legitimacy and performance comprise a lack of confidence in the local authority and weak institutional capacity, respectively. Despite the approval of a performance management system, poor implementation remains a problem.	Due to the one-party system, legitimacy is high with no formal repression and poor performance reported.	While repression becomes obsolete in a free and democratic society, legitimacy and performance are comprised by a lack of confidence in the local authority and weak institutional capacity, respectively, including failure to introduce a performance management system
*This simplified assessment of the elements of the vision of a developmental state for selected cases shows that the local government situation is very unique, and may require peculiar institutions and approaches in turning the latter vision into reality – perhaps a developmental model adapted to the municipal state within the dictates of the relevant legislation.			

The discussions in Table 1 compare the attributes of the traditional developmental state with the elements of developmental local government in the three cases. These attributes might have been tried and tested by the pioneers of the developmental state but need to be fully explored at the level of the local sphere of government. It is for this reason that the East Asian model, or the "flying geese paradigm" – that is, trying to catch-up by literally replicating what the early industrialisers did when grafting their developmental path, cannot be applied generically. However, from Leftwich's (1996) characteristics of a developmental state as presented in the first column of Table1, normative guidelines in facilitating the establishment of a developmental local government are presented.

The RLM and the MMM participants further highlighted the factors impeding the effective implementation of the vision of a developmental local government as involving a plethora of negative issues: financial constraints, resistance to change, working in silos, political interference, corruption, maligned deployment, non-payment of municipal services, red tape, understaffed critical departments (IDP and LED), skewed development, lack of a performance management system, lack of accountability, malicious compliance with legislative prescripts (especially public participation), poverty, unemployment, victimisation, hegemony of the liberation movement or ruling party, more people claiming indigence, no sense of urgency, failure to access untapped grants, and misconceptions.

These factors emerged as common denominators in the RLM and the MMM, perhaps due to their seminaries on governance systems and leadership styles as they are both led by one political party (ANC). According to the participants of Orania, the main reason why the attributes of the traditional developmental state are not evident in South African communities is due to their failure to manage their own economies. To the participants of Orania, economic development is an elementary local governance issue. Therefore, the study gives effect to the findings of Booysen (2014) on negative public perceptions of the current state of public service in South Africa. It further corroborates the apparent lack of confidence in the local sphere of government, as discussed in the LGTAS (2009).

Notably, the incorporation of a municipal vision in the political vision of the government of the day is a normative issue (Fukuyama, 2013). This is quite evident in Orania, as the political leadership of the Orania Movement dictates the developmental path that the municipality should take. The same applies to the influence of the ruling party (ANC) at both the RLM and the MMM level. This is reminiscent of the institutionalisation of racial segregation by municipalities during state repression.

Orania professes its right to self-determination as bestowed to a municipality "to govern, on its own initiative, the local government affairs of its community, [and] is subject to national and provincial legislation, as provided for in the Constitution" – espoused in section 151(3) of the Constitution of Republic of South Africa. Notably, although the latter constitutional provision, read in conjunction with Chapter 7 of the Constitution of Republic of South Africa, is an overarching legislative framework for all municipalities, the participants argued that Section 235 constituted the basis for a common law municipality, i.e. Orania. Despite this, the final form of local government, even if it is initiated by the municipality concerned, as per section 151(3) of the Constitution (South Africa 1996), is envisaged to be developmental.

In terms of the findings of this study, it appears that there are no strong legal grounds to question the political commitment of the leadership in all three cases regarding the vision of a developmental local government. The basis for political commitment in this regard is worrying on two fronts: whether the vision of a developmental local government is clearly defined and/or feasible in terms of public policy directives. There is an apparent legislative inadequacy in defining the objects broadly in the White Paper on Local Government (1998) in terms of how municipalities should implement the vision of a developmental local government. Ideally, a normal legislative process involving a serious governance matter, such as developmental local government as detailed in the White Paper, would not necessarily end in the form of a discussion paper or proposed policy directive like a White Paper. The latter is merely the second stage in the legislative process, coming after a Green Paper (first draft) in policy-making process in South Africa. Furthermore, deficiencies associated with a vision that seems inadequately legislated make it difficult to explain the success or failure of the three cases in pursuit of a developmental local government. Without sound policy direction, the enforceability of good performance and/or accountability may not be easy. This exposes a gap of uncertainty on the ideal South African model of a developmental local government. In the case of the RLM and the MMM, the focal point is the short- to medium-term vision (five-year), while in Orania whatever is done is centred on the promotion of Afrikaner self-determination.

History

The deployment of highly skilled human capital (magistrates) at municipalities, as seen under Dutch rule (Tsatsire *et al*. 2009), can be embraced as the basis for building a meritocratic bureaucracy, while racial hatred and separate development are iniquities to avoid. Likewise, the role of the liberation struggle movement as championing freedom and democracy is something to embraced, while its negative effects relating to the inherent culture of defiance of the government of the day as manifested in the non-payment of municipal services (the RLM and the MMM) and episodic civil unrest, need to be cast off. According to a particular sect of Afrikaners, as attested to by the participants from Orania, the demise of white minority rule was associated with the looming extinction of the Afrikaner folk; their history and culture and the fear of possible reverse discrimination. Hence as a participant from Orania indicated, this whites-only town was established as an independent local government (Orania1). Ignorance of the influence of history in crafting the strategy and/or vision-making process may impact negatively on local government. Regarding the negative legacy of colonial apartheid, spatial planning remains a challenge, while racial segregation takes a new form, i.e. a conscious choice by the people of Orania to be separated from the rest of South Africa. In the same vein, as an MMM participant indicated, the hegemony of the liberation movement, in particular the ruling party (ANC) is characterised as one of the main obstacles to developmental local government (MMM1). The recurrence, in the post-apartheid and post-liberation struggle era, of a new version of racial separatism (Orania) and the inherent dominance of liberation in local governance politics reflect how the past events shaped the future of local government.

Ethical leadership

One RLM (RLM4) was agitated by the emergent tendency of some local business leaders who consciously bypass the municipal administration and deal directly with the politicians to bend the by-laws in their favour. In the MMM, allegations of the distortion of the market in terms of property rentals were levelled against anonymous businessmen said to be working closely with some politicians (MMM1). These tendencies can be seen as early precursors of political decay within municipalities. Contrary to the elements of ethical leadership, unethical favours or advantages enjoyed by politicians and prominent officials were also lamented. These are either personal or partisan or both, as highlighted by the participants in the RLM and the MMM.

In Orania, political consciousness in the community regarding the development trajectory propagated by their independent local government is given high priority. Every citizen has pledged allegiance to the promotion of Afrikaner culture and self-determination (Orania1 and Orania2). According to the participants, this particular commitment is ascertained during interviews for residency and subsequent orientation sessions.

MMM1 alleges that ward committees are reduced to being branches of the governing party (ANC) as their elections are rigged with a view to dispensing patronage and thus deepening internal political factions. To overcome this, one MMM participant argues that ward committees "must be constituted of people from different fields of interest, like business professionals, like engineers, you know religious communities, you know civic communities, small business and so on and so forth. Because those people, understand that the needs of a local community…" (MMM2). Alternatively, as one RLM participant indicated, it is not only the committees (oversight and ward) that need to be strengthened, but the entire council of the municipality (RLM1).

Strategy

In all three cases, strategy (mainly the IDP) is employed as a means towards the realisation of a vision. Interestingly, unlike the RLM and the MMM that adopted the IDP as the principal strategic planning instrument in terms of the provisions of the Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000, Orania, although governed in terms of the provisions of common law, has also adopted its own IDP. One participant of Orania expressly stated, 'We have an IDP' (Orania1). Furthermore, beyond the normal participatory democracy involving consultation with local communities and other relevant stakeholders, as required by law, the self-acclaimed 'independent local government" of Orania employs consultancy services in crafting its strategy. But as participants indicated, the strategy-making processes are done in-house in the case of the RLM and the MMM, although with some complaints that the IDP units are poorly staffed (RLM4; MMM4).

The use of the IDP as a principal strategic planning mechanism might at first create an impression that the three cases are on the right track towards the establishment of a developmental local government. This is because the White Paper on Local Government envisions the IDP as part of the critical tools and approaches required for the successful establishment of a developmental local government. Their compliance in this regard further gives effect to the theory and practice of strategy which encompass whatever means by which the vision is achieved (Grunig and Kuhn 2018). The IDP starts with a set of guidelines called a process plan, especially in the RLM and the MMM. A process plan is prepared by the IDP unit for consideration and approval by the municipal council. The end product of the IDP process is a deliberate five-year plan, reviewed annually. Its five-year lifespan runs concurrently with the local government electoral cycle of the council. Notwithstanding that the lifespan of IDP is a legislative requirement, most of the MMM participants (MMM1, MMM2 and MMM3) raised concerns about the current practice, said to be tampering with the long-term vision when reviewing the IDP, especially at the beginning of the new political term. These participants believe that it should be regulated for the long-term vision and not changed almost every five years.

Performance management

Although the White Paper on Local Government (1998) highlights performance management as one the critical approaches to assist municipalities to become more developmental, the performance management system at the MMM has not yet been introduced (MMM4), while at the RLM it has been developed and adopted. However, there are concerns regarding the implementation of performance management at RLM; it has not yet cascaded down to all levels, and employees are still grappling with understanding its importance and adherence to the performance standards (RLM3).

In the case of Orania, no particular details were shared regarding a performance management system in relation to any of the eight departments (Office of the Municipal Manager, Office of the Municipal Secretary, Department of Planning and Development, Department of Community Services and Department of Engineering), but it is considered as invaluable for both the municipality as an entity and the local community. In this regard, the Bo-Karoo *Opleiding*, a vocational training and education institution, serves as a performance or high excellence centre. All possible skills development and training needs in Orania are catered for in the curriculum of the Bo-Karoo *Opleiding.*

Poor performance at municipal level mainly involves the failure to institutionalise performance management systems, or only deals with it on ad hoc basis (Peters and van Nieuwenhuyzen 2013). Ideally, performance management has to be considered at the very early stages of policy processes. For example, the ruling party in South Africa (ANC, 1992) identified critical issues to be considered to sustain excellent performance in the public sector; namely, ensuring well-staffed and trained bureaucracies, 'nationally coordinated training', and human resource development aligned with education and training – similar to what Orania does through the Bo-Karoo *Opleiding*. These are a few options that should ideally be part of a strategy to enhance the institutional performance of the local government. One MMM participant cited the example of LED as to why municipalities are failing to develop the local economy; that is, they try to do everything by themselves without playing a facilitator role (MMM1).

In the cases of the RLM and the MMM, a holistic approach to strategy may require the municipal strategy to cover all three areas of vision, guided by the principles of a unitary state in policy making. Their strategies may have to involve the following interrelated processes and elements; (1) municipal growth and development strategy geared to developmental local government (aligned to the NDP and provincial growth and developmental strategy), and (2) IDP (vision of the incumbent mayor/council) and bottom-up community-based strategies if these municipalities adhere to legislative requirements and the will of the local community as some participants reasoned.

The observation drawn from this study about the four sources of municipal vision guiding the strategy processes is the predominance of the vision of the incumbent mayor and/or council. The inclusion of the perspectives of other spheres of government and the local community is what some participants characterised as malicious compliance. In this way, the municipal strategy (IDP) is truly a five-year plan. Hence, a more holistic approach needs to be explored. Focusing on the local government as a system (holistic approach) propels the municipal strategy practitioners to concern themselves with the leadership and management of collectives or group activism, including how the elements of the system under review interact.

An approved performance management system that is not implemented, as seen with the RLM, makes no significant difference.

Distressing issues

A number of distressing issues were mainly raised by the participants of the RLM and the MMM, while Orania stated financial constraints as their main difficulty. In the light of the negative publicity that participants claim Orania has endured since its inception, there is scepticism as to whether their financial constraints stem from not receiving any funds from the other spheres of government (provincial and national); an arrangement that they orchestrated voluntarily to protect their autonomy. In the case of the critical analysis of the RLM and the MMM, the following conclusions can be drawn from the empirical study regarding factors contributing to their distress:

- *Reductionist approach to strategy:* this is what one MMM participant (MMM1) calls a ‘piece-meal approach’ where the lifespan of the municipal strategy and vision is five years, subject to change by new incumbents, i.e., the mayor and/or the municipal council. In this way, the vision of the incumbent mayor tends to supersede the long-term vision, where such a long-term vision exists. In the light of political interference said to be prevalent in these two cases (the RLM and the MMM), the municipal administration is put under tremendous pressure to win the approval of the council or mayor. This discourages innovation and creativity or strategic thinking.

- *Lackadaisical approach to performance management:* the vision of a developmental local government is a constitutional mandate of local government, and failure to perform in this regard may be seen as a performance management issue. If the upper spheres of government invoke Section 139 of the Constitution to intervene when a municipality is considered unable to fulfil its executive obligation, logic suggests that the same principle should apply in terms of failure to create a developmental local government – a constitutional mandate. Critical partners in performance management, including the Public Service Commission, the Office of the Auditor General, and the council committees (section 79/80), and provincial and national legislative oversight function committees and National Treasury, seem less interested in the vision of a developmental local government. Where performance is taken seriously, the focus is limited to prominent officials with a particular reference to compliance, especially financial compliance. A systems thinker may characterise this situation as analogous to missing the forest for the trees. This is perhaps the reason for the apparent lackadaisical approach to performance management, partially implemented in the RLM and non-existent in the MMM. Johnson (1982) (cited in Musamba 2010) implores those aspiring a developmental model to note that a state must acquire the status of being a developmental state before it assumes other roles, such as welfarism. Taking Johnson's (1982) counsel into account, municipal performance may have to be assessed in terms of how local communities fulfil their obligations, too. For example, both the RLM and the MMM are experiencing non-payment of municipal services. Yet, the affected local communities are playing a passive role in terms of their obligation to pay for municipal services rendered, or at least expose those who can afford to pay, but remain in the indigent register of the municipalities. In Orania, individual community members are poised to empower themselves to be self-sufficient. As a result, the maximum effort put in by individual members of the local community is yielding good results, including the attainment of a low unemployment rate – said to be almost zero by the participants.

- *Lack of consequence management:* with a wide range of corrupt activities or related allegations, the lack of a substantial consequence management system weakens the institutional capacity of the municipalities. For example, beyond the identification of those involved in the distortion of property markets in the MMM and those allowing big businesses to undermine the municipal administration, what restorative measures are put in place? What are the consequences for the culprits? This is a question to be considered in a designing a municipal strategy related to a performance management system.

Emerging issues

Community social investment tax

The concept of a community social investment tax emerged in MMM2's response to exploring alternative ways to fund the developmental agenda. It could also be seen as a creative way of generating own revenue. The funding of the local developmental agenda has been the missing link in the developmental local government discourse. This type of tax system is envisaged to be generated from the multi-million Rands made by entrepreneurs through community development businesses, or 'tenderpreneurship' (meaning business-people who live solely on tenders but they do not have any established business); making some developments in certain communities but leaving without any form of contribution to those communities. Once a community social investment tax is legislated, a community or common pool account could be opened, prescribing a definite percentage to be committed to achieve socio-economic benefits or any developmental agenda as determined by the concerned community. With municipalities and the public sector in general said to be on the edge of a fiscal cliff, it appears that an estimated 75% of municipal funds from own generated revenue (Fanoe and Kenyon 2015) is not possible anytime soon. In the light of this particular dilemma facing municipalities, one of the following scenarios is likely to emerge:

- *Continued dependence of municipalities on equitable share*: distributed at the discretion of the national government, with conditions that may not always be congruent with the developmental path followed by a concerned community or municipality at a particular time; or

- *Municipal authorities* are likely to concern themselves with operating costs such as repairs, maintenance and the payment of personnel salaries, and not venture into the developmental agenda due to the slow-growing economy and the lack of initiatives therein; or

- *The emergence of a social uprising* is a radical expression of a lack confidence in the local sphere of government.

More mayhem may cause municipalities to collapse if there are no improvements in adopting better strategies that can enable municipalities to bridge the gap between the developmental outcomes and the means at their disposal. The independent local government of Orania seems to have hearkened to the counsel of its political arm, the Orania Movement; that is, not to follow the examples of the South African communities who fail to manage their own economies (Orania2). Whether the analysis of Orania's movement constitutes the harsh reality that South African municipalities might have to accept or not is left up to the local government practitioners and philosophers to determine. In Orania, money generated in Orania is set to circulate in the local community. Furthermore, there is a bias towards local community job opportunities whereby all jobs created in Orania are for the local community as per the community-based labour policy. They make no provision for migrant labour – only locals may be employed (Orania1). It is, therefore, quite evident from the empirical study that there is no local government apparatus that could operate as agencies of developmental local government. Thus, an LED unit could be re-established to serve the role of such apparatus, administered as an independent entity, working outside the control of the municipal council, but transmitting the ideals of a developmental local government (MMM1).

Lack of continuity

Although the overarching goal of a developmental local government may be inter-generational, it has become the norm for new incumbents of municipal councils to adopt a short- to medium-term vision defining their political term. This short-term approach is characterised by a one MMM participant (MMM1) as a "piecemeal approach" whereby every new incumbent (mayor/council) introduces a new vision and a new strategy. Whether the apparent pre-eminence of the so-called piecemeal approach (MMM1) is by design or coincidence, it appears to be impacting on the long-term planning, especially at the RLM and the MMM. Although some participants demonstrated a deep conceptual understanding of the significance of long-term planning and a developmental local government, the missing link is the conversion of such an understanding into reality.

In Orania, there is continuity in terms of policy direction or vision due to a single-party system. As a result, there is no time for party-politicking. The promotion of Afrikaner culture and self-determination can be seen as an inter-generational theme for all councillors and municipal councils. A major contributing factor to their minimal conflict stems from the selection of applicants for residential purposes; as one Orania participant indicated, only those who subscribe to the vision and ideology of Orania (movement) are accepted (Orania3). However, the governance of the local community through a hegemonic one-party system is considered problematic in a multi-party democratic system prevalent in the RLM and the MMM.

Dominance of the liberation movement

Some participants (RLM and MMM) believe that the developmental agenda is overshadowed by the dominance of the liberation movement. Unlike during the liberation struggle, such dominance takes a negative turn due to political interference, deployment of senior officials and councillors with ulterior motives, patronage, alleged rigging of ward committee elections, corruption and deprivation of opportunities to those opposing or not affiliated with them, and intra-party political conflict and factions spilling out into local governance (RLM4, MMM1, MMM2). All of these issues do not only account for the lack of confidence in the local sphere of government but annihilate the hope of a developmental local government (MMM1). The failure to move beyond the liberation struggle issues and turning communities to a developmental mode were raised as worrying by some participants in the MMM.

Untapped grants

It is rather ironic that amidst a plethora of poor institutional capacity-related challenges facing the municipalities, there are funds for capacity building such as the Municipal Systems Improvement Grant (MSIG) that have not yet been claimed, as some participants allege (MMM4). Lack of performance resuscitates the initial thoughts propagating the coordination of capacity-building efforts at the national level as espoused in the *Ready to Govern* document (ANC, 1992). Although it was only the MSIG that was cited in this regard, other capacity-building grants to be explored include the Local Government Financial Management Grant (LGFMG), the Infrastructure Skills Development Grant (ISDG), and the Efficiency and Demand-side Management Grant (EEDMG).

Self-sustenance

This particular theme fuels the debate on the feasibility of the developmental state in South Africa. All of the participants from Orania embrace self-sustenance as the bedrock of Afrikaner self-determination and perhaps a possible solution for South Africa in pursuit of a developmental state. This shows that Orania invests heavily in the empowerment of individual members of family households, such that they are self-reliant instead of relying on the state for survival. For example, the Bo-Karoo *Opleiding* plays a pivotal role in capacity building to promote self-reliance. Those in need of housing are orientated under the auspices of the community house-building programme to build their own houses, and they can further obtain loans from the Cooperative Bank for other expenses (Orania4). Both the land and preliminary infrastructure for services are subsidised by the local authority (Orania1). The idea of cooperatives contributes significantly to the national agricultural output of Israel. In the case of Orania, there is already a concern that local communities are not doing enough in terms of launching other cooperatives in addition to Spaar and Kredit Bank (OSK) (Orania1).

In summary, it is on the basis of the foregoing findings that the development of a framework for strategy implementation could assist municipalities to effectively achieve the vision of a developmental local government. The proposed framework covers the essence of the findings including the challenges relating to the public policy directive, the primary actors in the strategy-vision process, strategy execution, organisational structure, and the performance management system.

THE PROPOSED FRAMEWORK

The aim of this study was to develop a framework for strategy implementation that could assist municipalities to effectively achieve the vision of a developmental local government. Particular findings of relevance in this regard include challenges relating to the public policy directive, the primary actors in the strategy-vision process, strategy execution, organisational structure, and the performance management system. This framework is therefore premised on the idea that a correctly conceived and successfully implemented strategy will enable municipalities to overcome most of the current failures and challenges. The framework serves the dual purpose of providing normative guidelines towards the realisation of the vision of a developmental local government and best practices of strategy in municipalities. The main objectives of the proposed framework as summarised in Figure 2 include the following:

- To help municipalities keep track of the vision of developmental local government;
- To delineate roles and responsibilities in terms of the defining features of a municipality, including the people, political and administration structures; and
- To outline the role of IDPs in the long-term strategy.

Figure 2: A framework for a developmental local government strategy



This framework as depicted in Figure 2 demonstrates a key legal requirement which should be met as a prerequisite for building developmental municipalities. Compliance with such a legal requirement is unavoidable since the clarification of key roles and responsibilities of each primary stakeholder, including but limited to the local community, political leadership, municipal administration and economic development stakeholders, has to be highlighted in the amendment and/or new legislation on building developmental municipalities. These stakeholders are not "armchair" critics whose contributions are limited to a mere interpretation of the challenges facing the community and apportioning blame elsewhere; they are actively involved in governance – that is, providing strategies and possible solutions in terms of alternative organisational structures and the necessary institutional arrangements towards the effective execution of the developmental agenda. Performance management should be the collective responsibility of all stakeholders to ensure that the municipal strategy bridges the gap between the means and the public policy end (a developmental local government perspective). The proposed framework provides a holistic and multifaceted approach to the subject of strategy within the local government system and is summarised below.

RECOMMENDATIONS

In all three municipal cases, there is a unique competitive advantage that distinguishes each from the rest. However, they all have to realise their strengths and use them as the premise to create a new advantage towards the acquisition of developmental status.

Rustenburg Local Municipality (RLM)

In order to expand its vision, the RLM has to take full advantage of its strategic position as the host of the global major platinum mines and its existing good rapport with the mining industry through the Mayoral Stakeholder Engagement Committee (MSECO). The greatest deficiencies characterising the MSECO's engagements involve their informality and that they are circumstantially driven at the whim of the incumbent mayor. In accordance with the findings, the establishment of a developmental local government calls for the establishment of an economic development apparatus; hence, it is therefore recommended that:

- As part of its growth and development strategy, the RLM should transform the MSECO into a more formal local economic development advisory council whose composition should be determined thorough a discourse of participatory democracy and principles of meritocracy;

- Such an advisory council should be accorded ample opportunities to enjoy relative autonomy in developing the economy of Rustenburg; and

- For continuity purposes, this suggested advisory council should never be linked to the political term but to the RLM's long-term vision (2040) and should account to the Council of the RLM.

Orania Municipality

While it is an indisputable fact that most municipalities face multiple capacity challenges to realise the vision of a developmental local government, the lack of success factors of a developmental municipality in South Africa makes the case of Orania more interesting. This is due to the fact that Orania's apparent best model of community development is built upon the principle of self-sustenance. The potential emergence of Orania as the best model of a developmental local government in South Africa is undoubtedly great but equally discounted for obvious reasons – that is, negative perceptions about it as apartheid incarnate. Nevertheless, Orania offers innovate solutions for developing local economies. Since learning knows no boundaries, the Eastern Cape's local community of Mnyameni has already signed a community development partnership with Orania as they contend that such a partnership offers them the opportunity to learn some principles of self-sustenance and rely less on the government-of-the-day. Orania should therefore:

- Develop its community development model along the ideals of a developmental local government as outlined in the White Paper on Local Government (1998), as a premise to assess its key competencies as a best practice model of a developmental local government in South Africa; and

- This may lead to the end of what appears to be silent animosity between Orania and other municipalities, which mainly stem from negative publicity.

Mangaung Metropolitan Municipality (MMM)

There are three critical areas that the MMM cannot ignore in order to improve its approach to strategic management, namely: the prioritisation of a long-term vision, the introduction of a functional performance management system, and the recognition of community-based planning as its competitive advantage. Regarding a long-term vision, it will become difficult to win the approval of all the relevant stakeholders in building a developmental municipality if there is no directional path – that is, the one approved by the municipal council and local community. Failure to adopt a long-term vision propels incumbent mayors and councils to introduce a new vision in each political term. This episodic change in terms of the strategic vision of a municipality breaks the momentum of strategy. Another missing critical dimension in the MMM's strategy is a functional performance management system. The MMM has to adopt a functional performance management system towards its transformation from the current state of distress to the realisation of developmental status. It will be impossible to realise a meritocratic municipal bureaucracy without setting high performance standards.

Lastly, community-based planning should not be confused with the IDP or public participation processes, but, as originally intended and practiced in the MMM, it should be resuscitated to give precedence to the challenges facing the local community; diagnosed at the community (ward) level and presented in the form of a clear plan of action on how to resolve them as per the direction of the community concerned. In this way, community development becomes bottom-up, giving effect to the Freedom Charter's principle that the people shall govern. It provides for multiple partnerships between a municipality and social groups in establishing developmental municipalities. Thus, the MMM should revert to its community-based planning model.

CONCLUSION

Taking into account municipalities' deteriorating state of distress, there is a need to revise, design a new public policy, or amend and implement ones that promote the vision of a developmental local government. Since the original intent to legislate the concept of a development local government ended in the form of a White Paper, a definite public policy is needed for the following reasons:

- The White Paper on Local Government (1998) discusses only the ideal developmental local government that was neither thoroughly debated for approval purposes by the parliamentary committees nor by the legislative authority itself, nor set before the state law advisers to assess its legal and technical implications for the local sphere of government;

- For the above reason, the enforceability of a developmental local government is compromised, the implications of which could be the reason why most municipalities seem to treat the vision of a developmental local government as if it is a matter of choice, not an obligation; and

- A major policy proposition on developmental local government, i.e. the White Paper on Local Government, remains an unfinished public policy-making exercise as it is still in the form of a mere discussion document.

Within the public sector discourse, whatever a particular organ of state does has to be legitimised by means of a public policy approved by the relevant legislative authority. The clearer the policy, the easier it becomes to structure the political and administrative instruments. Furthermore, clearly defined policy ends set the stage for strategic management. This is because from its "military" etymology to date, strategy seeks to bridge the gap between policy means and ends. The apparent lack of public confidence in local government might have pushed many local development stakeholders to the periphery; thus being aloof from the developmental efforts explored by municipal authorities; hence, creating a developmental local government as a shared vision by all relevant stakeholders will stimulate commitment and shared responsibilities.

The framework propagates the developmental state as concurrent competencies of all spheres of government: national, provincial and local. Concurrent competencies, such as agriculture, trade, industrial promotion, urban and rural development and municipal planning, need to be considered in the spirit of cooperative government, especially for developmental state purposes. These functional areas form the basis for other spheres of government (provincial and national) to consolidate the resources at their disposal in pursuit of the growth and development of local economies. Following this developmental path requires necessary policy measures to be undertaken. Such measures should be subjected to a robust participatory discourse and the consensual outcomes of such engagements should be promulgated. A legitimate consensus should at least stem from the active participation of civil society, the political and administrative structures of a municipality, and the relevant economic development stakeholders.

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CONTRASTING GOVERNANCE ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE MANAGEMENT OF PERFORMANCE OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISES IN NAMIBIA

Ntelamo Ntelamo[1]

INTRODUCTION

The promulgation of the Public Enterprises Governance Act, 2019 (Act 1 of 2019) (Namibia 2019) has been highly anticipated for years. This anticipation was underpinned by an expectation that the governance of public enterprises in Namibia would improve, and that public enterprises, generally, would begin to deliver on their various mandates. As in the case of other African countries such as South Africa, Namibia also hosts public enterprises, which are owned by the government under the umbrella of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), also known as parastatals (Fourie 2014; Namibia 2020). It is therefore a fair expectation that the government would intend for the public enterprises to be governed properly, and of course to achieve their objectives in a sustainable manner.

Unfortunately, the majority of these public enterprises have performed poorly throughout the years. As a result, there was a need for intervention, with policies that could boost the operations of these parastatals. It is for this reason that the Public Enterprises Governance Amendment Act, 2015 (Act 8 of 2015) (Namibia 2015) introduced structural reforms by providing for the establishment of the Ministry of Public Enterprises and a Minister for the same Ministry; thereby doing away with the Council and the Secretariat, which existed in terms of the Public Enterprises Governance Act, 2006 (Act 2 of 2006) (Namibia 2006). The above changes did not occasion a paradigm shift and positive results in the long-prevailing misfortunes in the governance of public enterprises. Hence, Act 1 of 2019 was promulgated with high hopes.

The enactment of Act 1 of 2019 was conceived in a twenty-two-page policy paper published by the Ministry of Public Enterprises (Namibia, 2019). The policy paper pronounced a departure from various models that had hitherto characterised the regulation and governance of public enterprises in Namibia. It singled out for denouncing at least two models; the decentralised and dual governance models. At the same time, the policy paper pointed out that the above models had failed to steer the governance of public enterprises and in the same breath determined that a hybrid model would be the best, in terms of which centralised governance of public enterprises would be adopted.

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Clearly, Act 1 of 2019 would repeal Act 2 of 2006. Briefly, the hybrid model introduced a classification of public enterprises into categories. Accordingly, public enterprises would be classified into three categories (see Section 2(2)(a)(b)(c) of Act 1 of 2019); namely, commercial, non-commercial and extra-budgetary funds (Ministry of Public Enterprises 2019). Of importance, and to justify the hybrid model, commercial public enterprises would become the exclusive domain and accountability of the Minister responsible for public enterprises being the Minister heading the Ministry of Public Enterprises. Furthermore, the Minister would, in a power-sharing arrangement, still be responsible for all other public enterprises (non-commercial public enterprises and extra-budgetary funds), alongside a relevant Minister, as defined in section 1 of Act 1 of 2019, and the Minister responsible for Finance (Ministry of Public Enterprises 2019).

It is confusing that a Minister is defined as the Minister responsible for public enterprises and again in another context as a relevant Minister. Essentially, the Minister means the Minister responsible for public enterprises, and the relevant Minister in respect of a commercial public enterprise. However, apart from the Minister responsible for Finance, all other shareholder Ministers of public enterprises are referred to as relevant Ministers.

While other considerations are important, one should not lose sight of the rationale for concluding governance and performance agreements. The objective is to achieve proper governance and performance of public enterprises in Namibia (Namibia 2019). Drawing on the experiences of several years to the present, many public enterprises in Namibia have been reporting very dismal performance (Kagueehi 2007). It is important to underscore that governance and performance agreements have become important tools to assist in overturning the poor performance streaks which have to date been realised at many public enterprises in Namibia. To succeed, the manner in which governance and performance agreements are crafted and enforced should be taken seriously by all involved.

This article focuses on certain provisions in Act 1 of 2019 relating to the agreements concluded between a relevant Minister and a board of a public enterprise, performance agreements signed by a board and a CEO, including performance agreements between a CEO and senior management staff of a public enterprise. It aims to critically analyse the Public Enterprises Governance Act (Act 1 of 2019) and to contrast governance arrangements with the management of performance of public enterprises in Namibia. Specifically, consequences arising out of non-compliance with the provisions prescribing the conclusion of the governance and performance agreements are canvassed in this article. Furthermore, the article is interested in the dismissal of a CEO of a public enterprise who fails to achieve any of the deliverables in a performance agreement concluded with a board of a public enterprise. In the same vein, interest will be directed at the omission from Act 1 of 2019 of any form of punishment for a relevant Minister party to a governance or performance agreement with a board, for his or her failure to either enter into a governance agreement or perform in terms of a performance agreement that has been entered into. The article argues that there are no legal consequences for a relevant Minister failing to enter into governance and performance agreements with a board. This study analyses Act 1 of 2019 to determine the loopholes and challenges relating to governance and performance agreements, and to this end it will conclude that there will be minimal improvement in the governance of public enterprises in Namibia.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF A GOVERNANCE AGREEMENT ON THE MANAGEMENT OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISES

In accordance with Act 1 of 2019, it is imperative that Ministers conclude performance agreements with boards of public enterprises. Section 11(1) of Act emphatically states that

> "The *relevant Minister must, within ninety days from the date on which a board has been constituted, and with due regard to any directives laid down by the Minister under section 4(1)(e), enter into a written governance agreement with the board of a public enterprise in relation to –"*

In addition, Section 11(4) provides that *"Failure by the board of a public enterprise to sign the governance agreement within a reasonable time is a ground for the removal of the board" (*Section 11(4) of Act 1, Namibia 2019). However, if read together these subsections (1 and 4) are irreconcilable for at least a few reasons; one of which is that subsection 1 provides for a timeline within which a governance agreement must be concluded. On the other hand, subsection 4 is ambiguous as it fails to subject the conclusion of a governance agreement to the same timeline already mentioned in subsection 1. The stipulation would bring clarity as to the exact point to subject a board to a dismissal where there has been failure to enter into a governance agreement. Having failed to enter into a governance agreement, will a board be dismissed after ninety days or after a reasonable time? Interestingly, in light of the failure to conclude a governance agreement *within reasonable time*, whatever the construction '*within reasonable time*' means, the consequence for such failure falls on the board, leading to the board's removal.

There are questions, the first being, upon whom or which functionary does the obligation to enter into a governance agreement rest? Subsection 1 places the obligation of concluding a governance agreement on a relevant Minister of a public enterprise, and it is submitted that such obligation is well-placed. This therefore begs the question of how a board falls to be removed when a relevant Minister has failed to ensure a governance agreement is concluded as Act 1 of 2019 dictates. Accordingly, any sanction arising from failure to perform the stated obligation must fall on the same functionary whose duty it was to perform the obligation. According to Section 11(1) of Act 1 of 2019, the following words confirm upon which functionary the obligation squarely rests. "The relevant Minister must enter into a written governance agreement with the board of a public enterprise" (Namibia 2019).

The provision is couched in peremptory terms with the use of the word *'must'* requiring no discretion but compliance on the part of the relevant Minister. It is therefore unclear how failure would be attributed to a board of a public enterprise, whereas the obligation to conclude the governance agreement is placed on a relevant Minister. It is, however, argued that although the obligation is placed on the relevant Minister, it may well be that the board does not come forth to conclude the governance agreement against requests or scheduled appointments by the relevant Minister aimed at concluding a governance agreement. In the above instances, it would be correct to occasion the removal of a board as it is in the wrong by consistently failing to avail itself. Conversely, if the board submits and seeks an appointment or platform with the relevant Minister and he or she for any reason remains unavailable, would the relevant Minister's availability to conclude a governance agreement be used to remove a board? It may well be that the relevant Minister, for inexplicable ulterior motives, wishes to exploit the provision to orchestrate the removal of the board. In terms of the above, the provision is not without room for abuse by a relevant Minister should he or she for any reason develop a dislike of a board. To achieve the board's removal, the relevant Minister would frustrate any attempts to conclude a governance agreement and the consequence would fall on the board, as the provision provides no punishment for the relevant Minister in the case of his or her failure to enter into a governance agreement.

Act 1 of 2019 should have provided for instances where a relevant Minister is held accountable for any delays or total failure in concluding a governance agreement with a board of a public enterprise. According to some legal opinions, when a contract, including a governance agreement, provides for reciprocal obligations, both or all parties to it are obliged to perform their stated obligations (Hutchison 2013: 3-4; and *Ese Financial Services v Cramer* 1973). In terms of the above, the relevant Minister should assume obligations derived from an enabling law or document by placing them in the governance and performance agreements. Other obligations of a governance nature may flow directly from Act 1 of 2019 or other relevant statutes.

Throughout Act 1 of 2019, an impression is created that punishment can only be meted out on boards or other senior executives in the employment of public enterprises. Shareholder Ministers have been shielded from any form of punitive accountability, although they too are required to advance a range of performance-related functions in terms of Act 1 of 2019, and for this they should be held to account for any poor governance performance. The reasons for the omission of any form of punishment for relevant Ministers are entirely unclear, as nobody is above the law. Also, the employment of the words *'within a reasonable time'* in subsection 4, when subsection 1 explicitly determines a timeframe of ninety days within which the governance agreement should be judged as a fatal error to governance.

Since non-compliance with subsection 1 is grounds for removal of a board as expressed in subsection 4, it is submitted that subsection 4 must refer to the specific timeframe of ninety days mentioned in subsection 1 and do away with the vagueness of the phrase *'within a reasonable time'*. The inconsistency in provisions on the same issue could have been avoided. The construction *'within a reasonable time'* is likely to pose a threat to consistency in practice as governance agreements across various public enterprises would be concluded within varying time periods from the date of appointment of a board, depending on how the phrase may be interpreted from one public enterprise to another.

It also would have been proper for Act 1 of 2019 to clarify what would happen when some members of a board of a public enterprise have not signed the governance agreement with a relevant Minister. For a number of reasons, some board members may delay signing the governance agreement, for instance if they are ill or away on business or seeking legal advice on its contents or for any other reason, whether or not it is justifiable. The above is contended because the provision under discussion (Section 11(4) of Act 1 of 2019) merely refers to a board as a collective. Nothing justifies a wholesale approach to removing an entire board if other members of such board have signed a governance agreement. A good law should seek to provide for various scenarios that are capable of common sense and practical justification. It is argued that each board member is appointed on the basis of his or her own credentials (Section 8(1)(c) of Act 1 of 2019).

In the matter of *Disposable Medical Products v Tender Board of Namibia*, the court, while canvassing the issue of time in the institution of review proceedings, had an opportunity to look at the aspect of *'reasonable time'* (See the *Disposable Medical Products v Tender Board of Namibia* 1997). It was established that a factual inquiry had to be undertaken to examine the length of time to conclude whether a delay had occurred. Furthermore, some authorities indicate that the existence of prejudice to any party implies that a delay had indeed occurred (See *Radebe v Government of South Africa* 1995; and *Wolgroeiers v Municipaliteit van Kaapstad*). In the context of the discussion, should a relevant Minister fail to conclude a governance agreement with a board in reasonable time, causing the board's dismissal on these grounds, it would be taken that such delay was unreasonable and prejudicial to the board, because it led to directors being dismissed from the board. The inquiry would arguably proceed to establish where such delay emanated from. Should this point to a relevant Minister, it may beg the question of why such Minister would not face a sanction instead, as it was his or her obligation to conclude a governance agreement with the board now being dismissed for his or her failure.

DEFINING GOVERNANCE AGREEMENTS

The discussion undertaken until this point in this article has revealed that section 11 of Act 1 of 2019 is dedicated to aspects related to the governance agreement concluded between a relevant Minister and a board of a public enterprise (Namibia 2019). The entire section, including section 1 which contains definitions, omits to define what is meant by a governance agreement (Namibia 2019). A definition of a governance agreement would have been helpful to explain what it entails and set out a clear purpose of concluding one. Furthermore, it would have ensured a certain level of comprehension for all parties concluding it. It is argued that in practice, governance agreements may be entered into "to tick the boxes" or for compliance without any tangible resolve to transform governance in public enterprises.

Despite the lack of a definition for a governance agreement, section 11 of Act 1 of 2019 provides a basis to establish what a governance agreement entails, although not without a possibility for subjectivity or misconstruction. It is submitted that in the absence of a specific definition, in order to appreciate what a governance agreement entails, one would have to rely on what the agreement in question contains. For instance, section 11(1) provides that a governance agreement has to be in relation to the following aspects of a public enterprise:

> (a) the State's expectations in respect of the public enterprise's scope of business, efficiency and financial performance, and achievement of objectives; (b) the relevant Minister's obligations in relation to any function conferred or imposed by the establishing law or document of the public enterprise; (c) the principles to be followed by the public enterprise for business planning; (d) the measures which are necessary to protect the financial soundness of the public enterprise; (e) key performance indicators in terms of which the public enterprise's performance will be evaluated; (f) the

structure of the integrated strategic business plan and the annual financial plan; (g) the principles to be followed at the end of each financial year in respect of any surplus in the accounts of the public enterprise; and (h) any other matter relating to the performance of the public enterprise's functions under any law.

Paragraph (a) refers to "the State" in reference to the State's expectations, whereas throughout Act 1 of 2019 there is no outline or detail of the expectations of the State. It is unclear how the State's expectations – if different from the stated mandate of a public enterprise – would be accommodated alongside those of a public enterprise without amending the source document. It should be pointed out that the mandates of public enterprises are located in establishing legislation or memoranda of incorporation.

The word 'State' itself has not been defined to indicate its relevance to Act 1 of 2019 and the governance of public enterprises in general. It is inconceivable that the governance agreement of a public enterprise governance should contain expectations of the State other than being focused on objects of the establishing law or document directly drawn therefrom. It has not been established in any legislation known to the author that public enterprises are or should be in the business of managing or achieving the State's expectations. The danger is that the expectations of the State are impossible to quantify or measure and may fall outside the law or document establishing a public enterprise, let alone a governance agreement. Public enterprises should not be subjected to other ideals which fall outside their codified mandate as that would result in a deviation from their purposes. If reference to 'State' expectations is the same as the mandate of a public enterprise, then the word 'State' still serves no purpose other than unnecessary repetition.

Furthermore, it is commendable that a governance agreement should contemplate obligations for the relevant Minister provided for in an establishing law or document (see section 11(1)(b) of Act 1, Namibia 2019). The obligations for a relevant Minister would arguably justify his or her being party to the governance agreement. Notwithstanding the above, the section falls short of clarifying what would happen when a board and a relevant Minister fail to perform in terms of any of the obligations referred to. It is accepted that section 12 of Act 1 of 2019, which is discussed below, provides for individual performance agreements that each board member should sign with a relevant Minister. The concern, however, is that a governance agreement under section 11 is a contract with obligations for the parties to it. The above implies that a governance agreement would require some form of performance from the parties. It is suggested that a corresponding paragraph should have been included to refer to the board's obligations under the governance agreement; such obligations may be those, but not limited to, as may appear in an establishing law or document.

It should be mentioned that to govern a public enterprise properly, a board and a relevant Minister should execute the duties and obligations contained in an establishing law or document of that specific public enterprise. Arguably, therefore, a governance agreement and individual performance agreements cannot help but feature the expectations of the establishing law or document. From the above, one may deduce that a governance agreement would be a contract in terms of which a board and a relevant Minister agree to govern a public enterprise, by specifying what must be in place; indicating the intention to achieve good governance at the public enterprise in order to continuously achieve the public enterprise's purpose. It is believed that well-governed public enterprises can achieve good results.

INDIVIDUAL PERFORMANCE AGREEMENTS WITH BOARD MEMBERS

According to the Public Enterprises Governance Act (2019), a relevant Minister bears the responsibility for concluding individual performance agreements with each director on a board of a public enterprise (See section 12(1) of Act 1, Namibia 2019). Accordingly, the obligation is the similar to one relating to a governance agreement that a relevant Minister concludes with a board of a public enterprise (See section 11(1) of Act 1, Namibia 2019). What appears under section 12 of Act 1 of 2019 are two grounds upon which a director of a public enterprise could be removed from office; namely, failure to conclude a performance agreement, and contravention of any condition in a performance agreement entered into or any of the stated duties (see section 12(5) and (6) of Act 1, Namibia 2019). It should be noted that Act 1 provides for fiduciary duties as well as the duty of care and diligence which are part of every performance agreement entered into. Furthermore, Section 12(5) of Act 1 of 2019 provides for punishment of a board member for the failure by the relevant Minister to conclude a performance agreement. The failure to conclude a performance agreement is for the relevant Minister's account. The above is argued because the obligation to conclude the performance agreement has rightly been imposed on a relevant Minister (See section 12(1) of Act 1, Namibia 2019). It is submitted that, unless it is in practice proven that failure to conclude a performance agreement was at the instance of a board or board member, it would be unfair to remove a board member if the failure rests with a relevant Minister.

In practice, it would be pointless for a board of a public enterprise to conclude performance agreements with a relevant Minister if the public enterprise in question does not subscribe to a very functional performance management system. This suggests that the individual performance agreements of board members on the same board would provide a basis for a performance agreement concluded between a board and a CEO. Clearly, there must be a relationship between the performance agreement concluded between a board and a relevant Minister and the one between the board and the CEO, which in turn would be spread to senior management, middle management and the rest of the staff of a public enterprise. It is therefore clear that if a public enterprise does not subscribe to a performance management system, or if only a CEO and his or her executives subscribe, such performance management is flawed. It should be revised to encompass the entire public enterprise so that the public enterprise's performance in its entirety is properly measured and reported on. Invariably, it is not impossible to find public enterprises that cannot explain their own performance.

Performance management has been defined as a continuous process of "identifying, measuring and developing the performance of individuals and teams and aligning performance with the strategic goals of the organization" (Aguinis 2013:2). This definition indicates that the performance of individuals and teams must be aligned with the strategic goals of the organisation. In the same vein, a public enterprise's performance management system should be aligned to its strategic goals, which in turn are birthed out of its mandate as may be contained in its establishing law or document. A clear link should exist; indicating a progressive transition from an establishing law or document to a strategic plan and performance management system, to envisaged goals. A mismatch between strategy and mandate will mean that a public enterprise's performance could be misaligned with its mandate. From the above it may be deduced that a performance agreement signed by every board member with a relevant Minister should be one which is aligned with the strategic goals of the public enterprise in question. As already explained, a strategic plan is essentially the *'how and what'* of a public enterprise (Koch 2011). The 'what' part is derived chiefly from an establishing law or document, whereas the 'how' may emanate from codes, best practices, policies and procedures, regulations and other documents of best practice.

According to Armstrong (2014: 334), 'performance' is defined as a behaviour that accomplishes results. In the context of public enterprises, performance is about achieving intended results for a public enterprise. With the above, it becomes clear why a public enterprise would benefit from a performance management system. It is submitted that the objective is to achieve desired results as opposed to any other results. Without a performance management system, a public enterprise may possibly unintentionally achieve other results. The submission in this article is that individual performance agreements of board members of a public enterprise should not be divorced from the performance management of a public enterprise.

Furthermore, performance management is a "means of getting better results by providing the means for individuals to perform well within an agreed framework of planned goals, standards and competency requirements" (Armstrong and Taylor 2014:335). It therefore implies the development of a shared understanding concerning what is to be achieved and how it must be achieved. Good performance in public enterprises could be a shared responsibility with the first line of accountability placed on a shareholder Minister and the board of a public enterprise, then on the full-time executives. Each of the parties should bring its obligations to bear on the achievement of what has been agreed to in a performance agreement. Furthermore, a performance agreement is a contract that is intended to legally bind the parties to it. The manner in which performance should be achieved is answered by ensuring that within a public enterprise there is a working performance management system assisting in the implementation of all the performance agreements legally provided for and those necessary to support the overall achievement of the required performance. In addition, five elements go hand-in-hand with performance management, namely: agreement, measurement, feedback, positive reinforcement and dialogue (Armstrong and Taylor 2014:334).

It is clear from the foregoing discussion that implementing a successful performance management is a process, and implementation alone is barely half of what is desired. Accordingly, the performance agreements signed by board members require further continuous work to achieve the agreed performance results. Monitoring and evaluation forms part of performance management to ensure that expected results are regularly inspected way before the actual target date. A lack of continuous monitoring and evaluation may turn out results akin to a still-birth; leaving no time for correction as time for actual assessment would have arrived. Continuous monitoring and evaluation afford an opportunity for a public enterprise to inspect the nature of results it is likely to achieve, and steps can be taken to avert any embarrassing results.

The Namcode, although not legally binding on public enterprises, provides for board evaluation which should be conducted once a year (Namibia 2014). The above resonates with section 11(1)(e) of Act 1 of 2019 (Namibia 2019), which contemplates the evaluation of performance by a board. In the same vein, Act 1 of 2019 should have provided for a procedure on how performance evaluations would be conducted for directors serving on boards of public enterprises. If accepted, the suggestion would afford a relevant Minister the occasion to conduct a formal evaluation of a board's performance, which may either dispel or foreground the removal of a poorly performing board. Having conducted the above discussion, the next stage of the inquiry proceeds to section 12(5), which provides that: "Failure by a member of the board of a public enterprise to sign the performance agreement within a reasonable time is a ground *[sic]* for the removal of that member" (Section 12(5), Namibia 2019). The subsection refers to a board member; not an entire board of directors. It is appreciated that the provision relates to the individual performance agreements a relevant Minister concludes with each board member of a public enterprise, and the manner in which it is phrased suggests that board members do not have to sign at the same time or in the same place. Another argument may be that it is unclear from the section whether the individual performance agreements must reflect the same performance initiatives and targets for every board member, irrespective of whether these are uniquely aligned to the skills of each board member.

Section 12(2) of Act 1 of 2019 introduces board duties for which any breach would result in a dismissal (see section 12(6) of Act 1, Namibia 2019). This section designates the duties as 'conditions' and subjects them as read into every performance agreement, irrespective of whether these are included or left out. It highlights that in performing their functions, board members must "at all times act honestly", with reasonable "care and diligence", and if individuals do not serve on a specific board anymore they must not improperly utilise "information acquired" to gain an advantage or "cause a detriment to the public enterprise" (Section 12(2) of Act 1, Namibia 2019). Whatever labels are used, the stipulations fall under fiduciary duties and the duty of care and skill which are altogether inherent to the duties of a board. Breach of the duties of a board is a serious offence which would result in a dismissal of the board member concerned. A public enterprise is mandated to recover any damages suffered or profits gained by a director in breach of their duties. Furthermore, breach of the duties would result in any other civil or criminal liability as may be applicable under Act 1 of 2019 or any other law. Clearly, a board member may face a situation of double punishment for one and the same offence; namely, dismissal, damages and other civil or even criminal liability remain open for prosecution against a guilty board member. The provision of double punishment would have to pass the legal test generally recalled at the instance of punishing the same offence twice. It is not in the nature of the law to perpetuate punishment for one and the same offence. It should be considered that subsection 3, which provides for breach of the conditions in subsection 2, also empowers a public enterprise to recover any damages suffered through a legal process. The recovery of damages suffered is already a civil claim against a board member in addition to having dismissed the board member. If under any other law there would be another civil claim, it would be advisable that such other civil claim is bundled with the civil claim brought up by a public enterprise so that a board director in question answers to the case once and for all, as litigation on the same cause cannot go on in perpetuity. It remains to be decided by a court of law whether, when a board member breaches a provision of a performance agreement concluded or a provision of Act 1 of 2019, breach would in every case translate into a concomitant breach of a law other than Act 1 of 2019.

The above provisions signal a departure from Act 2 of 2006, in that Act 1 of 2019 now provides for consequences for irate board members. The prescription for dismissal of a board member who breached the critical provisions should be understood in the context of having been found guilty after a properly constituted forum has heard the matter. The only hurdle in the section is the fact that it must first be established that a board member was in breach for dismissal of such board member as the appropriate sanction. The drafters of Act 1 of 2019 are praised for the provisions that would seek to encourage accountability on the part of directors in public enterprises by providing for punishment for wrongdoing. It is contended that similar provisions should have been built into Act 1 of 2019 to hold relevant Ministers accountable, as an agreement cannot only advance obligations on one party without also doing so for the other party to it. Elsewhere in this article it was discussed by the citing authority that contracts generally run on the principle of reciprocity and bind parties to them. Practice tends to reveal that although board members may have a lot to explain when a public enterprise goes belly up, in some cases, public enterprises collapse because the board members were too weak to resist the wrong instructions and demands from relevant Ministers.

The myth of individual performance agreements

Aside from the above discussion, a further concern is that it is common practice that, as a norm, board members perform collectively and not individually, hence the designation of 'board'. Exceptions may be where a company has only one director, which rarely occurs in public enterprises. Section 216(1) of the Companies Act, Act 28 of 2004, provides that "every public company must have at least two directors and every private company must have at least one director" (Namibia 2004). In addition, legally the board of a company must comprise, in the case of a private company, or a personal liability company, at least one director. The same goes for public enterprises that have incorporated as companies and are known as state-owned companies. Emphasis is placed on the reality that a board's performance falls chiefly on decisions which are made collectively, which should be executed by executive management. The decisions are generally not the province of one board member but of a board as a collective and are generally taken at board meetings.

The work of a board should be seen in the light of a board not being involved in the day-to-day operations of a public enterprise. In terms of the above, a board primarily focuses on strategy approval and the guidance of strategic direction (Namibia 2014) and driving performance by providing leadership support to top management to achieve the strategic intent (Naidoo 2016). Accordingly, every board member's performance would be measured on the results achieved through the strategic intent linked to a public enterprise's mandate, and which the board approved, and management had to execute. It therefore follows that a board's performance is tied up in how top management of a public enterprise itself performs. Should a board not be able to effect strategic leadership and guidance to top management, a board member's individual performance, judged collectively, may lie in limbo.

A board is, by its nature, a collective institution; the word 'board' itself does not refer in this context to one director, it generally refers to a group of persons who serve together, thereby earning the designation 'board of directors', meaning a "governing body of the public enterprise … holding positions comparable with those of the board of directors of a company" (Namibia 2014). Although the provision refers to individual performance agreements, the agreements are assumed to be the same, word for word, for every board member on the board of a public enterprise. This is because of the collective nature of the performance required of a board, and often disregards the unique skills each board member brings to the work of a board. It may be that even a chairperson's individual performance agreement is generally, in practice, the same as for all other directors; which is probably an anomaly given that a chairperson is required to perform additional duties and for whose board fees are generally higher than for all other board members (Naidoo 2016). Be that as it may, the argument is that individual performance agreements, unless something appears to the contrary, are in the collective equation. Therefore, when a board's performance is rated, individual ratings are still something uncommon in public enterprises, as the ratings may reveal a collective effort confirming that the directors on a board rarely act or decide alone. It may then be that in practice, poor performance of a public enterprise would be attributed to an entire board, for which it can face dismissal. In the matter of ***Steenkamp v Central Energy Fund*** (2018), the applicants had their case dismissed after they refused to vacate the board of Petroleum Oil and Gas Corporation (PetroSA) following a streak of poor performance. It turned out that other board members had already jumped ship when they received notice to resign, and the applicants remained defiant until their application to oppose dismissal was dismissed. In brief, the dismissal of the PetroSA board resulted after PetroSA had made huge financial losses after the board had failed to meet agreed performance targets. To advance the above discussion, it should be noted that although individual performance assessment for board members is practical, board members are generally required to perform collectively, as the powers conferred upon the board are conferred upon the board as a collective and not on any one or more of the directors as individuals (Namibia Government Notice 2016). The reason is, as stated above, a board in the context under discussion is not a one-person show. Notwithstanding the foregoing, board members may perform differently on very common and collective tasks as some may perform better, and others may exhibit higher expertise, yet others may display more commitment to board work. In the end, it is still as rare in practice to single out one director as a performer against all others than it is common to label a board as being either competent or incompetent, even if the poor or good performance is the result of a few.

To this end, if a board member or a board of directors should fail to achieve performance targets agreed with a relevant Minister, part of the problem could be that it failed to lead and guide top management in executing strategy; thereby failing to drive performance across the public enterprise. In some rare occasions it may be that failure on a performance agreement would point to a lack of substantial support in the form of varied resources from a relevant Minister. Whatever the reason, the board should collectively ensure that it conducts regular performance assessments to be alive to its own performance, which arguably would reflect that of a public enterprise as a whole.

PERFORMANCE AGREEMENTS OF STAFF OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISES

Laudably, Act 1 of 2019 introduces provisions which, if well implemented, may improve governance in public enterprises; the condition precedent being the right calibre of leadership obtained in all various public enterprises. It cannot be emphasised enough that public enterprises only achieve results in accordance with how they are directed and controlled by those governing them. The submission resonates with one of the definitions of corporate governance which refers to how companies are directed and controlled (Papp and Auer 2016). At the core of a public enterprise's success or failure is the leadership in charge of its day-to-day operations. Boards, as representatives of shareholders, should be warned not to indulge management too much. It is in the space of public enterprises where endless excuses of poor performance and blame-shifting are the norm, and assumption of responsibility and accountability is hard to come by. With correct and consistent implementation and enforcement of performance agreements across public enterprises, endless excuses may soon be a thing of the past in public enterprises in Namibia.

The effects of sections 11 and 12 of Act 1 of 2019 appear to have been carried over into other functionaries in a public enterprise. For example, section 17(3) of Act 1 of 2019 provides that

> *"If a chief executive officer or senior management staff member has failed to comply with any provision of a performance agreement which he or she has concluded in terms of this section such failure constitutes a ground for his or her dismissal from the service of the public enterprise, subject to compliance with the rules of natural justice: Provided that such a failure that has been caused by unforeseen circumstances outside the control of the chief executive officer or staff member, does not constitute such a ground."*

The above provision relates to the consequence of poor performance for CEOs and senior management staff of public enterprises. The provision builds on section 17(1) of Act 1 of 2019, which requires the board to enter into a performance agreement with a CEO of a public enterprise. It is submitted that it should have been part of the provision that when a board fails to enter into a performance agreement with a CEO, such failure would constitute grounds for the board's removal. Furthermore, such extension would be complete if worded in such a way as to place the obligation of concluding a performance agreement on both the board and the CEO of a public enterprise. In other words, if the board and the CEO of a public enterprise fail to conclude a performance agreement for the CEO in question, both should face dismissal. Accountability in public enterprises should go both ways and a one-way approach should be discouraged if good governance is highly desired. A provision along the lines of what is suggested would eliminate the tendency of blame-shifting, which tends to characterise the affairs of public enterprises when governance goes wrong, as a result, one may lose sight of which functionary is accountable.

To hold a board accountable for failure to conclude a performance agreement of a CEO would resonate with the suggestion in sections 11 and 12 of Act 1 of 2019. The suggestion, which appears elsewhere in this article, is that the relevant Minister must equally be held accountable for to the failure of such relevant Minister to conclude either of the agreements, or to perform in terms of either of the agreements. Furthermore, to subject a board to removal for failing to conclude a performance agreement with a CEO would send out a strong message about the resolve to achieve good corporate governance in public enterprises. Boards should ensure those they appoint to run public enterprises are competent. Incompetent executives should not be hired to run public enterprises as they would run them into the ground. It is commendable that, where there is poor performance, Act 1 of 2019 introduces equitable steps to deal with the poor performance decisively rather than tolerate it. To ignore poor performance in public enterprises is arguably postponing a much bigger problem, as the poor performance would eventually be difficult to reverse. Accordingly, when poor performance crops up, it should immediately be curbed.

For the sake of ensuring that public enterprises achieve the kind of results which were conceived at their establishment, any other performance results must be rejected. Those who occasion a string of poor results should be dealt with in such a manner that public enterprises are permanently starved of dismal performance. The performance agreement under discussion is one where parties intend to be legally bound by the terms and conditions of such agreement; accordingly, it is a legally enforceable contract. The intention to be bound is enshrined in the fact that the provisions provide for at least one-sided consequences where failure has resulted. The consequences are referred to as one-sided because sections 11 and 12 merely appropriate punitive measures on a board or board member, while no consequence is appropriated to the relevant Minister who is also a party to both a governance and performance agreement. Interpreted correctly, the provision under discussion clearly calls for the immediate dismissal of poorly performing CEOs and senior managers of public enterprises (Section 17(3) of Act 1, Namibia 2019).

Upon poor performance being ascertained, grounds for dismissal of the CEO or senior manager would have been established. The only other further issue would be to occasion a procedure where the identified poorly performing CEO or senior manager(s) are afforded an opportunity to explain. What the provision entrenches is to negate any other defence but one, which is where the reason for poor performance was unforeseen. Once it has been established that the poor performance could not have been unforeseen, in other words it was objectively foreseen, a dismissal must be carried out. It is submitted that the provision is near-water-tight to ensure that lame excuses justifying poor performance are not accommodated in public enterprises. It is hoped that the provision of the Act would, in practice, be met with consistent application and enforcement across public enterprises (see Section 17(3) of Act 1, Namibia 2019).

GOVERNANCE AND PERFORMANCE AGREEMENTS AS CONTRACTS AND THEIR APPLICATION TO SHAREHOLDER MINISTERS

Prior to and since the inception of Act 2 of 2006, the subject of governance and performance agreements in public enterprises has not been taken seriously in Namibia. It is unclear why governance and performance agreements have not been given the weight and binding effect they should ordinarily have hitherto commanded. One suspected reason is that the enforcement of agreements has been lacking; partly because Act 2 of 2006 did not itself contain measures to deal with poor performance and fell short of providing for punitive measures for poor performance and non-compliance. The other reason may relate to the failure to enforce performance agreement by those whose duty it was, as there was no punishment for non-compliance.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, contracts by their very nature are legal documents which, when freely entered into, must be enforced – in accordance with the *pacta sunt servanda* legal principle, which holds that contracts entered into freely must be respected (see Booysen 2003). In other words, legal consequences must ensue if the terms and conditions of a contract are not honored, even if a statute providing for their conclusion (as was the case with Act 2 of 2006) does not provide for punitive steps in that regard. If parties to a contract intend to be bound by its terms and conditions, the contract they have entered into should be binding. It is respectfully stated that the various agreements provided for by Act 1 of 2019 are essentially valid contracts. By the use of the word 'agreement', Act 1 of 2019 is understood to contemplate an agreement the nature of a contract. A contract is generally taken to mean that agreement concluded by parties thereto with a serious intention to establish legally enforceable obligations (Schulze and Kelbrick 2015). With respect to this, all parties without exception assume obligations when they conclude a contract, and this includes the relevant Minister of a public enterprise.

The relationship that exists between public enterprises and politically connected shareholders in Namibia may have contributed to poor performance. The nature and operation of public enterprises is fraught with complexities regarding governance structures; with ownership and control appearing blurred and compromising their effective management (Pargendler 2012). Relevant Ministers have routinely been fingered for interfering in the objective operations of public enterprises; an event which can undermine any governance and performance agreements entered into (Makuta 2009; Thabane and Van Deventer 2018). It is with the above in mind that this article argues that without punishment or some form of strict accountability on relevant Ministers, governance in public enterprises will not be achieved. Although shareholder Ministers in Namibia should be party to governance and performance agreements which are binding, Act 1 of 2019 has treated them as sacrosanct, with hollow obligations, and their flaws should be blamed on the board (Section 11 and 12 of Act 1, Namibia 2019).

In Namibia, Cabinet Ministers were required to enter into performance agreements with the President (Kamwanyah 2017). Although not much could be gathered in terms of any performance achieved through the initiative, the initiative was commendable. Where the initiative could be pursued with vigour and results-driven intentions, a mechanism can be built into such agreements so that Cabinet Ministers who are shareholders in public enterprises account for the governance and performance of such public enterprises to Cabinet and Parliament.

CONCLUSION

The policy paper produced by the Ministry of Public Enterprises heralded the enactment of Act 1 of 2019, overhauling Act 2 of 2006. The thrust of Act 1 of 2019 includes a few provisions which on paper appear to show a determination to improve the accountability and governance of public enterprises. Important to this article are a few discriminating sections regarding how the removal of boards or board members would come about.

Whereas certain provisions place a burden on the relevant Minister to conclude a governance agreement and individual performance agreements within a specific or reasonable period, failure to perform this duty is placed on the board and individual board members. For the relevant Minister's own failure to conclude a governance agreement or to perform in terms of a performance agreement with a board, it is unfair to dismiss an innocent board under these circumstances. Furthermore, Act 1 of 2019 fails to distinguish circumstances where only some of the board members signed the governance agreement. Board members who may not have signed a governance or performance agreement within a specified timeframe following their appointment should be dismissed, where the failure is on their part.

The dismissal of a CEO and senior management staff for poor performance is a good step and should be enforced fairly and consistently across public enterprises. It is unclear how this will play out in practice given that CEOs and senior managers may conceal incidences of poor performance. It is recommended that ways should be established in legislation to measure and evaluate board performance in public enterprises in Namibia. Without measuring and evaluating board performance in a procedural manner, it will be difficult to justify any removal of directors based on unmeasured performance. Furthermore, accountability on the part of the relevant Ministers has been omitted in Act 1 of 2019, which will affect efforts to improve governance in public enterprises in Namibia.

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TOWARDS A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR ORGANISATIONALLY EFFECTIVE FEMALE LEADERSHIP IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: THE CASE OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISES IN ESWATINI

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INTRODUCTION

Despite increased efforts to address female marginalisation, public enterprises continue to grapple with the under-representation of women in leadership positions in Sub-Saharan Africa, as observed by Bahiru and Mengistu (2018), who cite numerous hurdles that face women leaders in public enterprises or state-owned enterprises (SOEs). There is massive infrastructural dilapidation in most African countries, emanating from a paucity of leadership. This article explores the organisational effectiveness of female leadership and develops an applicable conceptual framework. As most large organisations are led by males, the need for a leadership alternative becomes obvious. Considerable literature on women in leadership positions and leadership styles exists. These include the works of Rayyan (2017); Prime and Moss-Racusin (2009); Pafford and Schaefer (2017) and Pollitt, Robinson and Umberson (2018). However, comparative data on the subject appears to be limited, which makes it difficult to draw conclusions on which factors define their approach to leadership (Waylen 2015). Moreover, much of the available data is cursory and to a large extent emphasises personal attributes and impediments, while providing insignificant attention to relevant socio-political and organisational factors (Hassan and Silong 2008). Historically, male traits have been known to be suitably proven and therefore provide an accelerated advantage in effective leadership. Democratising leadership becomes excessively problematic in a male-dominated workplace. Nevertheless, exalting women to leadership positions compels the addressing of current societal incongruities as gender mainstreaming has not received the focus required (Prugl 2012).

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The discussion focuses on the Kingdom of Eswatini (formerly called Swaziland); a landlocked country in Southern Africa, bordering Mozambique to the northeast and South Africa on the other sides. In Eswatini, many challenges regarding women in leadership positions persist. For example, women constitute 47.1 percent of the employed population (World Bank Group, 2016), yet parliamentary representation of women is at 7.2 percent. While little effort is placed on increasing this number to attain an equitable distribution in the decision-making framework, public enterprises continue to provide insufficient support to fill this gap. The situation is further exacerbated by the lack of interest in improving women's leadership skills and competencies on a professional level. This scenario is depicted in Figure 1, as the dismal example of the Mananga Centre (School of Business, Leadership and Development) in Eswatini indicates a significant decline in female managers who registered and attended management and leadership training programmes between 2010 and 2015. This situation demonstrates a lack of commitment by both the organisations and women themselves to develop their leadership skills and therefore increase their opportunity to occupy leadership positions. This situation seems to support the case for women being under-represented, particularly at senior levels – referred to as the 'glass ceiling' in the works of Adams and Funk (2012). The underrepresentation of women and the associated challenges female leaders face are experienced the world over, which reveals structural and organisational hurdles (Agbim 2018).

Eswatini remains one of the few monarchies in Africa which strongly embraces its own unique traditions and practices manifest in the famous Umhlanga (Reed Dance) and Incwala ceremonies (Dlamini 2019). Given its roots in patriarchal society, where its gender roles and cultural dynamics are embedded, masculinity is supreme; hence, changing these practices may not be easily attainable (Nyane, 2019). Møller (2019) believes that this view is reinforced by the strong role assigned to customary law, which tends to dominate the Swazi Constitution. Traditional practices tend to play an overriding role in shaping leadership roles, often placing preference on masculinity. This argument is shared by Schapera (1937), who observed that leadership in Eswatini was largely hereditary and preserved for men, making it difficult for women to ascend to these positions. The general level of inequality manifest in stereotypical paradigms which are perpetuated, thus further creates major barriers to female leadership. The practice of hereditary leadership is not gender-inclusive; this is viewed as highly undemocratic and therefore divisive (Rugege, 1991; Akande, 2009). The effects of the COVID-19 pandemic have exacerbated the status of women in Eswatini, as the unemployment situation continues to take its toll.

Figure 1: Female registration at Mananga Centre, 2010 – 2015



Source: Mananga Centre statistics, 2015.

However, although the achievement of women in tertiary education is in balance with that of men, appointment of women at leadership entry levels becomes heavily filtered. This conceptual framework for female leadership therefore explores major impediments that limit effective leadership in a country like Eswatini. Two fundamental questions guide the approach followed: What are the factors that affect the consideration of female leadership in public enterprises? What could be the impact of female leadership on organisational effectiveness in a country such as Eswatini? This article intends to examine the extent to which women are considered for leadership positions in public organisations and to contribute to the construction of a conceptual framework for female leadership to achieve organisational effectiveness.

METHODOLOGY

This article adopts a cross-sectional qualitative research design in which data were collected through semi-structured interviews to obtain deeper insights from respondents. Twenty respondents were purposively selected and interrogated using a semi-structured interview guide. Four respondents were senior level managers (two male and two female), all of whom were in the age group of 40 to 50 years, and possession of at least a degree. One had less than five years' on-the-job experience, while the rest had over five years of experience. Of the eight middle managers (four male and four female), four were in the age range of 25 to 30, while the other four were in the range of 30 to 40 years of age. Two of these were non-degree holders, while the other 6 were in possession of at least a degree. Four of them had relevant job experience of more than five years, while the other four had less than five years of experience. The eight first-line managers (four male and four female) were in the age group of 25 to 30. Six of the participants were degree holders. Five of them had more than five yeas' work experience, while three had less than five years. All of the respondents were drawn from public enterprises in Eswatini and were interviewed in order to gather their opinion on gender equality in this context.

The feedback of the respondents was interpreted in a neutral and objective manner aimed at constructing an understanding of their worldviews and unearth hidden data. Data collected were transcribed and then analysed to construct the dimensions and indicators using thematic analysis. Through a process of analysis, collected data was interpreted in order to inductively generate responses to the research questions (indicated above) and to develop a conceptual framework. Kuechler and Vaishnavi (2012) place emphasis on the relevance of such an approach in describing and developing theories. This process is illustrated in Figure 2.

Figure 2: Towards developing a female leadership context



Source: Based on Saunders and Lewis, 2012.

LITERATURE REVIEW

There is widespread proliferation of discourse on matters of gender equality and inclusion (of gender mainstreaming) focusing on the role of women in leadership, as a result of the numerous societal inconsistencies globally. This section explores existing literature presented around this field, with a view to construct new knowledge of existing gaps.

Female leadership in perspective

Several scholars have written on the effectiveness of women's leadership, but little literature exists in sub-Saharan Africa. Hassim (2006) reports that historically, strategic decisions remained the prerogative of masculinity and therefore extended across present administrative and managerial functions. While remarkable progress has been realised, unfortunately the socio-political landscape continues to present major hurdles for female leadership. As women become gradually accepted for stimulating development, insufficient achievement exists for their leadership impact. The evaluation of female leadership paints a negative picture about powerful women leaders who display dominance and are considered social deviants who threaten the social hierarchical order (Brescoll, Okimoto and Vial 2018). From a socio-cultural perspective, women leaders face serious challenges in maintaining work-life balance; further creating fertile ground for excluding female participation in strategic decisions. Attempts have been made to promote gender equality in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries in tertiary institutions, but the gap continues to escalate, especially in Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics (STEM) disciplines that focus on innovative entrepreneurship (Brescoll *et al* 2018). This is a field that is mostly dominated by male students, thus widening the gender gap.

Female leadership and financial resources

Women tend to display preference for a career in finance, while masculinity demonstrated inconsistences in maintaining control measures (Prugl 2012). Therefore, a framework for female leadership should analyse organisational performance based on the ability to improve and protect the organisation's profitability. However, it cannot be determined *a priori* that women make better financial managers. Several scholars are cautious to determinatively assert that women are successful financial leaders (Prugl 2012). However, considering the nurturing attributes in women, they are likely to behave ethically and therefore respect financial demands to help increase the revenue base. Authors in this field applause behaviours displayed in actions such as attendance of board meetings (Bahiru *et al* 2018). It is therefore imperative to explore other possibilities that vindicate female leadership from a socio-economic perspective.

Female leadership in context

In working towards the design of a framework for female leadership, gender differences must be understood. Hassan *et al* (2008) observe that women display professional expertise and credibility, as mirrored in their educational achievement. An OECD survey conducted in 2017 found that the number of female doctorates grew faster than men, implying excellent academic achievements amongst women (Gagnon and Wolfe 2015). On the other hand, common societal and cultural perceptions towards female leadership are subject to scrutiny to establish the space for transformational leadership (Muralidharan and Saurav 2018). This approach gravitates around trust, often deeply rooted in intra-personal relationships (Muralidharan *et al* 2018). Women can now interact informally, using digitalisation to access information (Gagnon *et al* 2015). However, that space seems non-existent as the participation of women in decision-making positions remains minimal. Societies overlook the fact that women bring life into this world (nature) and make every effort to ensure that life is well taken care of (nurture) (Hassim, 1991). In spite of this natural social phenomenon, the stereotypical perceptions that masculinity is superior and that women are purportedly excluded from positions of authority still hold. Unique endowments are considered insignificant and additional household responsibilities assigned to women are thus natural (Annecke, 1990). While these observations are a major obstacle to female leadership, women are also held responsible for this dilemma. Gouw (2008) cites the lack of support from fellow women on one hand, as they tend to undermine each other in the leadership race. This kind of behaviour by women may be based on cultural and patriarchal practices that have normalised male dominance. Møller (2019) argues that culture and tradition are often supported by customary law to the extent that challenging these stipulations would be tantamount to usurp. In this view, careful considerations would have to be made to transform these practices through proper avenues.

Furthermore, the paradigm shift which is dramatically sweeping across the African continent adds impetus for women to catch up with masculinity. However, Pafford *et al* (2017) argue that society is not easily convinced that female leadership capabilities equate those of their male counterparts. It is nonetheless conceded that men and women are historically and culturally complementary. This is the basis of diversity and synergy which determines collaborative effort. A Westpac report showed that dividends increased at an average rate of 2.1 percent in profitability if gender parity is taken into account in senior positions (Robertson, Dias, Yule and Smink 2017). In another earlier study, Terjesen, Auilera and Lorenz (2015) explored the influence of female share on boards and established that these achieved higher than shares of independent directors. The cognitive dissonance theory describes how employees, including women leaders, become tense when emotions are in disharmony with their inner emotional stability (Agbim 2018). Gender-inclusive leadership dwells almost exclusively on encouraging the management of emotions to influence reason and rationality.

Emotional intelligence as a barrier to female leadership

Literature suggests that women tend to face challenges in managing emotions, evident in anger and aggression towards transgressors in conflict situations (Rahman and Haleem 2018). However, women also manifest feminine traits of compassion, charity and nurturing, which distinguish them in the workplace. A study conducted by Sarraf (2018) found that emotional labour increased exponentially when true feelings were expressed to show behaviours consistent with performance. A fundamental difference that required women to address was their failure to control their emotions when placed in positions of high authority. Gouws (2008) found that women in high-level echelons of leadership were too emotional to handle sensitive issues. Women therefore needed to address the challenges by embracing emotional intelligence as illustrated in Figure 5.

Figure 5: Emotional intelligence and job satisfaction

Source: Rahman *et al*. 2018.

In considering female leadership, Rahman *et al* (2018) perceive emotional intelligence as paramount to both individual and organisational development, as demonstrated in Figure 5. A plethora of research on emotional intelligence (EI) indicates that senior managers require a high degree of EI, which enhances job performance (Rahman *et al* 2018). Social perceptions render women emotionally uneven, which could affect their leadership credibility. Leadership efficiency operates within the context of individuality, as it relates to others within a team setting. An effective leader therefore demonstrates the ability to monitor his/her own and others' emotions, which translate into team emotionality. This is the basis of emotional intelligence in leadership, which provides the capacity to detect potential friction and thus eliminate possible conflict. In sub-Saharan Africa in general, and in Eswatini in particular, women may often suppress their emotions to show their respect for the traditional beliefs, even if these are in conflict with their personal emotions.

Ethical leadership

Public enterprises in sub-Saharan Africa experience a leadership paucity, without personal behaviour crafted around honesty, integrity and moral disposition, which are believed to be the conditions for effective leader-follower relationships. Bissessar (2018) asserts that the impact of female leadership can be meaningfully evaluated by largely focusing on personality traits that are scrutinised to weigh gender differences in light of ethical leadership. Even though positive strides were made on the subcontinent, Al-Asfour, Tlaiss, Khan and Rajasekar (2017) note that societies apply values differently in determining the levels of leader acceptability, where corruption and bribery have become so grossly institutionalised in sub-Saharan Africa. While gender-inclusive leadership may not be a panacea, understanding the different cultural backgrounds provides common ground for appreciating the prevailing ethical practice upheld in a particular situation. Leadership may therefore require adaptive faculty to adjust to demanding situations in terms of what would be morally 'good' or 'bad'. Furthermore, technological advancement has created an information explosion, where leadership behaviour is put under the microscope, with social media detecting dubious leadership practices. Despite all this, Shafique and Kalyar (2018) perceive ethical leadership as being interlocked with authenticity, a product of transformational leadership which displays traits of self-confidence, resilience and emotional stability. These values are submerged in stereotypes and prejudices that prevail in male-dominated environments (Pollitt, Robinson and Umberson 2018). Saffar (2018) describes the effects of globalisation as placing massive pressure on managers to remain ethical, but also gauging values maintained in a particular territory as overriding personal ethical convictions. In sub-Saharan Africa, the institutionalisation of ubuntu in society creates tension between societal and the leader's values; thus, questioning a leader's suitability for a leadership position.

Power and teams in leadership

Power corrupts when abused by individuals and is likely to breed disagreements and antagonism. Agbim (2018) observes that managers often use excessive formal power in concluding business transactions. Bissessar (2018) cites individualistic approaches, and states that power residing in individuals who legitimise personal interests that tend to be corrupt. On the other hand, the view of collectivism as socially shared service to others tends to be favoured by women who strive to promote healthy relationships. Societal values stimulate robust power politics, with Western individualistic cultures typifying more self-enhancing behaviours in contrast to Eastern collectivist cultures (Rayyan 2017). As Einarsdottir et al. (2018) indicated, women display the desire to accomplish organisational goals by using relationships to diffuse tension. As a result, teams provide a useful tool for achieving collective outcomes. Figure 6 illustrates the development of *esprit de corps*, where teams culminate into successful performance in Stage 4, where openness, agreements and acceptability thrive, providing the basis for gender inclusive leadership. Bahiru and Mengistu (2018) argue that the traits of compassion and empathy offer women the capacity to increase relationships in the workplace. Helgesen (2017) observes that women are faced with a dilemma in a hostile male-dominated environment that impedes their leadership potential. However, an understanding of key drivers to ethical leadership helps describe the major variables for realising collaborative team working (Alghamdi, Topp and AlYami 2017).

Figure 6: Effective team performance level



Source: Tuckman and Jensen 1977.

Sassler, Michelmore and Smith (2017) consider effective leadership to exhibit masculine traits such as ambition, assertiveness, shrewdness and self-control, while feministic characteristics display warmth, nurturing and compassion. Collectively applied, the phenomenon is likely to engender massive impetus that is likely to enhance organisational effectiveness. The political instrument is often used as a manipulative tool to mobilise women support as a lure to male-dominated leadership (Hassan *et al* 2008). Understanding team performance outcomes provides women with the opportunity to make a collaborative contribution, though not necessarily as leaders (Zhang Hong, Venkatesh and Brown 2011). The emergence of eco-leadership provides an exciting weapon for addressing some of the long-standing cultural barriers to female leadership. Eco-leadership provides a structure with interconnectedness between various sources of leadership information to promote information sharing (Belitski and Liversage 2019). The restrictive cultural limitations often imposed on women leaders are likely to be eliminated through digitalised networking and informality.

Argument for female leadership in sub-Saharan Africa

The current state of leadership in public enterprises in Eswatini drives widespread discontent with the service delivery into a quagmire; prompting action for redress. Despite some countries in sub-Saharan Africa that are doing progressively well, the condition of public enterprises in various countries in is often described as deplorable and requiring urgent salvaging (Longman, Daniels, Bray and Lindell 2018). Female leadership could make an important contribution as contemporary scholars often observe that women pay more attention to detail, implying more of a results-orientated approach (Oni 2017). Women exhibit an appetite for transformational leadership characterised by ethics (Muralidharan and Saurav 2018). Figure 7 illustrates a framework depicting movement towards gender-inclusive leadership to allow women's participation in strategic positions.

Figure 7: A framework for female leadership skills



Source: Diagram adapted from Muralidharan *et al*. 2018.

External forces influence existing self-inflicted barriers, thus deterring progression towards gender-inclusive leadership (Hunt *et al*. 2018). Every human environment naturally encompasses an unspoken culture that prescribes occupants to specific groupings; highlighting differences and similarities in how gender is perceived, as men command numerical dominance (Bissessar 2018). Positive gender relations include equal status, intergroup cooperation, supportive norms and acquaintances, which accelerate female leadership (Asubhi *et al* 2018). Pollitt *et al* (2018) state that leadership is often perceived in patriarchal terms, but acknowledge the co-existence of women and men as complements with different yet interconnected roles. Gender-inclusive leadership proffers a robust integration of the separate role-systems through collaboration. However, Bahiru *et al* (2018) perceive female leadership as in conflict with culturally and spiritually instituted positions for men, as supported by patriarchal practices which place masculine leadership as supreme. However, Muralidharan *et al* (2018) advocate for an inclusive leadership approach where women and men work in collaboration; thus, reinforcing leadership that utilises both transformational and transactional leadership styles. Figure 8 illustrates the ingredients of a balanced leadership model.

Figure 8: Balanced leadership ingredients



Knowledge of the task at hand, often understood through repetitive exposure to work, appears as experience and becomes meaningful if used to become functional when the leader applies such creativity to new scenarios. The leader's traits complement the desired leadership, which enables adjustments to address unique situations that may arise.

Men as agents of change

It is often perceived that women are very capable in managerial and administrative roles and their leadership talents are frequently ignored (Prime *et al* 2009). The traits of both men and women vary in different respects; making reliance on only one gender almost impossible. While men or women may be advantageous either way on leadership competence, it remains uncertain to determine the results of any comparison. To downplay this notion can be viewed as a missed opportunity for good business and therefore requires a careful application of the approach to this phenomenon (Muralidharan *et al*. 2018). Prime *et al* (2009) attribute the challenges faced by women leaders as solely caused by themselves. Women lobby and advocacy groups are robustly championed by women themselves and directed to women only, thus attracting resistance from the male-dominated workplace. Hardacre (2020) advocates for a solidarity-oriented approach in which men and women collaborate and both become agents of change to rally both women and men focusing on their shared identity. Women cannot address the gender problem alone as the root resides in masculinity. Unfortunately, women continue to exclude men by unconsciously estranging them; thus, threatening progress in gender initiatives. Women therefore miss the realisation that men are the most robust participants in the reduction of gender imbalances. However, Sassler *et al* (2017) argue that women are able to influence adolescent girls assuming the role of change agents for similar gender; calling for an alliance-based approach that is therefore inclusive of the problem to the solution.

RESULTS AND INTERPRETATION OF FINDINGS

In broad terms, the various respondents highlighted a number of factors that affects female leadership in public enterprises and provided data on the impact of female leadership on organisational effectiveness. These results focus on the emerging dimensions that impacts on female leadership; providing a new, robust female leadership dispensation, as illustrated below (see Figure 9 and the subsequent discussion).

Figure 9: Emerging dimensions for a new robust female leadership dispensation



Dimension A: Robust female leader effectiveness

A robust female leadership effectiveness is perceived in two dimensions of the concern for humanity (ubuntu) and relationship building.

Indicator 1: Concern for humanity – ubuntu

The concern for humanity was described as a show for ubuntu, a trait that is unique to femininity due to their endowment of embracing 'nature' and 'nurture' as expressed in the following comments by a female senior manager, Participant 7:

> *As mothers, women are good at caring as in-born, have a sense of nurturing, listening and serving. We feel for others and are honest. We have the nature of serving and therefore, do respect human life which we were involved in bringing about right from the beginning. We also like to provide services, as noted in funerals and when people are sick. We therefore feel for others and we are honest. Women respect individual value, ubuntu and men are not comparable. As mothers, we are good at caring for the family and showing a sense of nurturing and listening. We also have the nature of serving others and keeping people together in society.*

Women place extraordinary value on life in their desire to promote people's welfare as an element of ethical leadership experienced in the micro-society of the family that develops into a broader society. Fundamentally, the concept of ubuntu is emphasised in women; emanating from their biological traits as the basis for ethical consideration. Sassler *et al* (2017) cite the unique endowment of caring in women, while Lyness and Grotto (2018) determine the biological division of labour perceived in historical-cultural philosophy domesticated femininity with high concern for people. Their concern for people therefore demonstrates overriding benefits that influence organisational effectiveness (Oni, 2017). However, Bahiru *et al* (2018) insist that women can only improve organisational effectiveness if work-life balance is achieved. Conversely, Merkle, Reinold and Siegel (2018) perceive that men could be abusive in office and self-gratifying; posing a threat to service delivery in public enterprises. Women's leadership potential is therefore curtailed due to the adverse environmental conditions evident in the high prevalence of corruption, suggesting a paucity of ethical leadership and loss of societal trust (McCormack 2018). Participant 12, who is a male middle manager, offered a different, but equally related dimension to female leadership; observing that:

> *Women were made a weaker species as their bodies are different from those of men. Women are cleverer than men – examples seen in church. However, women can use only their brains, while as leaders, their bodies are needed. Because their bodies are not as strong as that of men, they become less effective leaders in situations where the leader's physical body makes a difference.*

The above narrative underpins the biological gender distinction which assigns great advantage to physical appearance in masculinity. As a consequence, female leaders are therefore relegated to less decisional roles, largely influenced by their antecedent socialisation (Tellhed, Bäckström and Björklund 2018). Nonetheless, women exhibit greater intellectuality; seemingly compensating for their physical impairment. However, Participant 6, who is a female senior manager, believes that:

> *Women possess similar traits found in both men and women as 50:50. I learnt from both men and women leaders who demonstrated firmness in meetings. I worked under a tolerant male boss. The female boss was serious and did things on time. My mother also inspired me.*

This narrative suggests that similarities exist in attributes possessed by both men and women and argues that leadership differences have nothing to do with one's gender orientation. Environmental pressures tend to compel women to adopt a less popular mechanistic leadership approach within perceived patriarchal society perceptions. In tandem with Brescoll *et al* (2018), the narrative reveals the demands levelled on female leaders as stimulating their intellectuality to repudiate negative male evaluations. According to Shafique *et al* (2018), while women may lack leadership traits such as self-confidence, resilience and emotional stability, Merkle, Reinold and Siegel (2018) find the presence of similarities in female and male leadership, but at varying degrees.

Indicator 2: Building relations

Relationship-building was found to provide an impact on female leadership, where teams created a vital role in achieving collective outcomes, as perceived by a senior female. Participant 4 noted:

> *Most women socialize, as seen in their participation in church, community clubs, development and domestic work. They show leadership qualities in the home, as they control finances and upbring the children. They like to provide benefits, especially during funerals. They are good at small details in leadership style.*

Although the visibility of women in social settings underpins the desire to work collaboratively, there is little guarantee that this may be useful in workplace relationships. However, this propensity tends to support the view that the domestic and work environments may not be totally separated. The quality of trust which instils a healthy leader-follower relationship is constructed and applied in different milieus and therefore can, once adopted, be applicable in every environment (World Report 2018). The narrative seems to be congruent with the value of transformational leadership where, if trust is promoted, it triggers some psychological stimulation in a leader-follower relationship. Kezar and Holcombe (2017) maintain that through mutual trust, leaders command a high degree of respect and familiarity. Participant 15, who is a first-line manager, highlighted some elements of team formation evident in women:

> *Women have good interpersonal skills, good listening skills, decision making and empathy. Women are patient, tolerant and free to come for advice and respect individual value. Thus, men take advantage of this. But women have the passion to lead.*

The above extract emphasises elements that promote trust as multidimensional and is therefore in line with Shafique *et al* (2018), who accentuate the existence of trust, a characteristic in transformational leadership that promotes leader-follower relations. However, overemphasis of a single concept seems disastrous; suggesting inclusion of the transactional approach to promote leader-follower transactional exchanges based on the reward and labour contract. Therefore, a combination of transformational and transactional leadership approaches highly contributes to stimulating intra-personal relationships (Bissessar 2018). Rahman *et al* (2018) argue that what is important is for the individual leader to effectively manage emotions in developing the leader-follower relations. Bahiru *et al* (2018) add that the traits of compassion and empathy supersede emotionality in building relationships in the workplace. Thus, an understanding of key drivers of ethical leadership helps to describe major variables in gender potentials for building collaborative teams (Alghamdi *et al* 2017). Participant 6, a female middle manager whose comments were similar to two other female managers, but in first-line level, picked on this notion, observing that:

> *Most women are religious. They outnumber men in places of worship and take part in most activities required in church, for example in singing and ululating and yet leave the leading of prayers to men. They like to live in communal structures with others, rather than being left alone.*

The element of spirituality, like the political aspect, finds expression in valuing humanity; accounted earlier as the basis for constructing sustainable relationships through collective habitation. Furthermore, women more than men seem to acknowledge the divine leadership hierarchical structure, which exalts masculinity while demoting women to a secondary status. Shafique *et al* (2018), supported by Bahiru *et al* (2018), assert that women's talent is unlocked for building relations in a diverse and inclusive environment. Both arguments point to the need for emphasising communality and connections. Zhang Hong *et al* (2011) consider reinforcing the concept of team performance, as opposed to individuality, to accelerate collective goal attainment.

Dimension B: Support for female leader effectiveness

The second dimension brings to light the nature of support that women leaders need as enablers and characterises managerial excellence and structured systems.

Indicator 1: Managerial excellence

The study found that women demonstrated excellent managerial skills in the workplace, as argued by Participant 6, who is a female first-line manager:

> *Men are supported by their female counterparts to serve in administrative functions. Thus, women are good at multiskilling, communication and have empathy, which is not seen in men. Women are thus good at small details that make things happen, like organizing the office, receiving visitors and general management functions.*

It would appear the narrative accentuates administrative functions that fall short of leadership expectations. Rayyan (2017) shares similar views; perceiving women as deeply rooted in managerial roles with little significance to leadership. Additionally, Bahiru *et al* (2018) perceive leadership as considerably complex, with several interpretations emerging. However, the nature of their attributes places them in the position to coach, at all managerial levels, as well as being able to mentor subordinates. Ndalamba, Caldwell and Anderson (2018) concur, adding that leadership can only help achieve organisational goals if management functions are complete. As a male senior manager, Participant 21 noted:

> *Religious beliefs contribute to the lack of female leadership. Women therefore turn to trying to impress even if it means breaking natural laws. They are hard workers, make people value their jobs, but are emotionally weakened.*

The above narrative signifies that spirituality tends to exclude women from becoming leaders and this view is supported by Catholicism, thus prohibiting female leadership as criminal (Gervais 2012). This argument is at the centre of the spiritual controversy, as women tend to avoid being labelled social delinquents when they decide to enter the leadership race, which of necessity requires masculine consent. In the absence of this sanctioning, female leadership may unfortunately be relegated to participants in an inclusive and diverse environment (Hassim 2006). The narrative states that women leaders fail to manage their emotions effectively, and this is supported by Brescoll *et al* (2018), who state that women leaders exhibit inconsistencies in managing emotions through a manifestation of restrained aggressiveness and anger in conflict situations. The concept of emotionality underpins female leadership weaknesses in achieving organisational effectiveness (Rahman *et al* 2018).

Indicator 2: Structured systems

The results of the study indicate that women place emphasis on details. This is demonstrated in the extract from Participant 9, who is a female middle manager:

> *Women are often particular about small issues such as perfecting task given and making sure they do the right things to the book. For example, as a supervisor, I had to do the job myself when my subordinates failed to do it. I ignored men's behaviour in the hope they would change, and therefore did the job on their behalf.*

The narrative seems to indicate that women focus on trivial issues that relate to structure and predictability and therefore value policies and procedures, as also established by Helgesen (2017). Okkolin (2016) echoes this view; adding that women accentuate certainty and are therefore risk-averse; emphasising systems. Exclusive focus on predictability and structures tends to limit innovation and creativity. The leadership aspect of coaching and mentoring subordinates is poorly adjudicated. A mid-level male manager, Participant 11, considered women leaders as overwhelmed by household chores:

> *Women should sacrifice and balance the issues of work and home. They often give excuses to be off duty to attend to family issues, letting work suffer. If you are working with a woman, you do the bulk of the work as they are attending to family problems.*

The narrative depicts the industrious nature of women as often hampered by work overload and the argument is supported by a Swedish Government Report (2017) that sought to reverse the policy on workplace, *vis-à-vis* domestic chores, by increasing masculine participation in incentivised household assignments. The convergence of household and workplace responsibilities remains a major challenge to women in leadership positions. Digitalisation is likely to smoothen some of the cultural restrictions that undermine female leadership (Zhang Hong *et al* 2011).

Dimension C: Factors inhibiting women leadership effectiveness

This study revealed that, apart from the factors that support female leadership, there are also detractors that deter women from attaining organisational effectiveness.

Indicator 1: Female leader adaptability challenges

In moving towards constructing a framework for female leadership, women were found to be risk-averse; thus, limiting their innovative capacity, as expressed by a senior female manager, Participant 1:

> *Women are patient and strong, because if beaten by their husbands, they will persist with life and try to hide the ordeal. Women deliver, yet men desert offices, and women are there despite family commitments. Women are seen in perseverance in times of family disputes, yet continue to be positive in life.*

The unflinching persona in women demonstrates that aspect of conservation which tends to maintain the status quo to avoid risk-taking. Rahman *et al* (2018) share similar convictions, adding that emotional instability keeps women away from uncertainties. Surprisingly, women adapt quite easily to domestic upheavals, succumbing to domestic violence (Bahiru *et al* 2018). Consequently, women may feel insecure in a male-dominant workplace displaying unwillingness to adapt to new situations. Within the male-dominated confines, women tend to develop low self-esteem, observed by a female middle manager, Participant 18:

> *Women lack confidence because they are undermined by men. They are also underutilised in leadership opportunities, while some women show jealousy. They think women become promoted through corrupt practices such as infidelity.*

Participant 12, a male first-line manager, adds that '*We still have few women leaders because women cannot take harsh decisions.'* The low self-esteem in women leaders derives from societal perceptions and prejudices, observed by subordinates as unscrupulous appointments. Women therefore hesitate to indulge in leadership positions for a variety of reasons, such as fear of the unknown. The threatening circumstance creates withdrawal from public circles; limiting their employability or promotional opportunities (Agbim 2018). The cultural and spiritual doctrines deter female self-esteem to exercise their leadership talents independently and confidently (Longman *et al* 2018; Alotaibi, Cutting and Morgan 2017). Thus, women remain curtailed within harsh male-dominated environments.

Indicator 2: Female leader scope for informality

The second indicator revealed in this study pertains to the limited informal structures open to women, as narrated by female first-line manager, Participant 20:

> *My boss who is male knows me more than his wife, which is not the case with women bosses. Women cannot be as open as men. They are always reserved … So, it is important that you create a relationship that is more than work itself, but must keep some professional distance.*

This narrative shows the leader-follower relationship that manifests at a high-level intimacy and familiarity shared by the different genders, revealing some degree of extroversion. The power of exploitative informal relationships is demonstrated; providing a sense of work etiquette and decorum. Alotaibi *et al* (2017) further assert that women fail to utilise the informal structures but rather prefer to reinforce formal and structured channels. Conversely, men are portrayed in this study as utilising informality more than their female counterparts; accentuating socialisation and networking. Participant 20, who is a female, states that "... men are more open than women", implying their ability to socialise outside the workplace, while participant 11 stresses that they are overburdened both by workplace burdens and household chores. These demands place constraints on women who regard informality structures as a luxury. More importantly, women themselves tend to be responsible for their downfall by protecting their purported female territory (Helgesen 2017). As a result, there seems to be tension between men and women in locating strategies for advancing female leadership. Participant 18 reinforces this notion:

> *In my department, most women are reluctant to take part in activities outside the scope of their work. They come to work on time, leave the company after work hours and rarely have time for outside work activities, electing to go home after work. If forced to attend other programmes organized in the company, they will stay with the people they are familiar with and protect their territory.*

The above narrative suggests that women avoid participating in extramural activities, implying some degree of introversion and limited use of the informal structure. Muralidharan *et al* (2018) echo the same view that female avoidance of 'out-of-work' assignments restricts their entrepreneurship, which further curtails their leadership potential. Robertson *et al* (2017) argue that exploiting the informal structure improves information sharing and empowers leader decision-making shrewdness. Bahiru *et al* (2018) make similar claims to the effect that informality accommodates a facility for providing feedback; alerting leaders to modify behaviours befitting any environmental changes. Participant 17 observes:

> *Women like to work on jobs that encourage individual concentration like finance and technical work where there is little disturbance from others. They work better when left alone. Women are mostly not willing to initiate social activities, especially those that are married, preferring to remain in the background. It is therefore difficult to tell them where and when they go wrong or appreciate what they are doing.*

This narrative indicates that female inclination for independent work allows for their introversion; suggesting the desire for technical tasks with minimal human interruption. In the extract, there is limited informality, and therefore restricted scope for feedback that can be offered in good faith (Helgesen 2017). One way that could assist women's leadership efficiency relates to the reorganisation of work schedules to accommodate domestic commitments. The need to support women in the workplace demonstrates how women managers depend highly on organisational patronage to accomplish both occupational and domestic assignments (Ndalamba *et al* 2018). Women are likely to perform better if their work and household environments are modified to accommodate gender-inclusive conditions. From a woman's perspective, women need to play their part in adopting to the tenets of extroversion related to informality, so that coaching and mentoring tasks can be effectively conducted (Laukhuf and Malone 2015). In fact, balanced leadership requires leadership skills that will facilitate supervisory functions expected of every leader (IECEP 2011).

IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PRACTICE

As part of the framework developed for enhancing female leadership effectiveness, a number of useful dimensions were identified. The first dimension related to creating a robust female leadership, first with an indicator of respect for ubuntu; characterising a unique endowment of caring to garner common social good for doing ethical business with men abusing office (Selzer *et al* 2017). Organisations should therefore endorse female leadership to reduce unscrupulous practice and increase organisational effectiveness (Oni 2017). The next indicator referred to relationship building, with emotions being managed to accelerate mutual trust and familiarity and therefore attain organisational goals collectively (Shafique *et al* 2018; Alghamdi *et al* 2017). Women leaders should embrace both transactional and transformational leadership approaches to stimulate intra-personal relationships with the ultimate attainment of organisational effectiveness (Afsar *et al* 2018).

The second dimension suggests female leadership enables effectiveness, where managerial excellence might focus on an over-emphasis on management at the expense of leadership. Management and leadership go hand-in-hand, and a good and effective leader should be able to balance them in practice. The notion of leadership requires a greater focus on women leaders (O'Neil *et al* 2016; Bahiru *et al* 2018; Ndalamba *et al* 2018). In structured systems, women place emphasis on details and the value of predictability which policies and procedures provide, although it often limits creativity (Helgesen 2017; Okkolin 2016). Women leaders should focus more on adopting an inclusive leadership approach where risks are shared, with some policy on work-life balance targeting household chores to avert women to work overload (Nyman, Reinikainen and Eriksson 2017).

The last dimension targets major impediments to female leadership effectiveness; addressing the notion that women avoid taking risks, thus withdrawing from public leadership responsibilities due to cultural and spiritual factors, which could have a negative impact on their self-esteem and belief in their capability (Agbim 2018; Longman *et al.* 2018; Alotaibi *et al* 2017). As part of their managerial role, supervisors should share ideas through coaching and mentoring processes to achieve quantum benefits (IECEP 2011). Women and men have complementary and connected roles (Pollitt *et al* 2018). Reduced socialisation and networking curtail information sharing (Bissessar 2018; Muralidharan *et al.* 2018). Men should therefore be part of gender mainstreaming initiatives and women should see them as strategic partners, and informally also utilise digital approaches (Helgesen 2017).

CONCLUSION

This article presented a conceptual framework for promoting female leadership and women's contribution to organisational effectiveness. This framework could be applied and tested in various scenarios. Three important dimensions were identified that could likely provide a new leadership dispensation to female leaders and address several of the inequalities. These dimensions focus first on robust female leader effectiveness, supporting the effectiveness of female leaders, and third on factors inhibiting female leader effectiveness.

The move towards the construction of a leadership framework reveals a number of indicators or enablers that are identified. These include concern for humanity (ubuntu) and building relations in the first dimension. The second dimension creates a pillar for managerial excellence and structured systems, including adaptability in the face of challenges; and finally, the scope for informality among female leaders as the third dimension. Addressing many of these factors will contribute towards enhanced female leadership. Consequently, this triangular structure constitutes a multidimensional approach where all stakeholders are involved, with men at the epicentre of the engagement.

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ASSESSING THE CAPABILITIES OF NSG FACILITATORS IN BUILDING CIVIL SERVANTS' CAPACITY FOR THE EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS

Izimangaliso Malatjie[1]

INTRODUCTION

The United Nations (UN) Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (UN 2015) adopted 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) that are intended to stimulate action over the next 15 years in areas of critical importance for humanity and the planet. The SDGs are also referred to as 'The Global Goals'. Since 2015, these goals have rapidly gained traction and salience among a broad range of actors beyond the 193 UN member states who unanimously endorsed them, as well as among actors such as public policy bodies, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and public and private sector organisations (Bebbington and Unerman 2018).

The adoption of the SDGs by the United Nations should be considered a significant step forward. Nevertheless, experience with the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) has proven that the implementation process represents a serious challenge (de Vries, 2016). It appears that the complexity of the goals, the lack of clarity between the numerous stakeholders involved as well as issues with measuring progress make effective implementation more difficult. If nations are to achieve the SDGs by 2030, public sector organisations must clarify their own missions in this process, thus setting clear goals and objectives. SDG 16 relates to building peace, justice and strong institutions. This implies that the public service has to play a critical role in the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. In this context, the transformation and changes that the public service is undergoing call for public servants to build the awareness, competencies and skills needed for the future in order to contribute significantly and effectively to the attainment of the SDGs. The public service has a key role to play in the implementation of the Agenda 2030. Hence, public servants require skills and competencies that are relevant to the implementation of the SDGs. Policymakers and administrations are under a great deal of time, political and social pressure to establish the framework conditions (Reiners and Reiber 2018).

According to a UN Report (UN 2018), awareness is the entry point to building momentum for cross-sectoral action on the SDGs in national and sub-national contexts. Knowledge and

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understating of Agenda 2030 enables public servants to establish pathways for the achievement of these targets. Policy awareness in the public service increases the chances that centres of government will assign priority to the integration of the Goals into national development plans and allocate sufficient resources for the implementation of the related programs. These skills can be acquired through education and training. In South Africa, this can be done as part of the curriculum at universities, or as part of the compulsory induction programme (CIP) for public servants who join government for the first time. It should be noted that the National School of Government (NSG) is well positioned to offer well-designed training programmes to build the capacities of public servants at various levels of management.

The article intends to determine the extent to which NSG facilitators are offering training programmes in a way that promotes the attainment of the SDGs. In order to achieve its objective, the article is divided into five sections. Section one outlines the methodology that was used to gather data and information. Section two explores the background and relevance of the SDGs. Section three examines the establishment of the NSG as a school and the type of training programmes it offers. Section four discusses the findings before it concludes and provides some recommendations.

METHODOLOGY

Sample and data collection

The population of this study consisted of 176 Independent Individual Contractors (IICs) who are contracted by the NSG to facilitate training to public servants. These individuals are not full-time employees of the NSG, but are facilitators who are contracted to deliver training for a specific number of years. A questionnaire was used to collect data. An electronic version of the questionnaire was loaded on Survey Monkey and emailed to all NSG IICs. The questionnaire was administered in English and consisted of ten closed ended questions, which took ten minutes to complete. Of the 176 distributed questionnaires, 54 responses were received, which gives a 31% response rate, and 30 questionnaires were not completed in full and thus could not be used. The questionnaire was emailed to all IICs, then a reminder was sent out on a weekly basis until the final date of submission of completed questionnaire. The low response rate is attributed to the fact that, although 176 IICs are on the NSG database, not all of them are utilised at any given point as most of the NSG courses are now aimed towards e-learning instead of face-to-face contact learning.

Data analysis

Data was collected using Lime-survey and exported to Microsoft (MS) Excel. The dataset was coded using MS Excel’s find and replace functions, i.e. strongly agree = 1, agree = 2, disagree = 3, and strongly disagree = 4. Similarly, extremely satisfied = 1, very satisfied = 2, somewhat satisfied = 3, not satisfied = 4. Data analysis was performed using MS Excel 2013, with the Analysis ToolPak add-on.

BACKGROUND AND RELEVANCE OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS

The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) of 2000, also known as the Millennium Goals, aimed to compensate for the autonomous concentration of wealth by focusing on ensuring dignity for the poorest people. The MDGs mobilised people in different parts of the world and in different capacities to implement the MDGs, even though the end results have been uneven. Negotiations on the follow-up to the now expired MDGs have expanded the scope of discussion to include ecological issues. They have led to the adoption of the document entitled “Transforming our world: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development”, which includes the SDGs under the auspices of the United Nations General Assembly. The SDGs set goals to ensure a social floor and planetary boundaries and suggest some of the means that should help in achieving these goals (Gupta and Vegelin 2016). The SDGs are built on what is commonly referred to as the five Ps:

- People: ‘We are determined to end poverty and hunger, in all their forms and dimensions, and to ensure that all human beings can fulfil their potential in dignity and equality and in a healthy environment.’
- Planet: ‘We are determined to protect the planet from degradation, including through sustainable consumption and production, sustainably managing its natural resources and taking urgent action on climate change, so that it can support the needs of the present and future generations.’
- Prosperity: ‘We are determined to ensure that all human beings can enjoy prosperous and fulfilling lives and that economic, social and technological progress occurs in harmony with nature.’
- Peace: ‘We are determined to foster peaceful, just and inclusive societies that are free from fear and violence. There can be no sustainable development without peace and no peace without sustainable development.’
- Partnership: ‘We are determined to mobilize the means required to implement this Agenda through a revitalized Global Partnership for Sustainable Development, based on a spirit of strengthened global solidarity, focused in particular on the needs of the poorest and most vulnerable and with the participation of all countries, all stakeholders and all people’ (UN 2015).

South Africa was one of the early supporters of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. This commitment is intertwined with its contribution to setting Africa’s long-term development goals. In 2013, South Africa played a leading role in the African Union (AU) to define eight long-term development ideals for the continent. These ideals were later translated into the seven aspirations of the AU’s Agenda 2063. The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the SDGs offer the potential to transform the dominant approaches to economic, social and environmental challenges. The SDGs aim to create an integrative agenda that includes environmental sustainability and social concerns with the poverty eradication agenda (Stevens and Kanie 2016). To address these aims, the SDGs comprise 17 goals (see table 1 below) relating to social, ecological and economic outcomes (UN 2016).

Table 1: Sustainable Development Goals

GOAL NUMBER	OUTLINE DESCRIPTION
SDG 1	End poverty in all its forms everywhere
SDG 2	End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture
SDG 3	Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages
SDG 4	Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all
SDG 5	Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls
SDG 6	Ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all
SDG 7	Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all
SDG 8	Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all
SDG 9	Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization and foster innovation
SDG 10	Reduce inequality within and among countries
SDG 11	Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable
SDG 12	Ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns
SDG 13	Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts
SDG 14	Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development
SDG 15	Protect, restore and promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably manage forests, combat desertification, and halt and reverse land degradation and halt biodiversity loss
SDG 16	Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels
SDG 17	Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the global partnership for sustainable development

Source: UN 2015.

Gupta and Vegelin (2016) point out that the successful implementation of the SDGs would not only mean that poverty and marginalisation are reduced, but ecological sustainability is also enhanced, and the gap between the powerful and less powerful is minimised. It also means recognising a powerful ends-means connection between the goals and the ways in which they are integrated into global society. This requires conceptual coherence between the SDGs and how they are applied. Thus, the methods for implementation would need to embrace the principles of inclusive development in themselves to overcome unequal power relations in order to genuinely address these goals.

Agenda 2030 and its SDGs have become universal guideposts for transformative change. While parliaments and political leaders are responsible for designing effective strategies, public servants play an indispensable role in operational implementation. Achieving progress on the SDGs will require governments to practice innovative ways of horizontal and vertical coordination. However, there are significant gaps in capability and expertise, which need to be filled if the public service is to be able to facilitate economic and societal transformation (Reiners and Reiber 2019).

THE ROLE OF THE NATIONAL SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT

The National School of Government (NSG), formerly known as the Public Administration Leadership and Management Academy (PALAMA), was established in 2008. In terms of the Public Service Act, 1999 (Act 1 of 1999), the NSG is regarded as a schedule one department. As a training institute, the NSG's role is to be actively involved in capacity building. This includes ensuring improved employee performance through training and development. Programmes offered include leadership skills, financial skills and technical skills. Furthermore, the lack of understanding of the PMS is addressed through training programmes (Public Administration Leadership and Management Academy 2010:9; Dastile 2018).

The existence of the NSG arises from the recognition of the need for a strategic shift, enabling government to use training and development to improve the functioning of government departments and their consequent achievement of policy goals (NSG Strategic Plan 2015-2020:2). Just like any other government department within the public service, the NSG has a vision, mission and value statement which provides direction to the organisation as well as its employees. Employees are expected to perform their duties according to certain directives, and the vision, mission and values of the NSG assist in highlighting the responsibilities of employees to achieve the mandate of the organisation (Dastile 2018).

The NSG Annual report (2020) indicates that the legislative mandate for the NSG is derived from the Public Service Act, 1994 (Proclamation 103 of 1994), as amended (South Africa 1994). This is the core mandate, which establishes the NSG for it to fulfil a function of providing training or causing the provision of training to occur within the public service. Another piece of legislation – the Public Administration Management Act, 2014 (Act 11 of 2014) (South Africa 2014) – was promulgated to give effect, *inter alia*, to the progressive realisation of the values and principles governing public administration across the three spheres of government; to provide for capacity development and training; and for the establishment of the School.

According to Dastile (2018:84-85), the NSG is expected to provide training to employees who are undertrained, orientate employees on all the policies that need to be implemented within the organisation, and provide courses that can help employees enhance their skills in the workplace. The NSG has to consider the broader changes which occur in the public service that require the organisation to pay attention to issues of the Batho-Pele principles, employment equity and skills development. Further, the author adds that training interventions are usually identified and scheduled in a coordinated way. Emphasis is also placed on the constant revision of the contents of these training interventions to make provision for the changing needs of a particular institution. Training and development interventions are therefore part of the process of transforming an individual employee into a professional. As mentioned previously, to professionalise public service training, interventions at the NSG are offered in four streams (Management, Induction, Administration and Leadership). Training delivery takes place through a hybrid of outsourced training facilitators: Independent Individual Contractors (IICs), Higher Education Institutions (HEIs), private training providers, current public servants, and the NSG trainers themselves. Therefore, three core values define the NSG, namely: learn, grow, and serve. The attainment of these core values will surely play an important role in incorporating the SDGs into the Education Training and Development (ETD) programmes offered by the NSG. These values are briefly discussed below.

Learn

Capacity for learning is an essential foundation for South Africa's future development, and this value must find expression in the NSG. The NSG must assist public organisations to continuously improve outcomes and impact by institutionalising effective and reliable learning. As improved performance is the ultimate purpose of all the NSG's training and development programmes, there should be an organisational development focus in every aspect of the NSG's design, development and delivery, ensuring that capacity issues are approached holistically, developmentally and systematically (National School of Government 2014:23).

Capacity for learning is an essential foundation for South Africa's future development, and this value finds expression in the NSG. The NSG will assist public organisations to continuously improve outcomes and impact by institutionalising effective and reliable learning. As the ultimate purpose of all the School's learning and development programmes and services is improved performance of public sector institutions, there will be an organisational development focus in every aspect of design, development and delivery; ensuring that capacity issues are approached holistically, developmentally and systematically.

Grow

The National School of Government (2014:23) maintains that learning is accompanied by growth. The content of training and development should be socially and politically progressive, national in character but supported by and reflective of the needs and challenges of local contexts. Learning programmes should be designed to be dynamic and developmental: they must ensure that public servants are able to access relevant knowledge and develop critical and reflective, analytical and problem-solving skills that will enable them to be responsive to the needs and demands that confront the public sector.

With learning there is growth. The content of learning and development is socially and politically progressive, national in character but supported by and reflective of the needs and challenges of local contexts. Learning programmes will be designed to be dynamic and developmental; they will ensure that public servants are able to access relevant knowledge and develop critical, reflective, analytical and problem-solving skills that will enable them to be responsive to the needs and demands that confront the public sector. Thus, one of the key features of the programmes and services of the NSG will be their relevance. The School's research and knowledge management support services will ensure that public servants are able to contribute to the ongoing development of policy-relevant knowledge through their own learning and development process.

Serve

Finally, service and professional, responsive, service-oriented public servants are central to a developmental state. The NSG should emphasise partnerships, consultation and engagement with the objective of developing collective leadership for a uniform, professional and capable public service, imbued with a culture and ethos of service (National School of Government 2014:23). Serving and a professional, responsive service orientation are central to a developmental state. The School will emphasise partnerships, consultation and engagement in the development of a national Learning and Development Strategy, with the objective of developing collective leadership for a uniform professional and capable public service, imbued with a culture and ethos of service. The NSG will be grounded in the democratic ethos and values of the South African Constitution and contribute to institutionalising the values and principles of public service it outlines. These include the following: accountability; integrity; respect; consistency; excellence; fairness and social justice (NSG 2014).

The NSG is intended to educate, train, professionalise and develop a highly capable, skilled and committed public service cadre, with a sense of national duty and a common culture and ethos. The school endeavours to nurture a culture of professionalism and innovative thinking and serves as a catalyst for reform and modernisation, in pursuit of a performance-oriented public service (NSG 2020:12). Thus, providing generic, mandatory and demand-driven training that is focussed on improving education and learning in leadership, management and administration (including front-line services) in the public service (NSG 2017).

The learning and development of public officials play a significant role in addressing the systematic challenges of public management, administration and service delivery. The NSG implements an integrated learning framework for public sector training. The framework informs a generic curriculum framework and functional learning area frameworks for the NSG, which are underpinned by the required competency frameworks for the public sector. Guidance on how to translate the integrated learning framework into effective courses, programmes and qualifications is provided in a curriculum operational strategy. The ability to implement the learning framework is underpinned by the assumption that the required human and technological infrastructures and capacity are in place to manage and deliver training (NSG 2020:3).

The National Development Plan (NDP) – Vision 2030 – envisions the building of a capable and developmental state with capable institutions and the capacity to provide relevant and responsive interventions for the benefit of South African citizens. The future requires a state that is capable of playing a developmental and transformative role, with skilled public servants who are committed to the public good and capable of delivering consistently high-quality services to all South Africans. The NDP identifies critical interventions to build a professional public service and consequently a capable state. The anticipation of well-run departments staffed by skilled public servants, who are capable, motivated and ethical has significant implications for public administration education, training and development interventions, and the impact they are intended to have on the functioning of the state.

In a learning framework by the NSG (2020), it is indicated that service delivery remains a top priority of government. In achieving the goals of the NDP, the Medium-Term Strategic Framework (MTSF) for the 2014 – 2019 term articulates government's commitment to achieve an efficient, effective and development-oriented public service. Thus, the mandate of the NSG in line with the NDP and the attributes of a developmental state, gives impetus to building a common service ethos and a competent public service, link training and development to the national development goals, and focus training on improving work performance and service delivery (NSG 2018:7). According to McLennan and Orkin (2009), the NSG was informed by the thoughts of increasing the relevance of training to government's need and the relevance to a developmental agenda; therefore, taking charge of the training agenda of the public sector.

Public servants are responsible for implementing development programmes, monitoring progress, undertaking evaluations on results and impacts, reporting and providing feedback that informs policy decisions on the trajectory that projects should take. Thus, public servants are critical to the operations of government, hence qualified and skilled individuals are required to carry out the mandate of government (UN 2018).

Potgieter (2019) indicates that capable and competent public services are required in order for governments to remain responsive to the aspirations of citizens, deliver effective services and achieve national development objectives. Management development institutes, schools of government and public service academies were created with the unique role of building capacity among public servants to better support the achievement of government objectives. Such institutions support governments through teaching and learning programmes that contribute to mainstreaming the appropriate work ethic, productivity, norms and standards, and supporting the creation of a culture of lifelong learning amongst public servants. Therefore, such institutions should be appropriately structured, governed and funded, and remain responsive throughout the development and rollout of relevant programmes.

Public service performance is based on the premise that people are the most important asset of public sector institutions and the agents of quality public service delivery, winning the fight against corruption and good governance. The knowledge, skills, values, attitudes and abilities of public servants are the heart of state performance. Thus, the availability of core skills and competencies in the public service will be a major determinant for the country in order to attain the SDGs (UN 2018). Therefore, it is against this backdrop that the NSG is compelled to come up with ways of incorporating SDGs into the current curriculum of training and reskilling of public servants.

Based on the information provided in the preceding paragraphs, it is evident that in order to achieve SDGs, public servants will need to acquire new skills and competencies. Therefore, government needs to make an urgent investment in retooling public services and equipping public servants with knowledge, skills and competencies on SDGs. Thus, the NSG with its given mandate will need to invest in the training and development of public servants with emphasis on SDGs.

DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

Figure 1 below indicates that 48% of respondents agreed with the statement "The sustainable development goals agenda have an influence when I provide training for government officials" and 46% strongly agreed with this statement. Only 6% of respondents were not sure about the statement. According to the UNDP (2015), progress on the SDGs depends on public servants as they are a crucial variable in the performance of governments and the outcomes they are able to deliver. Therefore, it is important that government provides appropriate training on SDGs to all public servants. Emphasis is in terms of article 195(1) of the Constitution Act of 1996 (South Africa 1996), which stipulates that the success of the public service depends on its capabilities to maintain a sound administration, deliver services to citizens, and design and implement development programmes. These capabilities in turn depend on the skills, performance, integrity and motivation of the public service personnel corps. Thus, best personnel administration practices that include performance management and continuous professional development suited to the South African context need to be pursued.

Figure 1: Training for government officials



The results indicate that 46% of respondents agree with the statement “I link the 17 goals of the 2030 agenda into my training materials” and 20% strongly agree with the statement while only 17% are in disagreement. The responses are indicated in Figure 2 below.

Figure 2: 17 Goals of the 2030 agenda linked to training materials



Figure 3 indicates that 52% of respondents agreed with the statement “I understand the implementation of the 2030 agenda”, while 28% strongly agree with is statement. Only 2% of respondents did not agree with the statement.

Figure 3: Understanding the implementation of the 2030 Agenda



The results of the study indicate that over 80% of respondents were in agreement with the statement “There are challenges in terms of monitoring the progress of implementing the 2030 Agenda in training government officials”. The above results are supported by Vayrynen (2005), who contends that the implementation as well as the monitoring and evaluation of development goals require an effective and impartial public administration system that faithfully implements the relevant policy decisions. Figure 4 below indicates the results:

Figure 4: Challenges in terms of monitoring the progress of implementing 2030 Agenda



The following statement was posed to participants: "there is a module on training of trainers on SDGs in my institution". Over 50% of respondents indicated that they were not aware of this module, while 26% disagreed with the statement.

Figure 5: Module for training of trainers on SDGs



Figure 6 indicates that 39% of respondents agreed with the statement "There are awareness programmes for public sector trainers on the 2030 Agenda", while 19% disagreed with the statement, and the rest (43%) were not sure.

Figure 6: Awareness programmes on the 2030 Agenda



The responses in this category indicate that 43% of respondents were not sure about the statement "SDGs Agenda 2030 is included in my organisation's training policy" while 32% of respondents agreed with the statement. While 26% totally disagreed with the statement, Tandoh-Offin (2019) indicates that unless policy integration is backed by practical effort, including participatory and learning processes, there might be a chance that we miss the opportunity to deliver on the SDGs.

Figure 7: SDGs Agenda 2030 included in organisation's training policy



Of the respondents, more than 40% agreed with the statement "SDGs Agenda 2030 is included in the training curriculum", while 26% of respondents were unsure and only 4% strongly disagreed with this statement.

Figure 8: SDGs Agenda 2030 is included in the training curriculum



The results indicate that 85% of respondents indicated that they are ready as facilitators to train and present courses on Agenda 2030. Only 2% disagreed with this statement and the rest (3%) were unsure. The overwhelming majority of respondents who agreed with this statement indicates that the NSG has been empowering its facilitators on Agenda 2030.

Figure 9: Readiness of facilitators to train on Agenda 2030



In this category, 54% of respondents agreed with the statement "There is movement towards the implementation of the 2030 Agenda in government programmes", while 46% completely disagreed with the statement. The results indicate that government departments lack the thorough knowledge and skills necessary to develop awareness programmes on the 2030 Agenda. This statement is supported by Afonso-Gallegos, Bekele-Thomas, Dayal, de Jongh, Fourie, Mkhize, Muller and Schaefer (2018), who indicated that while sustainable development in its broadest sense depends on integration, coordination and alignment across various sectors, it requires certain responsibilities to be driven by key departments to ensure delivery.

Figure 10: Movement towards the implementation of the 2030 Agenda in government programmes



The findings above are supported by literature, as it is pointed out in the NDP that the public sector is conceptualised as the engine of transformation, growth and development. It is necessary, therefore, that the learning and development efforts of the NSG produce a public sector corps that consistently has the professionalism, high-level skills, knowledge, competencies, values and attitudes required to respond to South Africa's developmental needs. Responsiveness to the developmental agenda of the nation requires a flexible and changing curriculum that reflects the priorities of development and nation-building as they develop over time; thus, the School is designed to address these challenges (NSG 2014).

According to the UNDP (2017), successful implementation of the SDGs and Agenda 2063 will require an integrated approach that coordinates the efforts of all sectors of government working in collaboration with private sector and civil society. This is where the participation and role of the NSG becomes very important. The NSG's strategic plan (2014) highlights the aim of the School as to contribute to establishing a capable, professional and responsive public service that is committed to, and has institutionalised, the values and policies of a developmental state. This would be a public service that delivers services that are able to address the challenges of poverty and inequality. Therefore, the NSG will be responsive to the challenges of national development, with the aim of working towards the achievement of the 2030 Agenda.

Based on the above information and results of the study, it is imperative that the NSG introduces a course that is directly focussed on the implementation of the SDGs because without a capacitated public workforce, South Africa will not be able to achieve these goals. Curricula should be developed around the SDGs and facilitators should also be trained so that they can have a thorough understanding of the SDGs. Information on SGDs should also be shared with the rest of the staff members at the NSG; this can be done via forums, brown bag sessions and formal meetings. The NSG, as a training arm of government, should be in the forefront of mainstreaming SDGs into the public service, through formal training, workshops, seminars and roundtable discussions. Most importantly, the leadership of the school needs to have awareness of the relevance of the 2030 Agenda and actively support the inclusion of the relevant content in the curriculum.

CONCLUSION

Gupta and Vegelin (2016) are of the view that the implementation of SDGs would need to challenge the business-as-usual approach to growth. Seeking to promote the rule of law at the national and international levels, upward and downward accountability in institutions, enhanced participation, freedoms and capabilities at all levels, the SDGs clearly aim to bring up the baseline for developing countries. With the Agenda 2030, public administrations are asked to play a central role in the implementation of the SDGs. As a result, national and subnational governments must coordinate their efforts in order to avoid overlapping and or potential conflicts. Furthermore, there is still a need for greater awareness on the role of public servants in this process. Thus, the achievement of the SDGs is strongly linked to the ability of public servants to perform. Therefore, particular attention should be given to the inclusion of SDGs in education and training programs of Schools and Institutes of Administration as well as other institutions delivering education and training in the field.

The NDP continues to remain the compass in efforts to build a capable and developmental state and address the socio-economic challenges of poverty, unemployment and inequality in our society. What is important, in the context of the mandate of the NSG, is the emphasis that a capable state requires ethical and effective leadership, competent and ethical public servants, sound institutional policies and systems, and clear lines of accountability, and consistent and fair application of rules. NSG will through its ETD interventions produce ethical and competent public servants, to bring about the capable state envisaged by the NDP to achieve the goal of a capable and developmental state (NSG 2020).

Alfonso-Gallegos *et al.* (2018) indicated that the 2030 Agenda's SDGs have been very well received in South Africa since their formulation in 2015. The country has assumed a prominent role globally and in Africa in guiding the process and in negotiating for the adoption of the SDGs in its capacity as Chair of the G77 and China. However, enthusiasm for the SDGs is more pronounced at the political and senior echelons of policy making, while only slowly building up steam within government, civil society, the private sector and the public at large. Therefore, government needs to look at mainstreaming SDGs by aligning these goals into the Medium Term Strategic Framework (MTSF).

The 17 SDGs are integrated—that is, they recognize that action in one area will affect outcomes in others, and that development must balance social, economic and environmental sustainability (UNDP, 2019). For implementation of SDGs to be successful, sustained coordination of policies, programmes and strategies at all levels is required. Thus, in the works of Alfonso-Gallegos *et al*. (2018) it is highlighted that to deliver on SDGs, Agenda 2063, NDP and other national and continental obligations, there is a need to partner, coordinate and collaborate in order to establish and strengthen partnerships that blend the strengths of state and non-state actors. Based on the above information and results of the study, the NSG cannot do it alone this requires greater levels of collaboration and engagement by all sectors and stakeholders in society at the provincial, national, regional and global levels. The results presented in this article may contribute to the understanding of the role education and training could play in the process of attaining the SDGs by the public service of a country like South Africa. The empirical results provide insights into the readiness of NSG facilitators to implement capacity development training for the attainment of the Global Goals.

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CHALLENGES FACING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE GREEN MOVEMENT IN RESIDENTIAL AREAS IN LUSAKA, ZAMBIA

Peter Nyakalale and Clever Madimutsa[1]

INTRODUCTION

Zambia is one of the African countries that have intensified their efforts to manage the environment. This is illustrated by the adoption of the Make Zambia Clean and Healthy Campaign in 2007. This campaign was revived in 2015 as the Keep Zambia Clean and Healthy Campaign. Through this revival, the government designated the first Saturday of every month as the official day of cleaning the country (Republic of Zambia 2018). In 2018, the campaign was re-branded as the Keep Zambia Clean, Green and Healthy Campaign. The re-branded campaign introduced the green aspect to the campaign and encouraged citizens and institutions to have vegetation and avoid indiscriminate cutting of trees (Lungu 2018). Despite the adoption of the Keep Zambia Clean, Green and Healthy Campaign, the levels of community awareness of green building practices are still low (Sichali and Banda 2017). This shows that there are challenges faced in the process of implementing the green movement in residential areas in the country.

The purpose of this article is to identify the challenges of implementing the green movement in residential areas in Zambia, with a particular focus on the Lusaka district. To achieve its purpose, the article begins by reviewing literature on the management of green residential areas. This is followed by an application of governance network and implementation theories in the management of green residential areas. Thereafter, the article presents the methodology used to conduct the research. It then presents the challenges faced by the government to implement the green movement in residential areas. This is followed by an explanation of the challenges faced by the residents to keep their premises green and the conclusion.

MANAGEMENT OF GREEN RESIDENTIAL AREAS: A REVIEW OF LITERATURE

The literature shows that many studies have been done to try and gain knowledge of green environments. These include studies on awareness, attitudes and perceptions of green building practices and principles, valuing urban green spaces in some residential areas, the nature of and challenges behind the deterioration and poor management of urban green spaces, the use of GIS technologies in analysing challenges and opportunities for the management of urban green spaces, sustainable green infrastructure, green neighbourhood environments

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and their implications for health promotion, physical activity and well-being, and green spaces preference, perceptions and barriers in a rapidly urbanising city (see Weimann 2017; Tan *et al.* 2019; Wendel *et al.* 2012; Johansson and Smars 2015; Gaspard and Mukanyandwi 2014; Mensah 2014; Cilliers and Sarel 2015; Sichali and Banda 2017; Lindgren 2010). Sichali and Banda (2017) conducted a study on awareness, attitudes and perception of green building practices and principles in the Zambian construction industry. The study found that those who took part in sustainability construction projects showed greater awareness and knowledge than those who did not. Further, that knowledge gained was dependent on education levels. However, the weakness of these studies is that they neglect the management of green surroundings in the form of green trees and grass. In an effort to address this problem of environmental degradation, African countries have introduced measures such as using technology in analysing the challenges and opportunities for the management of urban green spaces, valuing green spaces. Gaspard and Mukanyandwi (2014) looked at the use of GIS technologies in analysing challenges and opportunities for the management of urban green spaces in Kigali, Rwanda. The study found that the management of green spaces in Kigali City is still facing some challenges, which includes a lack of policies on green space management, a low level of awareness among local people, rural-urban migration leading to inappropriate human settlements in some areas of the city, waste management challenges, and pollution. Mensah (2014) also adds that the nature and distribution of green spaces in Africa is influenced by ecological zones and climate conditions. However, the studies are generalised to cover urban green spaces and not specifically green residential areas.

Studies on the need for a green environment have also been done in other countries and regions in the developing world such as China, Asia and Latin America (See Johansson and Smars 2015; Wendel *et al.* 2012; Tan et al 2019). Johansson and Smars (2015) found that public parks were the greatest contributors to the green infrastructure in China. Parks also contained a lot of trees and other flowering species, which are beneficial for biodiversity, while main roads consisted of greenery, with trees, shrubs and ground cover and vegetation between road lanes. Tan *et al.* (2019) indicate that there is a positive relationship between physical health and perceived safety in urban green spaces, mental health and social functioning, especially in women and the vulnerable. However, these studies did not cover residential areas, which are equally important.

The problem of environmental degradation is not only faced by developing countries but also developed ones such as Sweden, Malaysia and Poland (Feltynowski and Strohbach 2018; Baycan and Nijkamp 2009; Mohamad *et al.* 2015). Feltynowski and Strohbach (2018) conducted a study on the challenges of urban green space management in the face of using inadequate data in Poland. The study found that broader institutional failures were related to problems in urban green infrastructure planning, management and research, including a lack of awareness of green space quality and benefits and the related political disregard for urban green spaces. Mohamad *et al.* (2015) further indicate that the most influential factor that led to most people buying green residential areas was the landscape design, as most people liked to live in an environment that is visually stimulating with a nice view of the landscape. However, these studies were conducted in developed countries where social and economic advancement are different from Africa and therefore cannot be generalised to Zambia.

Despite the literature providing valuable information on environmental degradation in both developing and developed countries, it is not comprehensive. Much of it focuses on public parks, construction of green buildings, planning of green buildings and the value of green spaces, low levels of awareness among local people, rural-urban migration leading to inappropriate human settlements, and shanty compounds. The literature does not specify the challenges faced by specific categories of stakeholders in the process of promoting green residential areas, especially in Africa. This article intends to fill this gap by focusing on the implementation of the green movement in residential areas in Lusaka district.

THE RELEVANCE OF GOVERNANCE NETWORK AND IMPLEMENTATION THEORIES TO THE MANAGEMENT OF GREEN RESIDENTIAL AREAS

This article is guided by the assumptions of governance network and implementation theories. The proponents of governance network theory include Koppenjan and Klijn (2012), Mayntz (1993), Bortel and Mullins (2009), Madimutsa and Pretorius (2018) and Davies (2002). According to Koppenjan and Klijn (2012), public problem-solving and service delivery involves networks of interdependent actors. Through networking, the actors share resources to achieve collective goals. Mayntz (1993) adds that despite the fact that network actors are autonomous, they are able to pursue collective goals through deliberate coordinated actions. In line with this assumption, the implementation of the green movement in residential areas is expected to be managed by various actors who depend on each other to achieve collective goals. These actors include government institutions and residents.

However, Bortel and Mullins (2009) argue that governance networks have several problems, which include state dominance and control over the whole network. Davies (2002) also contends that the state remains dominant regardless of the measures put in place. In line with this assumption, it is expected that the state dominates and controls the whole process of implementing the green movement, regardless of the views presented by the residents. Madimutsa and Pretorius (2018) assert that governance networks can also be captured by actors in the private sector whose desire is to save costs and increase profits. In line with this assumption, it is expected that actors in the private sector such as private companies will attempt to influence the implementation of green movements to make profits for themselves. As a result, local communities may not benefit from green movements.

The role of personal interests in policy implementation is also explained by implementation theorists such as Van Meter and Van Horn (1975). According to Van Meter and Van Horn (1975), successful policy implementation depends on the availability of resources to support both the implementation process and personal needs of the implementers. This means that if policy implementers fail to access a share of the resources, then the implementation process will be characterised by challenges. Van Meter and Van Horn (1975) further assert that policy implementation is also affected by the capacity of implementing organisations and their interaction with the socio-economic and political environments. Based on this assumption, it is expected that the implementation of the green movement in residential areas is affected by factors that are both internal and external to the implementing actors.

METHODOLOGY

The research used a mixed methods design comprised of both qualitative and quantitative designs. This research used both qualitative and quantitative methods of data analysis. For qualitative data, content analysis was used to analyse data collected from key informants using semi-structured interviews. Based on the data patterns, conclusions were drawn and recommendations made. On the other hand, quantitative data collected from the heads of households through a questionnaire were analysed using a computer programme called the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS). Through the qualitative design, in-depth information on the challenges faced by government in the green movement in residential areas was collected from key informants. On the other hand, through the quantitative design, statistical data on the challenges faced by residents in keeping their premises green was collected. This research was confined to Lusaka district. Lusaka district was chosen as it is not only the capital city but also the largest city in Zambia. It is the centre of commerce and government in Zambia and connects the country's four main highways heading North, South, East and West. Lusaka district is politically divided into seven constituencies and 33 wards. The population of Lusaka district is approximately 1 267 440; the only city in Zambia with more than one million people with a total area of 418km squared (Central Statistical Office 2013). The presented data was collected from Mtendere compound representing high density areas, Chilenje Township representing medium-density, areas and Kabulonga residential area, representing low-density areas of Lusaka. The increased economic activity in Lusaka highlights the need to take care of residential areas due to increased human activity.

Primary data in this study was collected from a sample of 128. The sample was made up of eight key informants consisting of one official from the Ministry of Local Government, one official from Lusaka City Council, and six officials from Lusaka Water and Sewerage Company. There were also 120 heads of household from three residential areas. The research used a multi-stage sampling method to draw a sample from residential areas. In the first stage, the residential areas in Lusaka district were stratified into low-, medium- and high-density areas. One residential area was chosen from each category using simple random sampling method from which samples were drawn. In the second stage, the sample of 120 households was divided as follows: 53 households in high-density areas, 43 households in medium-density areas and 24 households in low-density areas. The actual household was selected by a systematic sampling method by randomly selecting the first unit, and the remaining units were selected at fixed intervals. A skip interval of four was used. The actual respondents, who in this research were heads of households and key informants, were purposively selected. The methods of data collection were interviews and a questionnaire. Interviews were used for the key informants as they provided qualitative data while a questionnaire was used to collect information from heads of households. Further, secondary data was collected by reading and analysing relevant documents in order to obtain detailed information on what is documented on the research topic. This research applied content validity by ensuring that all aspects of the topic at hand were covered in the questionnaire and interview guides. In order to assess the reliability of the collected data, this research tested the instruments of data collection using the internal consistent method.

CHALLENGES HINDERING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ZAMBIAN ENVIRONMENTAL CAMPAIGN

As stressed earlier, both the government and community members are facing challenges with regard to the implantation of the campaign "Keep Zambia Clean, Green and Healthy Campaign in residential areas". This section highlights those challenges for both categories.

Challenges faced by the government

In this section a focus is on challenges faced by the government and an emphasis is on the central government, the local council and the water utility company.

The central government

The central government faces numerous challenges in the process of implementing the Campaign. An official at the Ministry of Local Government explained that the role of the Ministry of Local Government was to provide guidance and oversight to all local authorities in the country on all local government programmes, including the 'Keep Zambia Clean, Green and Healthy Campaign'. He further explained that the main challenge that the Ministry of Local Government is facing in the implementation of the Campaign in residential areas is that civic leaders have not understood the concept clearly as they mainly demand money. He indicated the following:

> Our role as Ministry of Local Government and Housing in this campaign is to provide guidance and oversight to all local authorities. The challenges that we face in the process of implementing the keep Zambia Clean, Green and Healthy Campaign is that civic leaders have not yet understood the concept clearly as they mostly just demand for money to implement the campaign. In order to improve our role in the implementation of this campaign, there is need to engage the lowest organ at grass root level in this case the ward (Local Government Administration 2019).

This finding shows that the implementation of the campaign is a challenge to the central government, which fails to get the necessary support from tother stakeholders such as civic leaders. This finding also supports Mayntz (1993), who also argues that a network is a form of governance which is characterised by a number of autonomous actors who have the capability to pursue collective goals through deliberate coordinated actions. It also shows that the role of the Ministry of Local Government in this campaign is to provide guidance and oversight to local authorities. This finding is in line with Davies (2002) who argues that in many cases networks are strongly controlled by the state through their officials who act on the basis of personal interest, hence state capture. The above is fuelled by the desire of the state officials to engage in projects which they would benefit from and not necessarily what would benefit the citizenry.

The Local Council

A Lusaka City Council official explained that among the stakeholders in this campaign are the households, the Ministry of Health, through Community Based Organisations (CBOs) like the Neighbourhood Health Committees, the Lusaka Water and Sewerage Company, the traditional leadership, the Parks and Gardens department under the Lusaka City Council and the Ministry of Local Government through community development centres (Official, Lusaka City Council 2019). He added that the role of the Ministry of Local Government is to sensitise households and ensure enforcement of the law while the Lusaka Water and Sewerage Company has the responsibility of providing water for irrigation. He said that "the role of the Ministry of Local Government is Implementation, sensitisation of household heads in homes and enforcement while the role of the Lusaka Water and Sewerage Company is provision of water for both irrigation and planting of plants" (Lusaka City Council 2019). He also explained that the Lusaka City Council's role is to sensitise households on the importance of living in a green environment as well as provide guidance on the implementation of the campaign. He said, "Our role is to sensitise households on the importance of living in a green environment and guidance on implementation". The Lusaka City Council official further asserts that the challenges faced by the council in the process of implementing the campaign is people's mind set, lack of information for people to appreciate the benefits of the campaign, few stakeholders, especially those to conduct sensitisation on the benefits of a clean and green environment, a lack of effective communication strategies such as the use of social media, and the non-availability of such information in the school curriculum (Lusaka City Council 2019).

These findings show that the Lusaka City Council is the implementer while the Ministry of Local Government and Housing's role is to provide guidance and oversight of the implementation of this campaign. In so doing, it is the role of the council to sensitise the public on the Keep Zambia Clean, Green and Healthy Campaign. However, there is a challenge with funding, which is not adequate to ensure that the Lusaka City Council implements this campaign. This shows that the Ministry of Local Government and Housing as an oversight actor in this network is not performing its functions to the achievement of the collective goal, namely, the success of the campaign. This is in line with the Koppenjan and Klijn (2012), who argue that the governance network comprises of actors that depend on each other for survival. In this case, the council depends on the Ministry of Local Government for funding and the subsequent survival of the campaign.

The water utility company

The Lusaka Water and Sewerage Company is one of the stakeholders mentioned by the Lusaka City Council official as being responsible for providing water to the residents of Lusaka. A company official further explained that apart from supplying water to residents, the company also provides sewerage services. However, the water utility company faces challenges; with the main one being the high cost of electricity to pump water to its customers, while at the same time, compliance levels from customers in paying their bills remains at only 70%. In his view, the water supplied to the residents of Lusaka was also not adequate to cater for their needs including watering grass and trees, and the company was in the process of upgrading the whole water supply system (Official, Lusaka Water and Sewerage Company 2019).

Another official at Lusaka Water and Sewerage Company (LWSC) (Interview, 1st October 2019) also explained that the company had challenges with the lower levels of underground water which greatly affected the company operations. He said that “The underground water levels are very low hence we cannot pump enough water”. Another company official added that the long hours of load shedding by the Zambia Electricity Supply Corporation (ZESCO) and illegal water supply connections by customers made the situation worse as the company could not pump adequate water while the demand for water was high (Interview, 1st October 2019). He noted, “We cannot pump enough water because there is too much electricity load shedding and illegal connections by customers. This raises the demand for water which is not enough”.

Another official at the Lusaka Water and Sewerage Company also argued that among the challenges faced by this campaign was the lack of sensitisation and compliance levels by the residents in paying for their water bills which he said was average unless disconnected (Interview, 29th September 2019). He stated that “the problem is that people are not sensitised and only pay their bills when disconnected”. He also pointed out that the company had challenges in terms of water demand, which had outstripped supply. Meanwhile, all officials interviewed at LWSC assert that in their view, the water supplied to the residents of Lusaka by the company was not adequate to cater for people’s needs, which include the watering of grass and trees.

The above findings show that the Lusaka Water and Sewerage Company has limited capacity as regards the supply of adequate water to the residents of Lusaka. The situation is made worse by the advent of load shedding by the Zambia Electricity Supply Company, which has led to the company failing to pump adequate water to its customers who happen to be residents of Lusaka. Further, the LWSC infrastructure, which is the water line or pipes network for Lusaka, is not adequate to cover most areas of the city, hence the need to upgrade the underground water system. Therefore, with inadequate capacity by the water utility company, it is not possible to actualise the campaign and later on achieve success. The LWSC as an actor in this case is not properly playing its part to the success of the whole campaign.

Challenges faced by residents

In this section the focus is particularly on the challenges faced by community members in terms of maintaining green trees and grass.

Availability of green trees in residential areas

It is necessary to know if the majority of the Lusaka residents are aware of this campaign. Knowledge of this will indicate whether sufficient sensitisation occurred and whether the people know about the campaign and their role in the campaign. It has been observed that the majority of the respondents are aware of the Keep Zambia Clean, Green and Healthy Campaign. 61 respondents representing 50.8 percent said they were aware of the campaign while only 59 respondents representing 49.2 percent expressed ignorance. However, even if the majority were aware of the campaign, the difference between them and those are not aware is quite minimal, at only 1.6 percent. This demonstrates a need for sensitisation among other measures if the campaign is to be successful, as almost half of the respondents are not aware of the campaign. This is in line with the views of the official at the Lusaka City Council, who contended that there was a need to sensitise the residents of Lusaka on the importance of this campaign. This information is shown in the table below.

Table 1: Awareness of the Keep Zambia Clean, Green and Healthy Campaign

Awareness of the campaign	Type of Residential Area			Total	%
	Low Density	Medium Density	High Density		
Yes	17	26	18	61	**50.8**
No	7	17	35	59	**49.2**
Total	**24**	**43**	**53**	**120**	**100**

Despite the fact that the majority of the residents of Lusaka are aware of the Keep Zambia Clean, Green and Healthy Campaign, most of the trees found in residential areas are naturally growing trees. This situation means that the majority of citizens simply do not see the need to plant more trees and maintain the greenery. 85 respondents representing 70.8 percent have trees around their houses while 35 respondents representing 29.2 percent do not. The majority of these trees especially in high- and medium-density areas of Mtendere compound and Chilenje township, respectively, are indigenous. The situation is different in low-density areas – in this case, Kabulonga residential area – where, even though there are also natural growing trees that do not necessarily need to be cared for, the area also has small trees and flowers planted. This information is shown the table below.

Table 2: Availability of trees around the house

Availability of Trees	Type of Residential Area			Total	%
	Low Density	Medium Density	High Density		
Yes	22	35	28	85	**70.8**
No	2	8	25	35	**29.2**
Total	**24**	**43**	**53**	**120**	**100**

Furthermore, 63 respondents representing 52.5 percent have less than six trees around the yard, 9 respondents representing 7.5 percent have between 6 and 10 trees, which is the same percentage of those with 15 or more trees. However, 35 respondents representing 29.2 percent have no trees around their houses due to lack of space. In high-density areas, the lack of space has been pointed out as the main reason for the failure to plant trees and grass, especially seeing as the yards are generally too small for this activity. The situation is made worse by the desire of many residents to erect additional structures for rental income as opposed to supporting a greener environment. This means that the campaign is very difficult and a big challenge in high-density areas. This information is presented below.

Table 3: Number of trees around the house

Number of Trees	Type of Residential Area			Total	%
	Low Density	Medium Density	High Density		
Less than 6	15	27	21	63	**52.5**
6 – 10	4	3	2	9	**7.5**
11 – 15	0	3	1	4	**3.3**
Above 15	3	2	4	9	**7.5**
Not applicable	2	8	25	35	**29.2**
Total	**24**	**43**	**53**	**120**	**100**

Difficulty in maintaining green trees in residential areas

Despite a few residential areas having trees, the majority of these trees are not watered. As discussed earlier, most of these trees are considered to be natural trees that do not need any watering and care. 59 respondents representing 49.2 percent do not water their trees at all. Another 17 respondents representing 14.2 percent rarely water their trees. This is altogether too high a percentage of residents who do not water their trees as per the campaign requirement. The statistic of only 16 respondents representing only 13.3 percent who water their trees every day is worrying and another indication of failure of the campaign. Notably, various reasons were given for not watering the trees every day. The reasons range from erratic supply of water to the fear for high bills, while in some cases the yards have no trees as the residents see no need due to inadequate water supply. The situation is made worse by the landlords, who prefer to pave their yards for marketing purposes and raise the value of their properties, especially in low- and medium-density areas, while in high-density areas, the plots are too small to consider planting trees. The majority of the space around is taken up by additional houses put up for rent. Further, other residents have no maids or servants to water the trees while they are at work. Others simply have no running water at their houses. In Mtendere compound, some residents do not just see the need to water trees as they think that natural trees are not supposed to be watered. The non-availability of water supply to residents is confirmed by Lusaka Water and Sewerage Company officials interviewed as already discussed above. This information is shown below.

Table 4: Frequency of watering the trees

Frequency	Type of Residential Area			Total	%
	Low Density	Medium Density	High Density		
Every day	9	5	2	16	**13.3**
2 - 3 days per week	4	11	2	17	**14.2**
4 - 7 days per week	1	0	0	1	**0.8**
Once a week	3	2	5	10	**8.3**
Rarely	2	11	4	17	**14.2**
Not at all	5	14	40	59	**49.2**
Total	**24**	**43**	**53**	**120**	**100**

The majority of the residents of Lusaka have an inconsistent water supply. Only 41 respondents representing 34.2 percent have water supply throughout the day (19–24 hours), 14 respondents have water for between 13 and 18 hours per day representing 11.7 percent, 30 respondents have water supply between 7 to 12 hours per day representing 25.0 percent, with 35 respondents having water supply between 1 and 6 hours per day, representing 29.2 percent. This means that only 34.2 percent of Lusaka residents have water all day while 65.8 percent have inconsistent water supply. This finding also means that most residents of Lusaka district have an erratic water supply, which cannot cater for all their needs, including the watering of trees and grass. This is in line with the argument of Lusaka Water and Sewerage Company officials who all explained that in their view, the water supplied to the residents of Lusaka by the company was not adequate to cater for their needs including the watering of grass and trees. Therefore, it explains why residents have had challenges in maintaining green residential areas as most of them depend on water from the water utility company which is not adequate. The situation is worse in high-density areas, which mainly receive water for less than six hours per day. This information is shown below.

Table 5: Availability of water per day

Availability of Water per day	Type of Residential Area			Total	%
	Low Density	Medium Density	High Density		
19 - 24 hours	16	23	2	41	**34.2**
13 - 18 hours	4	6	4	14	**11.7**
7 - 12 hours	1	11	18	30	**25**
1 - 6 hours	3	3	29	35	**29.2**
Total	**24**	**43**	**53**	**120**	**100**

The water situation is made worse by the fact that water supply is mostly available during morning hours when most residents are either at work or busy with their businesses and not at home to water trees and grass. Those in high-density areas have even more challenges as most of them have no servants to water their trees and grass. Only 49 respondents representing 40.8 percent have water all day, 53 respondents with water supply in the morning only representing 44.2 percent, 8 respondents have water in the afternoon only representing 6.7 percent, 4 respondents have water in the evening representing 3.3 percent and 6 respondents have water at night, representing 5.0 percent. This means that the majority of residents have water supply in the morning only. The most affected are residents of high-density areas – in this case, Mtendere compound – while the majority of those with water throughout the day are from low-density areas – in this case, the Kabulonga residential area. The number of respondents with water supply throughout the day has risen to 49 respondents, representing 40.8 percent, due to the inclusion of respondents with personal boreholes and those with both local council and personal boreholes, mainly in low-density areas, who represent 11.7 percent and 7.5 percent respectively. This information is shown below.

Table 6: Time of the day when water is usually available

Time of the Day	Type of Residential Area			Total	%
	Low Density	Medium Density	High Density		
Whole day	17	30	2	49	**40.8**
Morning	4	7	42	53	**44.2**
Afternoon	1	2	5	8	**6.7**
Evening	1	2	1	4	**3.3**
Night	1	2	3	6	**5**
Total	**24**	**43**	**53**	**120**	**100**

Availability of green grass in residential areas

Just like the situation with trees, despite the implementation of the Keep Zambia Clean, Green and Healthy Campaign, the majority of residential areas do not have grass. 78 respondents representing 65 percent of the respondents have no grass around their houses while on the other hand; only 42 respondents representing 35 percent of the respondents have grass around their houses. The majority of those with grass around their houses are from low-density areas (in this case, Kabulonga residential are), while the majority of those with no grass are from high-density areas such as Mtendere compound. A select few in medium-density areas have grass around their houses (in this case, Chilenje township). This means that the majority of the Lusaka residents have no grass planted around their houses. This information is shown below.

Table 7: Availability of grass around houses

Availability of Grass	Type of Residential Area			Total	%
	Low Density	Medium Density	High Density		
Yes	16	21	5	42	**35**
No	8	22	48	78	**65**
Total	**24**	**43**	**53**	**120**	**100**

The majority of those with grass in their yard have insignificant portions. 18 respondents representing only 15 percent have less than 10 percent of their yard covered by grass, with only 9 respondents representing 7.5 percent having between 10 and 19 percent of their yard covered by grass. Notably, 78 respondents representing 65 percent have no grass. Again, this trend of building more structures on the only remaining spaces around the yard is mostly common in high-density areas, where the need for more buildings is preferred to greenery.

Difficulty in keeping grass green

The above situation is made worse by the fact that the majority of the residents that have grass do not even water it at all. 78 respondents representing 65 percent do not water their grass at all while 8 respondents representing 6.6 percent do so rarely. Only 16 of the respondents water their grass every day, representing 13.3 percent of respondents. The rest of the respondents water their grass at irregular times. The situation is worse in high-density areas. This is not healthy for the campaign. This information is shown below.

Table 8: Frequency of grass watering

Frequency of watering	Type of Residential Area			Total	%
	Low Density	Medium Density	High Density		
Every day	9	5	2	16	**13.3**
2 - 3 days per week	3	7	0	10	**8.3**
4 - 7 days per week	1	0	0	1	**0.8**
Once a week	2	4	1	7	**6**
Rarely	1	5	2	8	**6.6**
Not at all	8	22	48	78	**65**
Total	**24**	**43**	**53**	**120**	**100**

Among the reasons for not having grass around houses, especially in high-density areas, are water supply challenges. Various complaints from residents of Lusaka are presented below.

Table 9: Complaints about the supply of water to residents

Problems with water supply	Type of residential area			Total	%
	Low Density	Medium Density	High Density		
Not applicable	13	28	8	49	**40.8**
Poor attendance to faults and leakages	1	3	0	4	**3.3**
Poor customer service	1	3	1	5	**4.1**
There is no water supply in the area	3	2	11	16	**13.3**
Water being supplied is not enough	4	6	31	41	**34.1**
Water is dirty	2	1	2	5	**4.1**
Total	**24**	**43**	**53**	**120**	**100**

The findings above indicate that the majority of Lusaka residents at 34.1 percent do not have sufficient water supply, while 13.3 percent have absolutely no water. The majority of those affected are in high-density areas. This situation is not conducive for the successful implementation of the Keep Zambia Clean, Green and Healthy Campaign. The erratic water supply situation is not only demoralising to the residents; it also makes it impossible to water trees and grass.

CONCLUSION

Although the Keep Zambia Clean, Green and Healthy Campaign was launched with a network that included government and the private sector in the implementation process, the campaign has proven to be ineffective in Lusaka district. This is as a result of numerous challenges faced by the government, the private sector and citizens. The role of the central government in this campaign is to provide guidance and oversight. By implication, this shows that the campaign has been captured by the state as a dominant actor. This has led to a situation where most actors, including the local authority, wait for the central government to provide oversight, guidance and funding; without which the campaign is now failing. Further, the concept of the green environment has not yet trickled down to the grassroots level, which is the level of the ward in the community. This requires that sensitisation be conducted by the local authorities; an activity that is hindered by a lack of funding from the central government. The water utility company has limited capacity as regards the provision of water to the residents of Lusaka. The situation is made even worse by electricity load shedding, which has led to the water utility company failing to pump adequate water to its customers. Furthermore, the water utility company infrastructure in terms of water pipes for Lusaka is not adequate to cover most areas of the city, especially with the growing population and the mushrooming of unplanned settlements. In some cases, the pipes are worn out, with numerous leakages resulting in a loss of the already inadequate water. The water utility company has also failed to invest in a water system infrastructure upgrade for Lusaka, which is vital for improving the water supply to residents. Water supply to Lusaka residents by the water utility company is erratic and, in some areas, completely absent, with the whole street lacking water pipes in some cases. In some cases, selected houses have water as there are communal taps in high density areas. This makes it impossible for anyone to plant trees and grass that will require watering. Lusaka residents are also faced with poor customer service as the water utility company demands payment even if the water was not supplied. Additionally, if disconnected, it takes days for a customer to be re-connected, even after full payment has been made. This means that the customers have to remain without the commodity for days. This has proven to be a big challenge and is partly to blame for the failure of the campaign.

The major contribution of this article is that it has provided important information on the challenges that are faced by the government and other stakeholders in the process of the implementation of the Keep Zambia Clean, Green and Healthy Campaign and the reasons for the failure of the green movement. The article has also provided recommendations regarding what each stakeholder must do to ensure the success of the campaign., Though this article has provided valuable insights into the challenges faced in the implementation of the Keep Zambia Clean, Green and Healthy Campaign, it did not cover industrial or commercial areas such as company premises, shopping malls and office blocks, which provides considerable scope for further research.

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APPLICATION OF THE AFRICAN ONTOLOGICAL VALUE OF UBUNTU IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

Jan Tladi[1]

INTRODUCTION

Ubuntu is considered by some scholars as a transformative African ontological perspective capable of general application (Anderson 2003; Mokgoro 1998:2-3), and by others as amenable to specific contextual application within various disciplines such as corporate governance, communal and traditional settings, political circles, and conflict resolution (Olinger *et al*. 2007:32).The conception of ubuntu as an African ontological value-system is characterised by complex contextual settings (Anderson 2003; Mokgoro 1998:2-3); conflicting multiple interpretative elements (West 2014:57-58); and general and specific application dilemmas (Brooderyk 2010:68; Metz 2011:532; West 2014:53). This article explores the conception, scope, and content of ubuntu to theorise a particular perspective of corporate governance underpinned by African ontological values.

Over the past four decades, the corporate governance perspective as a favoured management approach and practice has grown exponentially and become a topical issue among shareholders, governments, regulators, boards, employees, as well as the general public; and as a result, it preoccupied many board-rooms due to its substantial public interest (Amoako and Goh 2015:14-15; Cuomo *et al*. 2016:222; Pargendler 2016:360). There is a growing body of research showing that the adoption of sound corporate governance practices and principles by organisations has revolutionised the corporate management landscape. Due to the growing need for a reduction of corruption and maladministration, the diffusion of socio-economic tensions, systemic risk mitigation, and increasing levels of inequality, there has been increased motivation for corporate governance (Amoako and Goh 2015:14-15; Pargendler 2016:360). What Pargendler (2016:360) terms 'the corporate governance obsession' has shown that over-reliance on the corporate governance phenomenon alone as a panacea for management misdoings needs revisiting. The principal aim of corporate governance is to ensure sustainable growth, economic efficiency and prudency in the management of an organisation. Good corporate governance provides a framework for acceptable practice, strategic direction and sound business judgement. Good corporate governance plays a crucial role in the maintenance of accountability, fairness and transparency in the implementation of organisational systems, processes and procedures. The application of good corporate governance cuts across all levels of the organisation, namely: the board of directors, top and senior management as well as the lower levels in the organisation.

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Corporate governance theoretical dispositions are not an end in themselves, but a means of maintaining economic efficiency, sustainable growth, and financial stability. The ever-changing corporate governance environment calls for optimally functioning organisations to be abreast of changes occurring at the legal, policy, socio-economic and technical levels. It is in the best interest of every organisation that they place a significant premium on good corporate governance to sustain the efficient and effective delivery of socio-economic and environmental outcomes in a cost-effective and cost-efficient manner. The board as the critical governance structure should act with diligence, skill and objectivity in the best interest of the organisation, shareholders, and stakeholders. The application of the values of ubuntu in corporate governance practices could add a valuable contribution to organisational efficiency and effectiveness. Ubuntu as a concept is grounded in an 'inclusive' approach to governance, as it signifies that an organisation exists to serve the interests of all stakeholders (West 2009:12), strongly influenced by Ubuntu values emphasising the importance of solidarity and co-existence (Broodryk 2010:68; Mangaliso 2001:24; Mbigi and Maree 2005:215). As a transformative instrument underpinned by fundamental principles of solidarity, cohesion, humanity, respect and dignity, and sustainable development, continental African organisations can derive greater benefits when adopting these fundamental principles in their corporate management approaches and practices.

The philosophical underpinnings of corporate governance align to the reality that values and power relationships are issues that matter worldwide within the corporate world; be it in public organisations, political settings or international organisations, and have significant power to shape societal values. The corporate governance perspective can be considered to be a playground where the diverse interests of corporate owners, stakeholders and government are ceaselessly interacting at organisational level. From a practical perspective, the underlying corporate governance principles and practices involve complex interdependent and inter-relationships requiring complex understanding, contextualisation and analysis. Qualitative review methods allow for the discovery of new variables and relationships, the understanding of complex processes, and influence of social world. Through the application of qualitative review methods, a variety of purposes can be derived such as the description of the social world in which policies and programmes can be actualised, and the amenability to social theory formulation. This article uses qualitative review methods to explore the application of African ontological values to enhance good corporate governance and strongly influence corporate management practices.

EXPLORING THE CONCEPT OF UBUNTU

Conceptualising the concept of 'ubuntu'

Ubuntu is defined loosely in a variety of ways by scholars. The concept is described by Himonga *et al*. (2013:26) as an ancient and traditional African worldview, induced by societal conduct through a set of values. Ubuntu is demonstrated by humanness – the universal spirit of compassion and community, harmony and hospitality, respect and responsiveness that individuals and groups show for one another (Mangaliso 2001:23). It is symbolised by fundamental rudimentary values manifested in the way African people think and conduct themselves toward each other and everyone else they encounter (Sulamoyo 2010:41). It is an idiosyncratic African way of life; a cultural philosophy applicable to other humanistic world views and other value systems across cultural traditions and heritage (National Heritage Charter 2005). It is considered a distinctive African notion of upholding the communitarian idea of human interconnectedness (Kamwangamalu 1999:25-27). The concept of ubuntu originates from pre-colonial African rural settings and is associated with indigenous ways of conflict resolution (Swanson 2008:53-54), which has for many centuries sustained communities in sub-Saharan Africa (Mnyaka and Motlhabi 2005:215; Ramose 2010:300). In South Africa, the conception is derived from the African maxim: "*motho key motho ka batho* – Sotho", or "*umuntu ngu muntu nga bantu* – Nguni", interpreted as "a person is a person through other persons", "I am because we are; We are because I am" (Goduka 2000; Ramose 1999:52, 2010:300). Ubuntu's ethical maxim is premised on the notion of "*feta kgomo o tshware motho*", which is directly translated as "go past the cow and catch the human being" (Ramose 2010:300). The concept is an African philosophy of life that has, over the years, been practiced in multiple forms and applied within general and specific contexts (Mokgoro 1998:2-3) to address a wide range of settings; including resolving disputes through indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms, politics, business, corporate governance, restorative justice, and conflict resolution and reconciliation (Du Plessis 2011:275; Olinger *et al*. 2007:33). It is generally accepted that ubuntu has the potential of turning into a progressive transformative force shaping corporate governance theory and management practices, as it is informed by underlying African principles and values. Nevertheless, there is a limited body of research on its application (Nussbaum 2003:21), and consequently, it has not been copiously embraced and fully developed to be practiced within African organisations (Mangaliso 2001:23-24). Through social action, the underlying African values may be employed to shape corporate governance theories, practices, and principles (Adu Amoah 2012:400).

Due to its loose interpretive nature, several scholars have attacked and criticised the concept of ubuntu (McAllister 2009:2; Metz 2011:534; West 2014:57). For instance, West (2014:57) holds that there exist a number of diverse elucidations of ubuntu, some of which appear to be inconsistent with each other, and it appears implausible that a single conception of ubuntu is even possible. According to Mokgoro (1998:2-3), ubuntu can be considered an intricate and complex concept having diverse forms of portrayals, which are contingent on the social context within which it is defined. Further, in the context of this article, the understanding is that the practice of ubuntu is far from forthright and one-dimensional, and that is has always been complex and multi-dimensional in its approach. In another study, Mokgoro (2010:225) holds that the concept would be eluded if the aspiration is to pin it down to a single, well-defined concept. Ubuntu means different things to different people and can be seen as an African worldview, doctrine, or ideology (McAllister 2009:2), and a philosophy, ethic, and community-based mind-set (Olinger *et al*. 2007:34). However, the concept seems to be excessively vague due to its failure to acknowledge the value of individual freedoms and is only suitable for traditional small-scale culture (Metz 2011:534). Ubuntu is criticised for being unclear and frustrating efforts for its application (West 2014:57-58). This has led to it becoming anything to anyone who so wishes to deploy it (Matolino and Kwindingwi 2013:201).

Like many African concepts, ubuntu is not easily definable. But there are unique features found within the array of concepts. It is generally acceptable as an African worldview amenable to universal and special application (Himonga *et al*. 2013:26); portraying an African way of life (Himonga et al. 2013:26; Mnyaka and Motlhabi 2005:236; Ramose 2010:300. It is an influential aspect of societal behavioural morality (Himonga *et al*. 2013:26; Mokgoro 1998:2-3; Sulamoyo 2010:41), which is deeply demonstrated through humaneness (Brack *et al*. 2003:319; Goduka 2000; Mangaliso 2001:23-24; Ramose 1999:52, 2010:300). In practice, the concept transcends the physical realm into the ancestral one; creating an inter-connectedness between ancestors, the living and the yet-to-be-born, underpinned by sustainable development. It is essential that steps be taken within the African continent in general and sub-Saharan Africa specifically to advance the concept in more coherent ways so that it can influence corporate governance practices and principles.

The theoretical framework

Institutional theory

Institutional theory can be considered a widely accepted theoretical posture that emphasises rational myths, isomorphism, and legitimacy. Researchers building on this perspective emphasise that a key insight of institutional theory is imitation: rather than necessarily optimising their decisions, practices, and structures, organisations look to their peers for cues to appropriate behaviour. In sociology and organisational studies, institutional theory is a theory on the deeper and more resilient aspects of social structure. It considers the processes by which structures, including schemes, rules, norms, and routines, become established as authoritative guidelines for social behaviour. Different components of institutional theory explain how these elements are created, diffused, adopted, and adapted over space and time; and how they fall into decline and disuse (Scott 2004, 2008). According to De Jonge (2015), institutional theory not only explains why organisational structures and practices become entrenched, but also how and why change occurs. Jennings (1994) describes two types of institutional pressure that can be instrumental in promoting change. First, when new rules are introduced that are backed by enforcement, coercive pressures can stimulate organisational change either directly or indirectly via institutional dependencies. For example, when new listing rules are introduced, setting new standards for the composition of company board membership, the rate and extent of actual change in listed company board composition can depend just as much on indirect pressures from stock exchange authorities as on the actual institutional penalties applied for non-compliance. Second, mimetic pressures to copy successful forms during periods of (economic or political) change or high uncertainty can stimulate change. As new standards or practice become more widely accepted and adopted, they gradually become more legitimised in the environment. Ultimately, these standards and/or practices reach a level of legitimisation where failure to adopt them is seen as irrational.

The agency or stakeholder theory

Mitchell and Meacheam (2011:151) are of the view that ‘agency theory’ is based on the relationship between one party, the principal, who designates certain tasks and decisions to another party, the agent. The focus of agency theory stems from assumptions that the agent will behave opportunistically, particularly if his/her interests’ conflict with the principal. Arrow

(1971) stresses that the pursuit of similar interests is not always evident between these two parties; causing an agency problem. When different interests arise, necessary attention must be directed to resolving this conflict. These differences are difficult to measure and require governing mechanisms to facilitate congruence and shared risk. Accordingly, Eisenhardt (1989) notes that the focus of agency theory has been on the potential conflict between agent and principal. One of the primary reasons why conflict emerges is that work contracts are imperfect since not every single contingency can be accounted for; monitoring is difficult and costly, and as such, the principal may have difficulty enforcing his/her property rights.

The stewardship theory

Although agency theory addresses manager-principal interest divergence, additional theory is needed to explain what, if anything, causes interests to be aligned. Stewardship theory has been introduced as a means of defining relationships based upon other behavioural premises. Stewardship theory has its roots in psychology and sociology and was designed for researchers to examine situations in which executives as stewards are motivated to act in the best interests of their principals (Donaldson and Davis 1989, 1991). In stewardship theory, the model of man is based on a steward whose behaviour is ordered such that pro-organisational, collectivistic behaviours have higher utility than individualistic, self-serving behaviours. Given a choice between self-serving behaviour and pro-organisational behaviour, a steward's behaviour will not depart from the interests of his or her organisation. A steward will not substitute or trade self-serving behaviours for cooperative behaviours. Thus, even where the interests of the steward and the principal are not aligned, the steward places a higher value on cooperation than defection (terms found in game theory). Because the steward perceives greater utility in cooperative behaviour and behaves accordingly, his or her behaviour can be considered rational.

According to stewardship theory, the behaviour of the steward is collective, because the steward seeks to attain the objectives of the organisation (e.g., sales growth or profitability). This behaviour, in turn, will benefit principals such as outside owners (through positive effects of profits on dividends and share prices), as well as principals who are managerial super-ordinates, because their objectives are furthered by the steward. Stewardship theorists assume a strong relationship between the success of the organisation and the principal's satisfaction. A steward protects and maximises shareholder wealth through firm performance, because, by so doing, the steward's utility functions are maximised (Davis, Schoorman, and Donaldson 1997). Further, the authors argue that, given the potential multiplicity of shareholder objectives, a steward's behaviour can be considered to be organisationally centred. Stewards in loosely coupled, heterogeneous organisations with competing stakeholders and competing shareholder objectives are motivated to make decisions that they perceive are in the best interests of the group. Even in the most politically charged environment, one can assume that most parties desire a viable, successful enterprise. A steward who successfully improves the performance of the organisation generally satisfies most groups, because most stakeholder groups have interests that are well-served by increasing organisational wealth. Therefore, a pro-organisational steward is motivated to maximise organisational performance, thereby satisfying the competing interests of shareholders.

Contextualising ubuntu within corporate governance

The corporate governance institutional theory can be criticised for its limited focus on corporate governance structures at the expense of other corporate governance mechanisms such as behavioural aspects. While agency theory is common for its elucidation of some dimensions of organisational complexities, it is also restricted by its stringent economic perspective. Stakeholder theory can be criticised for its inability to treat all stakeholders fairly and equitably in the face of competing stakeholder interests. The stewardship theory is imperfect in that it assumes that there is no conflict of interest between managers and shareholders, and that the goal of governance is, precisely, to find mechanisms and structure that facilitate the most effective coordination between two parties. The underlying limitations of the various theoretical frameworks provide grounds for the emergence of additional ones; explicating relationships that are grounded on non-economic assumptions underpinned by African values (Adu Amoao 2012:285).

The underlying ubuntu values treat an organisation as a unit comprising blended stakeholder interests that are predestined to attain mutual societal goals. It is clearly in the public interest that societal goals are achieved in a sustainable manner. Organisational internal stakeholders such as board, managers, and employees generally should pledge solidarity towards the attainment of developmental goals. Integrating ubuntu values in corporate management practices has abundant potential to be a greater management approach when managing organisations (Mangaliso 2001:25). There is an exigent need for the formation of meritocratic workforces that are competent and espouse the values of ubuntu (Adu Amoah 2012:289). The concept of ubuntu is fundamentally grounded in an inclusive governance approach; intensely influencing the pursuance of developmental goals that positively generate a correlation between organisational activities and stakeholders within and outside the organisation (West 2009:12). It denotes the serving of interests of stakeholders, involving a commitment to a stakeholder-centred approach predisposed by African socio-cultural value-system. Ubuntu follows a humanistic approach to corporate governance; intensely emphasising compassion, human dignity, relationship-building, and reciprocal respect (Browning 2006:133). African work settings can be transformed and used as truism of ethical organisational culture. There is a need to construct corporate governance practices and theoretical constructs that are underpinned by African ontological, epistemological, and methodological perspectives supported by principles and practices of modern business ethics and corporate governance. The primary goal behind such change and reconstruction in global outlook is principally philosophical; permeating the process of modernisation of the African continent (Adu Amoah 2012:289). The main challenge lies in the development of the concept into a logical, methodical, and thriving way of modern organisational life that is characterised by social justice, sustainability, and rational organisational structures and systems that are capable of meeting their aspirations (Mbigi and Maree 2005:112). Ubuntu values may be practiced within the workplace in the following corporate governance practices: strategic human resources management practices; organisational stakeholder management; organisational leadership development practices; and organisational sustainable development initiatives.

APPLYING FUNDAMENTAL UBUNTU VALUES IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

The notion of ubuntu is styled as 'collectivistic'; portraying a 'humane orientation culture'. This is displayed by an extraordinary amount of harmony and endurance throughout the system (Mangaliso 2001:25), which is signified through the spirit of humanity, declaring that my humanity is intricately bound up in yours – I am because I belong (Tutu 1999:30-35). Key to the philosophy of ubuntu is the understanding that people are naturally interdependent, and that life finds its meaning in the way people venerate this truth (Van Rensburg 2007:73). Human beings portray 'inter-dependence' and 'collectivism' when engaging in reciprocal aid and acting in shared beneficial ways. It depicts the substance of human beings' attitudes such as sensations and drives being definitely oriented toward others, by being empathetic and helping them. Failure to demonstrate 'inter-dependence' and 'collectivism' shows that they are dispassionate about each other's prosperity. 'Collectivism' or 'inter-dependence' means that the individual thrives as part of the society, and that society would appreciate the accomplishment of each of its members (Ochieng-Odhiambo 2010), and this is the spirit of ubuntu permeating the African human development trajectory. The aphorism "a person is a person through others", "*motho ke motho ka batho ba bang*", "*umuntu ngu muntu nga bantu*", or "I am because you are – we are because I am", demonstrates the fundamental essence of ubuntu. Through solidarity or inter-dependence, the ideology of communitarianism or human inter-connectedness is elevated (Kamwangamalu 1999:25-27) and has pre-eminence in contemporary South African organisational discourse (Du Plessis 2011:275). Of essence is to create greater solidarity serving as a foundation for the concept of ubuntu. One of the cornerstones characterising the concept of ubuntu should be fostering 'inter-dependence', 'collectivism', or 'solidarity' within all human endeavours, including organisations. The African worldview considers human beings as being inextricably bound together spiritually. Achieving this goal, human development and initiatives should be geared towards the attainment of solidarity and collectivism. If there is togetherness, a common destiny and mutual beneficial outcomes can be attained.

Naturally, human beings are social and communal beings and are rationally predisposed to display personal emotions. By acknowledging the importance of emotions, the corporate management discourse can evolve more holistically and inclusively (Mangaliso 2001:23). Ubuntu is socially oriented to realise cohesion by cultivating respect for others. The prerequisites of individuals to help others are naturally considered to be more substantial in African morality than in Western morality. When construed as moral theory, it is well understood to advocate honouring relationships, of sharing a way of life and caring for others' quality of life. One has a relationship of benevolence insofar as one desires another person well ('conation'); believes that another person is worthy of help ('cognition'); aims to help another person ('intention'); acts so as to help another person ('volition'); acts for other's sake ('motivation'); and, feels good upon the knowledge that another person has benefited and feels bad upon learning that he/she has been harmed ('affection') (Taylor 2014:340). It is through social cohesion that human beings may be sympathetic to one another's course. Stakeholder theory demands that organisations treat the network of stakeholders associated with the organisation equitably to satisfy their needs. It is in the interest of the organisation that all stakeholders adhere to the attainment of organisational goals. If there is greater cohesion, various organisational stakeholders work together towards the communal good at the expense of individual self-interest. In ubuntu, emphasis is placed on the human aspect and therefore human development should be placed above all other considerations (Fox 2010:122-124), and fostering cohesion entails essentially elements such as maximum engagement of parties, joint problem-solving approaches, decision-making by consensus, and mutual respect (Taylor 2014:339). Cohesion brings about communalism and the togetherness of people (Taylor 2014:339), and this resonates with one of the fundamental principles found in many religions, traditions, and worldviews; that is, "do unto others what you want them to do unto you". A person that espouses this value system is caring and humane in character and practice. Acting in a humane manner requires behavioural and psychological change from individuals and groups. Sociological and psychological factors play a crucial role in shaping the attitudes and behaviours of stewards, who are charged with the responsibility to lead organisations. Of particular importance is to ensure that these stewards' attitudinal and behavioural attributes are compatible with the ubuntu value system and worldview.

The underlying importance of humanity implies becoming more humane (Muchiri 2011:440), which is affirmed by one's humaneness; displayed by the recognition of the humanity of others (Ramose 1999:52). Being humane involves a common purpose to serve humanity (servant leadership) (Taylor 2014:338). How we treat others and are treated by others is the bottom line of being human, and should be the foundation of all societal and organisational developmental initiatives (Regine 2009:21).

The principle of mutual respect underlying ubuntu constrains parties to conduct themselves more appropriately to advance the dignity of others. The concept of human dignity is that one is to develop one's humanness by communing with those who have dignity in virtue of their capacity for communing; that is, individuals have dignity insofar as they have a communal nature, exhibited through identity and solidarity with others (Metz 2011:533-534). One of the fundamental constitutional injunctions throughout the Constitution of 1996 is the promotion of human dignity. This fundamental constitutional principle accords very well with the concept of ubuntu, since at the centre of ubuntu is the need to promote mutual respect and the protection of human dignity. The advancement of human dignity and respect for one another in the workplaces serve as an enabler for the attainment of common organisational goals. To promote the moral quality of the person, human beings should treat each other with respect and dignity (Bennette 2011:3032; Mangaliso 2001:23-25); ultimately translating into a human experience of treating people with respect and humaneness and contributing positively to the sustenance of the wellbeing of people and organisations (Metz 2011:534).

In the absence of coherent corporate governance mechanisms inspired by underlying African values, the concept of ubuntu would remain just a philosophical rhetoric. In practical terms, Ubuntu should comprise a set of values or a philosophy of life that is founded on conduct rules and social ethics to influence social conduct (Himonga *et al*. 2013:26; Taylor 2014:331). Displaying social conduct or morality implies creating a relationship between people and how that relationship should be conducted (Taylor 2014:332), by promoting a culture of accountability and transparency (Venter 2004:152). This is underlined through the existence of rights and responsibilities (Mnyaka and Motlhabi 2005:236), which are absolute to each person. For good corporate governance to prevail, high ethical conduct characterised by accountability and transparency among various role-players and stakeholders is key. Corporate ethics play a meaningful role in creating organisations that are ethically attuned and follow a high moral compass. Corporate ethics are therefore seen as one of the cornerstones of good corporate governance.

In promoting ubuntu "*botho*—humanness", we should consider the living, the dead "ancestors", and the yet-to-be-born (Ramose 2010:301). Nations should consider sustainability issues when investing to secure the future for all, poor and rich alike. The principle of "sustainable development" is becoming increasingly important given the finite nature of planet earth. Sustainable development should permeate all spheres of development, infrastructurally, socially, economically, and environmentally. It has almost become socially immoral to consider development of any nature without rethinking sustainability issues. Ubuntu recognizes the need to "think about" the interests of current and future generations and, therefore, corporate decisions taken today should consider such wider interests. One of the underlying values of King Code (2016) is sustainable development. This fundamental value system accords well with espousing ubuntu theory. In the enjoyment of worldly order, the living should always spare a thought for future generations. Fundamentally, all human endeavours and development should be underpinned by sustainable development imperatives.

There are extensive deliberations among business and social scientists on the concrete meaning of ubuntu; theoretically, ethically, and practically. Ubuntu is acquiescent of a transposition within different settings, and given its generalisable features, it has not only become part of organisational discourse, but it has also been used in other social settings. As suggested by Mangaliso (2001:24-25), integrating the principles of ubuntu in corporate governance management has inordinate potential as a superior management approach when managing organisations. Therefore, the higher probability of turning ubuntu into a constructive force in African organisations is underlined by the advancement of an inclusive approach creating a relationship between organisational activities and stakeholders within and outside the organisation (Nussbaum 2003:21). At the organisational level, it denotes serving of interests of stakeholders and involves commitment to a stakeholder-centred approach influenced by African socio-cultural values. Moreover, it advocates an inclusive governance approach, which strongly supports the pursuance of developmental goals (West 2009:12). It also signifies a humanistic approach to African corporate governance management; accentuating compassion, respect, human dignity, relationship building, and mutual interaction (Browning 2006:1321).

Ubuntu theory predisposed a person as a rational human being capable of participating and sharing with neighbours and fellow employees (Masina 2000). This is demonstrated through organisational ethical posture and practice permeating an organisation from the top to the bottom and embracing all stakeholder interests equitably. Consequently, organisations that espouse ubuntu should commit to an inclusive and sustainable development approach to corporate governance in organising their internal and external governance mechanisms to be strongly rooted on principles of "I am because you are – you are because we are" (King Code 2016; Taylor 2014:332). Employees in African organisations are more comfortable working under a corporate management style that is clear and scientific as opposed to one that is organic (Sulamoyo 2010:46–47). Such organisations are multicultural in character and emphasise humanistic values and harmonious teamwork (Jackson 2004). Employees should know the people they serve and centrally practice ubuntu. In the sphere of work, individual creativity and solidarity of cooperation and common ownership should go hand-in-hand to achieve organisational goals (Washington 2010:33). Mainstreaming ubuntu theory will assist in building successful institutions and organisations and will allow employees to develop a positive work ethic (Brack *et al*. 2003:319). Organisational leaders should display ubuntu values in the way they lead organisations (Regine 2009:21). Ubuntu theory as a framework for corporate governance should influence organisational leaders to use state resources more efficiently by investing in communities, and should develop new institutional corporate governance mechanisms that are built on ubuntu principles (Nkondo 2007:99). Ubuntu emphasises teamwork and relationship-building and requires empathy between organisational leaders and followers. The consequences of an ubuntu-oriented leadership style include teamwork from grassroots level, coupled with encouragement of team members to sacrifice personal gains for collective outcomes. This style includes creative cooperation, open communication, teamwork and reciprocal moral obligations (Botha and Claassens 2010:78-81). Ubuntu underscores an organisation as an integral part of the society and can no longer be seen existing in its own narrow universe of internal stakeholders and value-creation resources alone. However, it operates and forms part of general society. Organisational stakeholders are not just those individuals and entities within its narrowly defined value chain, but society as a whole (King Code 2016).

Democratic systems are aimed at making representatives across all spectrum accountable and answerable for their actions and, by design, create open societies and transparent economies. Accountability and transparency validate the very existence of social equality and good governance. Accountability and transparency entail a duty to expose actions and their consequences, and elucidate and substantiate them publicly (Mazrui 2002). Organisational leaders and employees need to adhere to the requirements of accountability and transparency (Tambulasi and Kayuni 2005:153). It is conceivable that by displaying high level of accountability, leaders would be exemplary in their actions and uphold organisational interests. They should practice servant leadership to inspire their employees to follow suit (Muchiri 2011:444). Organisational leaders inspired by ubuntu appreciate that people are equal as they are different. In the spirit of ubuntu, they should nurture cooperative and collaborative working environments by encouraging their employees to participate, share, and support each other and collectively promote teamwork. Ubuntu-inspired leaders should command influential power in their organisations and create work relationships based on mutually favourable outcomes and respect (Regine 2009:17). Organisational leaders with ubuntu should recognise their interconnectedness and how their humanity is inextricably bound to others. They should become pleased when other people are successful, since their success is everyone’s success. A corporate governance management style endowed with ubuntu means a humane style of governance based on collective solidarity rather than individualism. Organisational leaders with ubuntu should be the embodiment of respect, teamwork, and mutual support. The corporate governance leadership philosophy of ubuntu emphasises collectivism and relationship-building over material things. The spirit of ubuntu should be fostered in all who are involved with service delivery and organisational performance-enhancing initiatives.

SIGNIFICANCE AND LIMITATIONS OF THE APPLICATION OF THE VALUE OF UBUNTU

African ontological and philosophical perspectives underpinned by ubuntu values are offered as an alternative to other corporate management practices in pursuit of good corporate governance practices within organisations. This will help African organisations to implement corporate governance practices from African ontological and philosophical perspectives. The article contributes to the work of corporate governance stakeholders such as corporate owners, practitioners, regulators, and civil society, in several ways: it serves as a sounding-board for good corporate governance practices within organisations; it contributes to theoretical enhancement within the field of corporate governance; it provides a conceptual framework for organisations in their implementation of good governance practices; and it massively contributes to enhancing the corporate governance body of knowledge. Our hope is that this study will help to raise the quality and aspirations of corporate governance and consequently, contribute to theory development in the field. Further research is required to extrapolate the necessity and practicalities surrounding this theory, coupled with an investigation of additional measures towards enhancement of this theory of corporate governance.

CONCLUSION

Ubuntu theory represents a distinctly African worldview that envisions organisations that are dependent on societies which respect fundamental human rights, protect the environment, and safeguard the rights and opportunities of future generations. African organisations need to implement corporate governance practices that are rooted in African ontological and philosophical perspectives to improve corporate governance compliance. They should design and implement ubuntu principles and practices within their corporate governance structures and arrangements to create organisations that promote solidarity, cohesion, humanity, respect, dignity, and sustainable development. The advancement of good corporate governance is regarded as a “journey” rather than an “event”. It is a continuum that is never-ending so long as modern organisations exist. It is a challenge with unlimited room for improvement and innovation. The more an organisation’s business model positively impacts on society and environment, the more the quality of life in developing economies will improve. This improvement, in turn, will positively affect the prospects of sustainable development for those organisations.

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ABSTRACTS OF ARTICLES IN THIS EDITION

RÉSUMÉS DES ARTICLES DE CETTE ÉDITION

SUMÁRIO DOS ARTIGOS NESTA EDIÇÃO

THE DEFICITS OF DEMOCRATIC MECHANISM AND INSTRUMENTS IN NIGERIA'S FOURTH REPUBLIC

Al Chukwuma Okoli, Chigozie Joseph Nebeife and Markus Arum Izang

This article interrogates the phenomenon of democratic deficits in Nigeria's Fourth Republic based on an exploratory analysis of secondary sources. The essence of government is encapsulated in the fulfilment of public good. A democratic government is acclaimed to be most suited to the determination and implementation of such a mandate. However, this has not been the general experience across the world, and more specifically in emerging democracies. For instance, successive democratic administrations in Nigeria's Fourth Republic have left a lot to be desired in relation to fulfilling their democratic mandate through proper representation and good governance. A series of elections has produced different crops of supposed people's representatives. Yet the existential conditions of the people have not been met in a manner that justifies that these representatives rule at the instance of the people, let alone represent their interests and aspirations. The gaping deficits of democracy in this regard has warranted the submission of this paper to the effect that electoral democracy in Nigeria's Fourth Republic has not brought about the needed democratic dividends in terms of efficient governance and effective representation.

Keywords: *Democracy; democratic deficits; democratic representation; election; Fourth Republic, Nigeria.*

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LES DÉFICITS DES MÉCANISMES ET INSTRUMENTS DÉMOCRATIQUES SOUS LA QUATRIÈME RÉPUBLIQUE DU NIGÉRIA

Al Chukwuma Okoli, Chigozie Joseph Nebeife et Markus Arum Izang

Cet article se penche sur le phénomène des déficits démocratiques sous la Quatrième République du Nigéria en se basant sur une analyse exploratoire de sources secondaires. Le gouvernement, par essence, doit veiller sur le bien public. Un gouvernement démocratique est perçu comme étant le plus apte à déterminer et à remplir un tel mandat. Cependant, à travers le globe, le ressenti n'est pas le même, et plus particulièrement dans les démocraties émergentes. Par exemple, les administrations démocratiques successives de la Quatrième République du Nigéria ont fortement laissé à désirer en termes d'accomplissement de leur mandat démocratique par une représentation appropriée et une bonne gouvernance. Une série d'élections a donné lieu à un vivier de prétendus représentants du peuple. Et pourtant, les conditions existentielles du peuple n'ont pas été remplies de manière à justifier que ces représentants gouvernent au nom du peuple, ou même représentent ses intérêts et ses aspirations. Les déficits flagrants de la démocratie à cet égard ont justifié la présentation de ce document, selon lequel la démocratie électorale sous la Quatrième République du Nigéria n'a pas apporté les dividendes démocratiques nécessaires en termes d'efficience de la gouvernance et d'efficacité de la représentation.

Mots-clés : *Démocratie ; déficits démocratiques ; représentation démocratique ; élection ; Quatrième République, Nigéria.*

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OS DÉFICES DO MECANISMO E DOS INSTRUMENTOS DEMOCRÁTICOS NA QUARTA REPÚBLICA DA NIGÉRIA

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Este artigo questiona o fenómeno dos défices democráticos na Quarta República da Nigéria com base numa análise exploratória de fontes secundárias. A essência do governo está englobada na realização do bem público. Um governo democrático é aclamado como o mais

adequado à determinação e implementação de um tal mandato. No entanto, esta não tem sido a experiência geral em todo o mundo, e mais especificamente nas democracias emergentes. Por exemplo, as sucessivas administrações democráticas na Quarta República da Nigéria deixaram muito a desejar em relação ao cumprimento do seu mandato democrático através de representação adequada e boa governação. Uma série de eleições produziu diferentes colheitas de supostos representantes do povo. No entanto, as condições existenciais do povo não foram preenchidas de uma forma que justifique que estes representantes governem à instância do povo, quanto mais que representem os seus interesses e aspirações. Os enormes défices da democracia a este respeito justificaram a submissão deste documento tendo em conta que a democracia eleitoral na Quarta República da Nigéria não produziu os dividendos democráticos necessários em termos de governação eficiente e representação eficaz.

Palavras-Chave*: Democracia; défices democráticos; representação democrática; eleições; Quarta República, Nigéria.*

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DEVELOPMENTAL LOCAL GOVERNMENT: A FRAMEWORK FOR IMPLEMENTATION

T.M. Ramodula and K.K. Govender

The thesis of this article is that successful establishment of the vision of developmental local government in South Africa depends on the quality of strategies adopted by municipalities. A thematic approach involving the vision of developmental local government and strategy is therefore employed in developing a framework for strategy implementation that is proposed to assist municipalities towards the realisation of their ultimate goal of a developmental local government. The framework is premised on the organisational dynamics involving related public policy directives, the primary actors in the strategy-vision process, strategy execution, organisational structure and performance management system. The concept strategy is examined in its military etymological sense and applied according to the local sphere of government, and specifically as a means towards the effective establishment of developmental government. This article further emphasises that developmental local government is a long-term vision that cannot be confined to the five-year political term of municipal leadership. Political tenure often ends while the municipal administration is still grappling with outlining the strategic intent or vision and adapting it to institutional norms and values. This is because such adjustment is further complicated by the uncertainties associated with the ever-changing environment. The proposed framework is envisaged to improve the interconnection between the strategy and vision of developmental local government.

Keywords: *local government, developmental state, developmental local government, strategy.*

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LE GOUVERNEMENT LOCAL DÉVELOPPEMENTALISTE : UN CADRE DE MISE EN ŒUVRE

T.M. Ramodula et K.K. Govender

Cet article énonce la thèse selon laquelle la concrétisation de la vision d'un gouvernement local développementaliste en Afrique du Sud dépend de la qualité des stratégies adoptées par les municipalités. Une approche thématique regroupant vision du gouvernement local développementaliste et stratégie, est donc utilisée en vue de mettre au point un cadre de mise en œuvre de la stratégie, qui est proposé pour aider les municipalités à réaliser l'objectif ultime d'un gouvernement local développementaliste. Le cadre est fondé sur la dynamique organisationnelle qui implique des directives de politique publique connexes, les principaux acteurs du processus vision-stratégie, l'exécution de la stratégie, la structure organisationnelle et le système de gestion des performances. Le concept de stratégie est examiné dans son sens étymologique militaire et appliqué sur la base de la sphère locale de gouvernement, et plus précisément, comme un moyen de parvenir à la mise en place effective d'un gouvernement développementaliste. Cet article souligne en outre que le gouvernement local développementaliste est une vision à long terme qui ne peut être confinée au mandat politique de cinq ans des dirigeants municipaux. Le mandat politique prend souvent fin alors que l'administration municipale est encore aux prises avec la définition de l'intention ou de la vision stratégique et son adaptation aux normes et valeurs institutionnelles. En effet, cette adaptation est aggravée par les incertitudes liées à l'évolution constante de l'environnement. Le cadre proposé est envisagé afin d'améliorer l'interconnexion entre la stratégie et la vision de l'administration locale développementaliste.

***Mots clés :** gouvernement local, État développementaliste, gouvernement local développementaliste, stratégie.*

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GOVERNO DESENVOLVIMENTISTA LOCAL: UM QUADRO PARA EXECUÇÃO

T.M. Ramodula e K.K. Govender

A tese deste artigo é que o estabelecimento bem-sucedido da visão de um governo local desenvolvimentista na África do Sul depende da qualidade das estratégias adotadas pelos municípios. Uma abordagem temática envolvendo a visão de uma administração local e estratégia que vise o desenvolvimentismo é, portanto, utilizada no esboço de um quadro de implementação de estratagemas proposto para ajudar os municípios na realização do seu objetivo final de uma governação local para promover o crescimento. O quadro baseia-se na dinâmica organizacional envolvendo diretivas de política pública relacionadas, principais atores no processo de visão estratégica, execução da estratégia, estrutura de organização e sistema de gestão do desempenho. A estratégia conceptual é examinada no seu sentido etimológico militar e aplicada de acordo com a esfera de governo local, e especificamente como um meio para o estabelecimento efetivo de um governo desenvolvimentista. Este artigo sublinha ainda que este tipo d governo é uma visão a longo prazo que não se pode limitar ao mandato político de cinco anos da liderança municipal. Esses mandatos, frequentemente terminam enquanto a administração municipal ainda se debate com o esboço de intenção ou visão estratégica e a sua adaptação às normas e valores institucionais. Isto porque tal ajustamento torna-se ainda mais complicado devido às incertezas associadas ao ambiente em constante mudança. O quadro proposto destina-se a melhorar a interligação entre a estratégia e a visão do governo local em matéria de desenvolvimentismo.

***Palavras-chave**: governo local, estado de desenvolvimentismo, governo local desenvolvimentista, estratégia.*

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CONTRASTING GOVERNANCE ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE MANAGEMENT OF PERFORMANCE OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISES IN NAMIBIA

Ntelamo Ntelamo

In Namibia, public enterprises have experienced a fair share of poor governance and poor performance. This is because of the inadequacy of the legislation that was intended to regulate the governance of public enterprises. For instance, the Public Enterprises Governance Act, 2006 (Act 2 of 2006), as amended by the Public Enterprises Governance Amendment Act, 2015 (Act 8 of 2015), does not provide punishment for poor performance. In order to correct the severe cause and effects of poor governance, the Ministry of Public Enterprises, established through Act 8 of 2015, embarked on a drive to overhaul Act 2 of 2006. A policy paper was drafted; culminating in the enactment of the Public Enterprises Governance Act, 2019 (Act 1 of 2019). The Act introduces a few changes aimed at improving the governance of public enterprises. Chief among the changes are the powers of a relevant Minister to remove a board or a board member upon non-compliance with relevant provisions relating to governance and individual performance agreements. Furthermore, chief executive officers (CEOs) and senior managers will be dismissed when they fail to perform in accordance with their performance agreements. What Act 1 of 2019 amongst others, omits to provide for, are consequences for the relevant Minister failing to perform in terms of the prescribed agreements with the board or board members.

Keywords*: Governance, regulate public enterprises, , Namibia legislation, performance management.*

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COMPARAISON ENTRE LES MODALITÉS DE GOUVERNANCE ET LA GESTION DES PERFORMANCES DES ENTREPRISES PUBLIQUES EN NAMIBIE

Ntelamo Ntelamo

En Namibie, les entreprises publiques ont vécu de nombreux cas de mauvaise gouvernance et de piètres performances, ceci en raison de l’inadéquation de la législation qui devait réglementer la gouvernance des entreprises publiques. Prenons par exemple, la Loi de 2006 sur la gouvernance des entreprises publiques (Loi 2 de 2006), telle que modifiée par la Loi de 2015 portant modification de la loi sur la gouvernance des entreprises publiques (Loi 8 de 2015), qui ne prévoit pas de sanction pour les mauvaises performances. Afin de remédier aux causes et aux effets graves de la mauvaise gouvernance, le ministère des Entreprises publiques, institué en vertu de la Loi 8 de 2015, s'est engagé dans une campagne de révision de la Loi 2 de 2006. Un document d'orientation a été rédigé, qui a abouti à la promulgation de la Loi de 2019 sur la gouvernance des entreprises publiques (Loi 1 de 2019). Cette Loi introduit quelques changements visant à améliorer la gouvernance des entreprises publiques. L'un des principaux changements consiste à attribuer à un ministre compétent le pouvoir de révoquer un conseil d'administration ou un membre du conseil en cas de non-respect des modalités pertinentes de gouvernance et des accords de performance individuels. En outre, les directeurs généraux (PDG) et les cadres supérieurs seront licenciés lorsqu'ils ne respectent pas leurs accords de performance. Ce que la Loi 1 de 2019, entre autres, omet de prévoir, sont les conséquences pour le ministre concerné au cas où il ne respectait pas les accords prescrits avec le conseil d'administration ou les membres du conseil.

Mots-clés : *Gouvernance, réglementation des entreprises publiques, législation namibienne, gestion des performances.*

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CONTRASTANDO OS DISPOSITIVOS DE GOVERNAÇÃO COM A GESTÃO DE DESEMPENHO DAS EMPRESAS PÚBLICAS NA NAMÍBIA

Ntelamo Ntelamo

Na Namíbia, as empresas públicas sofreram uma proporção justa de má governação e desempenho insatisfatório. Isto deve-se à inadequação da legislação que se destinava a regular a gestão das empresas públicas. Por exemplo, a Lei da Governação das Empresas Públicas, 2006 (Lei 2 de 2006), tal como alterada pela Lei de Alteração da Governação das Empresas Públicas, 2015 (Lei 8 de 2015), não prevê punição por desempenho deficiente. A fim de corrigir as graves causas e efeitos da má governação, o Ministério das Empresas Públicas, estabelecido através da Lei 8 de 2015, deu início a um esforço de revisão da Lei 2 de 2006. Um documento político foi redigido e isso culminou na promulgação da Lei da Governação das Empresas Públicas, de 2019 (Lei 1 de 2019). A lei introduz algumas alterações destinadas a melhorar a governação das empresas públicas. Entre essas, destacam-se os poderes de um ministro competente para exonerar um conselho de administração ou um membro do conselho em caso de incumprimento das respetivas disposições ligadas à governação e aos acordos de desempenho individual. Além disso, os diretores executivos e gestores de topo serão exonerados em caso de incumprimento dos seus acordos de desempenho. O que a Lei 1 de 2019, entre outras, omite, são consequências para o Ministro em causa, caso não execute as suas funções em conformidade com os acordos prescritos pelo conselho de administração ou seus membros.

Palavras-chave: Governação, regulamentação das empresas públicas, legislação da Namíbia, gestão do desempenho.

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TOWARDS A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR ORGANISATIONALLY EFFECTIVE FEMALE LEADERSHIP IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: THE CASE OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISES IN ESWATINI

Collin Kamalizeni, Mohammad Hoque, Abdullah Kader, and Hatikanganwi Mapudzi

This article analyses the extent to which female leadership affects organisational effectiveness using the case of public enterprises in Eswatini. Fundamental questions were raised: What are the prospects of female leadership advancing organisational effectiveness in public enterprises? What are the factors influencing female leadership's role in achieving the desirable goals? As part of a cross-sectional qualitative research process, twenty purposively selected respondents were targeted (made up of 10 male and 10 female managers in public enterprises in Eswatini). To this end, semi-structured interviews were conducted and interpreted using thematic analysis. In order to realise organisational effectiveness, this article notes that female leadership is effective if; firstly, female leaders apply a combination of transformational and transactional leadership styles in leading public enterprises. Secondly, they need to adopt an inclusive leadership approach to reduce the impact of risk and add some degree of informality in employing digitalisation to counteract some of the traditional-cultural barriers. Finally, and most importantly, female leaders need to enter into an active strategic partnership with their male counterparts in the promotion of gender equality initiatives. To conclude, the article suggests that female leaders' representation in strategic positions within public enterprises in Eswatini should be accelerated in order to stimulate ethical leadership and construct dynamic and collaborative masculine and feminine coalitions. Suggestions include further enquiry into digitalisation and eco-leadership to reverse major cultural-traditional stereotypes that hinder gender-inclusive leadership in public enterprises.

***Keywords**: public enterprises, gender inclusive leadership, organisational effectiveness, under-representation, leadership impact.*

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VERS UN CADRE CONCEPTUEL EN FAVEUR D'UN LEADERSHIP FÉMININ PERFORMANT SUR LE PLAN ORGANISATIONNEL EN AFRIQUE SUBSAHARIENNE : LE CAS DES ENTREPRISES PUBLIQUES À ESWATINI

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Cet article examine, à travers le cas des entreprises publiques à Eswatini, dans quelle mesure le leadership féminin joue sur la performance organisationnelle. Il soulève des questions fondamentales telles que : Quelles sont les chances de voir le leadership féminin améliorer la performance organisationnelle dans les entreprises publiques ? Quels sont les facteurs qui influencent le rôle du leadership féminin dans la réalisation des objectifs souhaités ? Dans le cadre d'un processus de recherche qualitative transversale, vingt répondants sélectionnés à dessein ont été ciblés (composés de 10 hommes et 10 femmes cadres dans des entreprises publiques à Eswatini). À cet effet, des entretiens semi-structurés ont été menés et interprétés à l'aide d'une analyse thématique. Pour parvenir à une performance organisationnelle, cet article note que leadership féminin est efficace si ; premièrement, les femmes dirigeantes appliquent une combinaison de styles de leadership transformationnel et transactionnel dans la direction des entreprises publiques. Deuxièmement, elles doivent adopter une approche inclusive du leadership afin de réduire l›impact du risque et ajouter un caractère informel dans l'utilisation de la numérisation pour contrecarrer certaines des barrières culturelles traditionnelles. Enfin, et surtout, les femmes dirigeantes doivent conclure un partenariat stratégique actif avec leurs homologues masculins dans le but de promouvoir les initiatives en matière d'égalité des genres. Pour conclure, l'article suggère une augmentation dans la représentation des femmes dirigeantes à des postes stratégiques au sein des entreprises publiques d'Eswatini afin de stimuler un leadership éthique et de construire des coalitions masculines et féminines dynamiques et collaboratives. Il suggère entre autres, une enquête complémentaire sur la numérisation et l'éco-leadership pour renverser les principaux stéréotypes culturels traditionnels qui entravent le leadership inclusif des femmes dans les entreprises publiques.

Mots clés : *entreprises publiques, leadership intégrant la dimension de genre, performance organisationnelle, sous-représentation, impact du leadership.*

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RUMO A UM QUADRO CONCEPTUAL DE LIDERANÇA FEMININA ORGANIZACIONALMENTE EFICAZ NA ÁFRICA SUBSARIANA: O CASO DAS EMPRESAS PÚBLICAS EM ESWATINI

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Este artigo analisa a dimensão em que a liderança feminina afeta a eficácia organizacional usando o caso das empresas públicas em Eswatini. Foram levantadas questões fundamentais: Quais são as perspetivas da liderança feminina promover a eficácia organizativa nas empresas públicas? Quais são os fatores que influenciam o papel da liderança feminina na consecução dos objetivos desejáveis? Como parte de um processo de investigação qualitativa transversal, foram visados vinte inquiridos propositadamente selecionados (compostos por 10 gestores masculinos e 10 femininos de empresas públicas em Eswatini). Para o efeito, foram realizadas entrevistas semiestruturadas e interpretadas utilizando a análise temática. A fim de se conseguir eficácia organizacional, este artigo observa que a liderança feminina é eficaz se: em primeiro lugar, as líderes femininas aplicarem uma combinação de estilos de liderança transformacional e transacional em empresas públicas de primeiro plano. Em segundo lugar, precisam de adotar uma abordagem de liderança inclusiva para reduzir o impacto do risco e acrescentar algum grau de informalidade através do uso da digitalização para contrariar algumas das barreiras culturais tradicionais. Finalmente, e ainda mais importante, as líderes femininas precisam de entrar numa parceria estratégica ativa com os seus homólogos masculinos na promoção de iniciativas de igualdade de género. Para concluir, o artigo sugere que a representação de líderes femininas em posições estratégicas dentro de empresas públicas em Eswatini deve ser acelerada a fim de estimular a liderança ética e construir coligações masculinas e femininas dinâmicas e colaborativas. As sugestões incluem mais investigação sobre digitalização e liderança ecológica para reverter os principais estereótipos culturais e tradicionais que impedem a liderança inclusiva do género nas empresas públicas.

***Palavras-chave**: empresas públicas, liderança inclusiva de género, eficácia organizacional, sub-representação, impacto da liderança.*

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ASSESSING THE CAPABILITIES OF NSG FACILITATORS IN BUILDING CIVIL SERVANTS' CAPACITY FOR THE EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS

Izimangaliso Malatjie

In 2015, the United Nations (UN) General Assembly adopted Vision 2030, which is made up of the global goals that are widely known as the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Vision 2030 represents a new and coherent way of thinking in terms of how issues as diverse as poverty, education and climate change fit together. The vision entwines socio-economic and environmental targets into 17 SDGs. The achievement of the global goals intends to promote a sustainable development by helping UN member states to secure a better future for all their citizens. The SDGs address crucial issues such as poverty, hunger, inequality, climate change, education, peace, justice and strong institutions. It is essential that countries pay particular attention to the inclusion of the SDGs in education and training programmes of schools and institutes of administration, as well as other institutions that offer higher education. This article aims to firstly examine the history, context, and significance of SDGs; secondly, it explains the manner in which SDGs have gained saliency among the public service, and finally, it intends to determine the extent to which facilitators within the NSG are equipped to promote the implementation of the SDGs through training programmes.

***Keywords**: Sustainable Development Goals, Training, Public Service, Agenda 2030.*

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ÉVALUER LES APTITUDES DES FACILITATEURS DU NSG À RENFORCER LES CAPACITÉS DES FONCTIONNAIRES EN VUE DE LA MISE EN ŒUVRE EFFICACE DES OBJECTIFS DE DÉVELOPPEMENT DURABLE

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En 2015, l'Assemblée générale des Nations unies (ONU) a adopté la Vision 2030, qui est constituée des objectifs mondiaux largement connus sous le nom d'objectifs de développement durable (ODD). La Vision 2030 représente une façon, nouvelle et cohérente de penser la manière dont des questions aussi diverses que la pauvreté, l'éducation et le changement climatique s'articulent les unes avec les autres. Cette vision regroupe des objectifs socio-économiques et environnementaux en 17 ODD. La réalisation des objectifs mondiaux vise à promouvoir un développement durable en aidant les États membres des Nations unies à assurer un meilleur avenir à tous leurs citoyens. Les ODD abordent des questions cruciales telles que la pauvreté, la faim, l'inégalité, le changement climatique, l'éducation, la paix, la justice et des institutions fortes. Il est essentiel que les pays accordent une attention particulière à l'inclusion des ODD dans les programmes éducatifs et de formation des écoles et des instituts d'administration, ainsi que des autres institutions qui proposent un enseignement supérieur. Cet article vise à examiner dans un premier temps l'histoire, le contexte et l'importance des ODD ; ensuite, il explique la manière dont les ODD ont gagné du terrain au sein de la fonction publique, et enfin, il entend déterminer dans quelle mesure les facilitateurs au sein du NSG sont équipés de manière à promouvoir la mise en œuvre des ODD par le biais de programmes de formation.

Mots-clés : *Objectifs de développement durable, Formation, Service public, Agenda 2030.*

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AVALIAÇÃO DAS CAPACIDADES DOS FACILITADORES DA NSG NO DESENVOLVIMENTO DAS APTIDÕES DOS FUNCIONÁRIOS PÚBLICOS PARA A IMPLEMENTAÇÃO EFECTIVA DOS OBJECTIVOS DE DESENVOLVIMENTO SUSTENTÁVEL

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Em 2015, a Assembleia Geral das Nações Unidas (ONU) adotou a Visão 2030, que é constituída pelos objetivos globais que são amplamente conhecidos como os Objetivos de Desenvolvimento Sustentável (ODS). A Visão 2030 representa uma nova e coerente forma de pensar em termos de como questões tão diversas como a pobreza, a educação e as alterações climáticas se articulam. A visão entrelaça objetivos socioeconómicos e ambientais em 17 ODS. A realização dos objetivos globais pretende promover um desenvolvimento sustentável, ajudando os Estados Membros da ONU a assegurar um futuro melhor para todos os seus cidadãos. Os ODS abordam questões cruciais tais como pobreza, fome, desigualdade, alterações climáticas, educação, paz, justiça e instituições fortes. É imperativo que os países prestem especial atenção à inclusão dos ODS nos programas de educação e formação das escolas e institutos de administração, bem como de outras instituições que oferecem ensino superior. Este artigo pretende, em primeiro lugar, examinar a história, contexto e significado dos ODS; em segundo lugar, explica a forma como os ODS ganharam relevo entre o serviço público e, por fim, pretende determinar até que ponto os facilitadores no seio da NSG estão equipados para promover a implementação dos ODS através de programas de formação.

Palavras-chave*: Objetivos de Desenvolvimento Sustentável, Formação, Serviço Público, Agenda 2030.*

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CHALLENGES FACING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE GREEN MOVEMENT IN RESIDENTIAL AREAS IN LUSAKA, ZAMBIA

Peter Nyakalale and Clever Madimutsa

The Zambian government launched the Make Zambia Clean and Healthy Campaign in 2007 to curb the indiscriminate disposal of waste. The campaign was then re-branded in 2018 to become Keep Zambia Clean, Green and Healthy Campaign. This meant that citizens and institutions were not only expected to keep the environment clean and healthy but also make it green by planting trees and grass. Despite the adoption of this campaign, residential areas in Zambia are still not green. The purpose of this article is to identify the challenges that have hampered a successful implementation of the green movement in residential areas in Zambia. The research was conducted in Lusaka using a mixed methods design. A total sample of 128 was engaged in the research, comprising 120 household heads and eight key informants. Multi-stage and purposive sampling methods were used to sample household heads and key informants, respectively. A questionnaire and interview guides were used to collect the data. The findings demonstrate that both the government and community members have faced numerous challenges to implement the green movement. On the one hand, the government lacks resources to sensitize people and supply enough water to residential areas. On the other hand, the residents are too poor to afford the payment of water services used to maintain their green areas.

Keywords: *Green movement, implementation challenge, government, residential area.*

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DÉFIS POSÉS PAR LA MISE EN ŒUVRE DU MOUVEMENT VERT DANS LES ZONES RÉSIDENTIELLES DE LUSAKA, EN ZAMBIE

Peter Nyakalale et Clever Madimutsa

Le gouvernement zambien a lancé la campagne “Rendons la Zambie propre et saine” en 2007 pour mettre un frein à l’élimination inconsidérée des déchets. La campagne a ensuite été rebaptisée en 2018 “Gardons la Zambie propre, verte et saine”. En d’autres termes, les citoyens et les institutions ne sont pas simplement censés garder l’environnement propre et sain, mais ils doivent aussi le rendre vert en plantant des arbres et de l’herbe. Malgré l’adoption de cette campagne, les zones résidentielles en Zambie ne sont toujours pas vertes. Cet article vise à identifier les défis qui ont entravé la mise en œuvre réussie du mouvement vert dans les zones résidentielles en Zambie. La recherche a été menée à Lusaka en ayant recours à un modèle multi-méthodes. Un total de 128 personnes ont participé à l’échantillonnage aux fins de recherche, soit 120 chefs de ménage et huit informateurs clés. Des méthodes d’échantillonnage dirigé et à plusieurs phases ont été utilisées pour échantillonner respectivement les chefs de ménage et les informateurs clés. Un questionnaire et des guides d’entretien ont été utilisés en vue de collecter les données. Les résultats indiquent que le gouvernement et les membres de la communauté ont été confrontés à de nombreux défis dans la mise en œuvre du mouvement vert. D’une part, le gouvernement manque de ressources pour sensibiliser la population et fournir suffisamment d’eau aux zones résidentielles. D’autre part, les résidents sont trop pauvres pour payer les services d’eau utilisés dans l’entretien de leurs espaces verts.

Mots-clés : *Mouvement vert, défi de la mise en œuvre, gouvernement, zone résidentielle.*

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DESAFIOS COLOCADOS À IMPLEMENTAÇÃO DO MOVIMENTO VERDE NAS ZONAS RESIDENCIAIS DE LUSAKA, ZÂMBIA

Peter Nyakalale e Clever Madimutsa

O governo da Zâmbia lançou a Campanha Make Zambia Clean and Healthy (Tornar a Zâmbia Limpa e Saudável) em 2007 para conter a eliminação indiscriminada de resíduos. A campanha foi então renomeada em 2018 para se tornar a Campanha Manter a Zâmbia Limpa, Verde e Saudável. Isto significava que não só se esperava que os cidadãos e as instituições mantivessem o ambiente limpo e saudável, mas também o tornassem verde, plantando árvores e relva. Apesar da adoção desta campanha, as áreas habitacionais ainda não estão verdes. O artigo visa identificar os desafios que têm dificultado a implementação bem- sucedida do movimento verde nos bairros residenciais da Zâmbia. A investigação foi conduzida em Lusaka através de um plano de métodos mistos. Uma amostra total de 128 pessoas esteve envolvida na investigação, composta por 120 chefes de família e oito informadores chave. Foram utilizados métodos de amostragem em várias fases e propositadamente para recolha de dados por parte de chefes de família e de informadores chave, respetivamente. Um questionário e guias de entrevista foram utilizados para recolher a informação. Os resultados da investigação indicam que tanto o governo como os membros da comunidade enfrentam desafios na implementação do movimento verde. Por um lado, o governo carece de recursos para sensibilizar as pessoas e fornecer água suficiente às áreas residenciais. Por outro lado, os residentes são demasiadamente pobres para poderem pagar os serviços de água utilizada para manter as suas áreas verdes.

Palavras-chave*: movimento verde, desafio de implementação, governo, área residencial.*

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APPLICATION OF THE AFRICAN ONTOLOGICAL VALUE OF UBUNTU IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

Jan Tladi

Worldwide, the corporate governance phenomenon has grown exponentially as a favoured corporate management approach to curtail governance deficiencies. Advancing the contemporary corporate governance phenomenon, scholars have, over the years, developed an array of frameworks to improve the nucleus of corporate governance practices and principles. Given the shortfalls of some of the dominant frameworks, the ubuntu perspective is offered as an alternative framework for the application of corporate governance underpinned by African ontological and philosophical perspectives. This article explores the conception, scope, and content of ubuntu to guide African organisations in executing corporate governance arrangements.

***Keywords**: corporate governance, ubuntu theory, agency theory, ubuntu concept.*

Advocate Jan Tladi, The Tramshed.

APPLIQUER LA VALEUR ONTOLOGIQUE AFRICAINE DE L'UBUNTU DANS LA GOUVERNANCE D'ENTREPRISE

Jan Tladi

À travers le monde, le phénomène de gouvernance d'entreprise a connu une croissance exponentielle en tant qu'approche privilégiée de la gestion des entreprises en vue de réduire les déficits de gouvernance. En vue de promouvoir le phénomène contemporain de gouvernance d'entreprise, les chercheurs ont, au fil des ans, mis au point un ensemble de cadres visant à améliorer le noyau des pratiques et des principes de gouvernance d'entreprise. Étant donné les lacunes de certains des cadres dominants, la perspective Ubuntu est proposée comme un cadre alternatif pour l'application de la gouvernance d'entreprise, étayé par des perspectives ontologiques et philosophiques africaines. Cet article explore la conception, la portée et le contenu de l'Ubuntu avec l'objectif de guider les organisations africaines dans l'exécution des dispositions de la gouvernance d'entreprise.

***Mots clés** : gouvernance d'entreprise, théorie de l'Ubuntu, théorie de l'agence, concept de l'Ubuntu.*

Avocat Jan Tladi, The Tramshed.

APLICAÇÃO DO VALOR ONTOLÓGICO AFRICANO DO UBUNTU NA GOVERNAÇÃO CORPORATIVA

Jan Tladi

A nível mundial, o fenómeno deste tipo de administração tem crescido exponencialmente como uma abordagem favorecida de gerência corporativa para reduzir as deficiências administrativas. Ao longo dos anos, os estudiosos têm desenvolvido uma série de quadros para melhorar o núcleo de práticas e princípios de governação corporativa. Dadas as carências de alguns dos quadros dominantes, a perspetiva 'ubuntu' é oferecida como um enquadramento alternativo para a aplicação dessa governação, sustentada por aspetos ontológicos e filosóficos Africanos. Este artigo explora a conceção, âmbito e conteúdo do ‘ubuntu’ para orientar as organizações Africanas na execução de acordos de governação corporativa.

Palavras-chave*: governação empresarial, teoria do ubuntu, teoria da agência, conceito de ubuntu.*

Advogado Jan Tladi, The Tramshed.

BOOK REVIEW

THE GLOBAL CAPITALIST CRISIS: WAY FORWARD FOR AFRICA

Author: Prof. Dan W. Nabudere, Marcus Garvey Pan-African Institute, Mbale, Uganda.

Seatini Books, Kampala, 2011

Reviewed by Firimooni Rweere Banugire[1]

This is an interesting, concise publication. In the course of 123 pages, the author explains the roots and consequences of the global capitalist crisis triggered by the excesses of the American economy in pursuing capitalism without a human face and without social responsibility. It digs into the details of what president Obama calls the irresponsibility of Wall Street, the heart of the American financial system. If you want to know how the casino (gambling) economy works, this is a good and very well-informed monograph to read. It locates the roots of the crisis in the inherent instability of free market capitalism taken to the extreme of market fundamentalism without any social responsibility.

However, be aware that the author approaches the subject from a political economy perspective, seeing the economy through the lens of politics and business, driven by organised greed. In this approach, the key issues highlighted include:

- The *casino* free-market economy is the last stage of productive capitalism and the realisation of its vision of concentrating capital in the hands of a very limited few people who then control the political system, leading to the demise of the social welfare systems and the misery of the working class.

- The process of making money out of money by the financial magnets; thereby discouraging production and leading to an unproductive and destructive form of economy, managed for the benefit of a tiny minority, irrespective of the social consequences.

- How the global financial crises affect African economies and how they should respond for long term economic transformation in the interests of shared prosperity and human security.

1 Prof F.R Banugire is a lecturer in Economics and Management at Bishop Stuart University (BSU), Coordinator of the Masters of Social Economics and Community Management.

Obviously, these negative trends spell doom for the capitalist socio-economic system because both the workers and the middle class stand to lose through a process of de-industrialisation, destruction of the natural environment and the erosion of the health and wealth of grassroots communities. No wonder, therefore, that most Americans saw the writing on the wall and voted for Obama as a drowning man does in clutching for the straw.

From this brief assessment, it is clear that soon after the collapse of authoritarian socialism in the East, immiserizing capitalism in the West is on a destructive path. Immiserizing growth must be understood as a "long-term phenomenon that could occur when the gain in a country's social welfare arising from economic growth is more than offset by the loss in such welfare associated with an adverse shift in the terms of trade" (Pryor 2007:208). In other words, economic growth could result in a country being worse off than before the growth, specifically if growth depends heavily on exports, it could result in a trade decline in the exporting country. Hence, the view is that it's time to reorganise the casino economy, starting with more systematic socio-economic regulations concerning the financial system, and the life support systems that generate real services (e.g. health, community habitat and environmental management, facilities).

The heart of this crisis, the author reveals, is the formalisation of the process of making money by trading in credit using Credit Default Swaps (CDS). Others have called CDS "financial weapons of mass destruction", which have done their job so well in the USA and other industrial economies that their destructive results have been transmitted to Africa and other least developed countries (LDCs).

What about the economics of money and trade? Why did it not foresee these trends and inform the authorities before it was too late? According to the author, capitalist (neoliberal) economics of the propertied/exploiting class is based on the sectarian interests on the dominant capitalist class which, in the absence of a good governance economic framework, will exploit the majority of citizens (working to lower-middle classes). What, then, is its impact on African economies, which are still largely peasant economies, with a rapidly growing urban sector? The author answers this central question by citing various commentators and concluding that many sources of foreign capital inflow will indeed decline, contrary to some government officials' preliminary optimism, which in his view was not well-informed. These include official aid, NGO budgets and tourism revenues, among others.

However, the most interesting conclusions arising out of this correct reading of the final stages of capitalism include, among others, the following: first, the collapse of capitalism as an instrument of the prosperity of nations, is inevitable given that it is driven by the *greed motive*, rather than the *social productivity* motive for the common good of society (my own words). No economic system can sustain itself in such a situation. It must collapse and with it, a new society will gradually emerge; a world community, based on human solidarity and not profit, a society in which exploitation and class divisions are reduced overtime. In other words, the global community, led by the victims of possessive capitalism, must seek *long-term structural socio-economic systems reforms* that will lead to a non-capitalistic market economy that embodies the ideas of *people-centred economies* that authoritarian communism could not achieve, and that the current neo-liberal capitalist globalisation cannot allow the most developed capitalist countries and the LDCs to achieve.

Second, LDCs are at the mercy of this monster of *possessive capitalism* and we cannot develop a new capitalism to transform African economies into industrial economies because capitalist globalisation prevents us from doing so. The door is wide open for foreign profiteers and their local partners to grab our natural resources and fuel corruption of local leaders as a means of getting away with their loot. The author concluded that, Africa must, therefore, seek convergence with the *post-capitalist models* that Americans and European are searching for as the only escape route from oppressive casino capitalism.

Third, the global economic crisis, as a crisis of capitalism, cannot be successfully reformed (regulated) by bailing out failed companies, even if this involves increased state co-ownership. This is because the root of the problem is both market failure and policy failure to link credit management to the production of goods and services needed by the majority of the population to live decent lives. *The wealth of nations* has been monopolised by the few and turned into a gambling system of making profits out of papers money without concern about its availability. Hence, financial capital and capitalists have lost social legitimacy as key partners in the governance of natural wealth and people's livelihoods. This lack of legitimacy is due to its increasing negative impacts on people as well as natural resources. Therefore, these market and policy failures should be seen as being driven by the economic system failure of free market capitalism.

Hence the inevitability of the collapse of laissez-faire capitalism and the urgent need for its *re-structuring and transformation* to save the global community from catastrophe. Capitalism has been discredited by its negative and immiserizing by-products of social crises and environment damage (i.e., man-made natural disasters).

The author, therefore, sees the right solution as coming from a *globalised economic governance* (emerging in the form of G20 and BRICS, in which LDCs have a voice, rather than the G7). However, the struggle is a long one, and all players at global, national and local level in all countries have a role to play politically as well as socially and economically as producers. Temporary bailouts, through the so-called economic stimulus packages of USA and OECD countries, are woefully inadequate to reform capitalism without globalised efforts to engineer a new form of "fair globalisation" as recommended by the World Commission on the Social Dimension of Development (ILO, 2004).

The author, therefore, calls for the reform of the capitalism-driven global system of economic governance, the so-called Bretlon Woods System (IMF, World Bank, WTO) as the only viable long-term strategy for achieving a fair and people-friendly globalisation. While noting the current reforms agenda, the author thinks that most of these are a mere tinkering with the symptoms of the diseases, not real helpful medicine. A structural transformation of capitalism is necessary in order to inoculate the industrial economies against social crises and to build economies that care for their citizens' welfare (the welfare social economies of the future). In this regard, his conclusions are consistent with those of the others who see capitalism as "structural genocide", or the financial crisis as a system crisis of capitalism (Leech 2012).

To conclude this brief review, the author analyses the global economic crises as a consequence of the excesses of capitalism as a socio-economic system for a few that has lost its social productivity as well as its social legitimacy.

It has risen from the status of being a *public good* for promoting wealth creation for all, to a status of *public bad* that generates misery and stagnation for the majority, and obscene gains for those who control financial capital. This is very correct reading of American and global capitalism; it has been recently confirmed by others especially Amin, 2011 (3), and Roubine (4), 2012.

The way forward for Africa and the poor in rich countries is to struggle for a truly “global society” where economic growth and economic management is localised at grassroot and national level through an appropriate system of *national economic governance* that is pro-people, not pro-finance capital. We need social democratic movements everywhere that fight for social and economic rights of all as the political and social antidote to rampant free market capitalism; for example, the Occupy Wall Street movements. We can construct a new world economy for human security on planet Earth through a variety of social movements.

What Africa needs are well-functioning markets that serve the interests of all social groups including the vulnerable and the poor. Good markets without the greed motive of capitalism. Good market-friendly policies determined by people’s organisations; not the global partnership of capitalists and their political agents.

This outcome, however, requires a “new” type of knowledge about how these markets work or ought to work; a new economics. African universities must, therefore, be supported to research the right solutions to our social and economic problems; to contribute to a renaissance of ideas for the protection of African economies from the global shocks of capitalism in its long but painful and destructive days. The new economics must be society-based and people-centred in order to ensure prosperity and human security for all, including effective solutions for climate change, mitigation and adaptation.

The author contributed much to ‘opening our eyes’ with this publication and it should be read by all those (professionals and individuals) concerned with poverty, prosperity and the exploitation of man-by-man within an African context. This important and relevant dialogue should continue; with interested parties studying the issues highlighted and exploring different, and new, paradigms in the study of social and economic matters. For policy makers it is of relevance to take note that this monograph places emphasises on the importance of socio-economic system-building as a strategy for addressing the challenges emanating from global financial crises.

CRITIQUE DE LIVRE

LA CRISE CAPITALISTE MONDIALE : LA VOIE À SUIVRE POUR L'AFRIQUE

Auteur : Prof. Dan W. Nabudere, Institut panafricain Marcus Garvey, Mbale, Ouganda.

Seatini Books, Kampala, 2011

Une critique de Firimooni Rweere Banugire[1]

C'est une publication intéressante et concise. En 123 pages, l'auteur explique les racines et les conséquences de la crise capitaliste mondiale déclenchée par les excès de l'économie américaine dans la poursuite d'un capitalisme sans visage humain et sans responsabilité sociale. Il détaille ce que le président Obama a appelé l'irresponsabilité de Wall Street, le cœur du système financier américain. Si vous voulez savoir comment fonctionne l'économie des casinos (jeux de hasard), c'est une bonne monographie, très bien informée, à lire. Elle situe les racines de la crise dans l'instabilité inhérente au capitalisme de libre marché poussé à l'extrême du fondamentalisme de marché sans aucune responsabilité sociale.

Cependant, il faut savoir que l'auteur aborde le sujet sous l'angle de l'économie politique, en voyant l'économie à travers le prisme de la politique et des affaires, sous l'impulsion de la cupidité organisée. Dans cette approche, les questions clés mises en évidence sont les suivantes :

- L'économie de marché de *casino* est la dernière étape du capitalisme productif et la réalisation de sa vision de concentration du capital dans les mains d'un nombre très limité de personnes qui contrôlent ensuite le système politique, ce qui entraîne la disparition des systèmes de protection sociale et la misère de la classe ouvrière.

- Le processus consistant à faire de l'argent avec l'argent des aimants financiers, décourageant ainsi la production et conduisant à une forme d'économie improductive et destructrice, gérée au profit d'une infime minorité, indépendamment des conséquences sociales.

- Comment les crises financières mondiales affectent les économies africaines et comment ces dernières devraient y réagir pour une transformation économique à long terme dans l›intérêt d'une prospérité partagée et de la sécurité humaine.

1 Le professeur F.R Banugire est maître de conférences en économie et en gestion à l'université Bishop Stuart (BSU), coordinateur de la maîtrise d'économie sociale et de gestion communautaire.

De toute évidence, ces tendances négatives sont synonymes de désastre pour le système socio- économique capitaliste, car tant les travailleurs que la classe moyenne sont perdants dans un processus de désindustrialisation, de destruction de l'environnement naturel et d'érosion de la santé et de la richesse des communautés de base. Il n'est donc pas étonnant que la plupart des

Américains aient su lire les signes et aient voté pour Obama tel un homme en train de se noyer qui s'agripperait à une paille.

De ce bref bilan, il ressort clairement que peu après l'effondrement du socialisme autoritaire à l'Est, le capitalisme appauvrissant de l'Ouest est sur une voie destructrice. La croissance appauvrissante doit être comprise comme un «phénomène à long terme qui pourrait se produire lorsque le gain en bien-être social d'un pays résultant de la croissance économique est plus que compensé par la perte de ce bien-être, associée à une évolution défavorable des termes de l'échange» (Pryor 2007 :208). En d'autres termes, la croissance économique pourrait entraîner une détérioration de la situation d'un pays par rapport à la période avant la croissance, surtout si ladite croissance dépend fortement des exportations, elle pourrait entraîner une baisse des échanges commerciaux dans le pays exportateur. Par conséquent, l'idée est qu'il serait temps de réorganiser l'économie de casino, en commençant par des réglementations socio- économiques plus systématiques concernant le système financier et les systèmes de survie qui génèrent de véritables services (par exemple, la santé, la gestion de l'habitat et de l'environnement de la communauté, les installations).

Le cœur de cette crise, révèle l'auteur, est la formalisation du processus de faire de l'argent en négociant des crédits à l'aide de Couvertures de défaillance (CDS). D'autres ont qualifié les CDS «d'armes financières de destruction massive», qui ont si bien fait leur travail aux États-Unis et dans d'autres économies industrielles que leurs résultats destructeurs ont été transmis à l'Afrique et à d'autres pays les moins avancés (PMA).

Qu'en est-il de l'économie de l'argent et du commerce ? Pourquoi n'a-t-elle pas prévu ces tendances et informé les autorités avant qu'il ne soit trop tard ? Selon l'auteur, l'économie capitaliste (néolibérale) de la classe des propriétaires immobiliers/exploitante est basée sur les intérêts sectaires de la classe capitaliste dominante qui, en l'absence d'un cadre économique de bonne gouvernance, exploitera la majorité des citoyens (travaillant dans les classes moyennes inférieures). Quel est donc son impact sur les économies africaines, qui sont encore largement des économies paysannes, avec un secteur urbain en croissance rapide ? L'auteur répond à cette question centrale en citant divers commentateurs et en concluant que de nombreuses sources d'entrée de capitaux étrangers vont effectivement diminuer, contrairement à l›optimisme préliminaire de certains responsables gouvernementaux qui, selon lui, n'étaient pas bien informés. Il s'agit notamment de l'aide publique, des budgets des ONG et des recettes du tourisme.

Cependant, les conclusions les plus intéressantes qui découlent de cette lecture correcte des étapes finales du capitalisme sont, entre autres, les suivantes : premièrement, l›effondrement du capitalisme en tant qu'instrument de prospérité des nations est inévitable étant donné qu'il est motivé par le *motif de cupidité,* plutôt que par celui de la *productivité* *sociale* pour le bien commun de la société (mes propres mots). Aucun système économique ne peut se maintenir dans une telle situation. Il doit s'effondrer et avec lui, une nouvelle société va progressivement émerger ; une communauté mondiale, basée sur la solidarité humaine et non sur le profit, une société dans laquelle l'exploitation et les divisions de classes sont réduites au fil du temps. En d'autres termes, la communauté mondiale, dirigée par les victimes du capitalisme possessif, doit rechercher des *réformes structurelles* à *long terme des systèmes socio-économiques qui* conduiront à une économie de marché non capitaliste incarnant les idées d'économies centrées *sur les personnes* que le communisme autoritaire n'a pas pu réaliser et que la mondialisation capitaliste néo-libérale actuelle ne peut permettre aux pays capitalistes les plus développés et aux PMA de réaliser.

Deuxièmement, les PMA sont à la merci de ce monstre de *capitalisme possessif* et nous ne pouvons pas développer un nouveau capitalisme pour transformer les économies africaines en économies industrielles parce que la mondialisation capitaliste nous en empêche. La porte est grande ouverte pour que les étrangers profiteurs et leurs partenaires locaux s'emparent de nos ressources naturelles et alimentent la corruption des dirigeants locaux afin de s'en tirer avec leur butin. L'auteur conclut que l'Afrique doit donc chercher à converger avec les *modèles post- capitalistes* que les Américains et les Européens recherchent comme seule voie de sortie du capitalisme de casino oppressif.

Troisièmement, la crise économique mondiale, en tant que crise du capitalisme, ne peut être réformée (régulée) avec succès en renflouant les entreprises en faillite, même si cela implique une augmentation de la copropriété de l'État. La raison en est que la racine du problème est à la fois l'échec du marché et l'incapacité des politiques à lier la gestion du crédit à la production des biens et services dont la majorité de la population a besoin pour vivre décemment. *La richesse des nations* a été monopolisée par une minorité et transformée en un système de jeu consistant à faire des profits avec de l'argent papier sans se soucier de sa disponibilité. Par conséquent, le capital financier et les capitalistes ont perdu leur légitimité sociale en tant que partenaires clés dans la gouvernance des richesses naturelles et des moyens de subsistance des populations. Ce manque de légitimité est dû à ses effets négatifs croissants sur les populations et les ressources naturelles. Par conséquent, ces échecs du marché et des politiques doivent être considérés comme étant dus à l'échec du système économique du capitalisme de marché libre.

D'où l'inévitabilité de l'effondrement du capitalisme du laisser-faire et l'urgence de sa *restructuration et de sa transformation* pour sauver la communauté mondiale de la catastrophe. Le capitalisme a été discrédité par ses sous-produits négatifs et appauvrissants des crises sociales et des dommages causés à l'environnement (c'est-à-dire les catastrophes naturelles provoquées par l'homme).

L'auteur considère donc que la solution doit provenir d'une *gouvernance* économique *mondialisée* (qui émerge sous la forme du G20 et des BRICS, dans lesquels les PMA ont une voix, plutôt que du G7). Toutefois, la lutte est longue et tous les acteurs aux niveaux mondial, national et local dans tous les pays ont un rôle à jouer, tant sur le plan politique que social et économique en tant que producteurs. Les plans de sauvetage temporaires, par le biais de ce que l'on appelle les plans de relance économique des États-Unis et des pays de l'OCDE, sont terriblement inadéquats pour réformer le capitalisme sans des efforts mondialisés pour concevoir une nouvelle forme de «mondialisation équitable», comme le recommande la Commission mondiale sur la dimension sociale du développement (OIT, 2004).

L'auteur appelle donc à la réforme du système mondial de gouvernance économique axé sur le capitalisme, le système dit de Bretlon Woods (FMI, Banque mondiale, OMC), comme seule stratégie viable à long terme pour parvenir à une mondialisation équitable et favorable aux populations. Tout en notant le programme de réformes actuel, l'auteur pense que la plupart de ces réformes ne sont qu'un simple rafistolage des symptômes des maladies, et non un véritable remède utile. Une transformation structurelle du capitalisme est nécessaire afin d'inoculer les économies industrielles contre les crises sociales et de construire des économies qui se soucient du bien-être de leurs citoyens (les économies sociales de bien-être de l'avenir). À cet égard, ses conclusions sont conformes à celles des autres qui considèrent le capitalisme comme un «génocide structurel», ou la crise financière comme une crise systémique du capitalisme (Leech 2012).

Pour conclure cette brève revue, l'auteur analyse les crises économiques mondiales comme conséquence des excès du capitalisme en tant que système socio-économique qui, pour certains, a perdu sa productivité et sa légitimité sociales.

Il est passé du statut de *bien public* visant à promouvoir la création de richesses pour tous, à un statut de *mal public* qui génère la misère et la stagnation pour la majorité, et des gains obscènes pour ceux qui contrôlent les capitaux financiers. C'est une lecture très correcte du capitalisme américain et mondial ; elle a été récemment confirmée par d'autres, notamment Amin, 2011 (3), et Roubine (4), 2012.

La voie à suivre pour l'Afrique et les pauvres des pays riches est de lutter pour une véritable «société mondiale» au sein de laquelle la croissance économique et la gestion économique sont localisées au niveau local et national grâce à un système approprié de *gouvernance* économique *nationale* qui soit favorable aux populations et non au capital financier. Partout, nous avons besoin de mouvements sociaux-démocrates qui luttent en faveur des droits sociaux et économiques de tous comme antidote politique et social au capitalisme de libre marché rampant ; tels que, les mouvements *Occupy Wall Street (occuper Wall Street)*. Nous pouvons construire une nouvelle économie mondiale pour la sécurité humaine sur la planète Terre grâce à une variété de mouvements sociaux.

Ce dont l'Afrique a besoin, ce sont des marchés qui fonctionnent bien et qui servent les intérêts de tous les groupes sociaux, y compris les personnes vulnérables et les pauvres. De bons marchés sans la cupidité du capitalisme. De bonnes politiques favorables au marché, déterminées par les organisations populaires, et non par le partenariat mondial des capitalistes et de leurs agents politiques.

Ce résultat nécessite toutefois un «nouveau» type de connaissances sur le fonctionnement réel ou souhaité de ces marchés, une nouvelle économie. Les universités africaines doivent donc être soutenues pour rechercher les bonnes solutions à nos problèmes sociaux et économiques ; pour contribuer à une renaissance des idées visant à protéger les économies africaines des chocs mondiaux du capitalisme dans ses jours longs mais douloureux et destructeurs. La nouvelle économie doit être fondée sur la société et centrée sur les personnes afin de garantir la prospérité et la sécurité humaine pour tous, y compris des solutions efficaces en vue de l'atténuation et de l'adaptation aux changements climatiques.

L'auteur, à travers cette publication, a énormément contribué à nous «ouvrir les yeux». De ce fait, celle-ci devrait être lue par tous ceux (professionnels et particuliers) qui s'intéressent à la pauvreté, à la prospérité et à l'exploitation de l'homme par l'homme dans un contexte africain. Ce dialogue important et pertinent devrait se poursuivre ; les parties intéressées devraient étudier les questions mises en évidence et explorer différents, et nouveaux, paradigmes dans l›étude des questions sociales et économiques. Pour les décideurs politiques, il est pertinent de noter que cette monographie met l'accent sur l'importance de la construction de systèmes socio-économiques comme stratégie pour relever les défis émanant des crises financières mondiales.

RESENHA DE LIVRO

A CRISE CAPITALISTA GLOBAL: O CAMINHO À FRENTE PARA A ÁFRICA

Autor: Prof. Dan W. Nabudere, Marcus Garvey Instituto Pan-Africano, Mbale, Uganda.

Livros Seatini, Kampala, 2011

Resenhado por Firimooni Rweere Banugire[2]

Esta é uma publicação interessante e concisa. Ao longo de 123 páginas, o autor explica as raízes e consequências da crise capitalista global desencadeada pelos excessos da economia Americana na prossecução do capitalismo sem rosto humano e sem responsabilidade social. Aprofunda os detalhes daquilo que o Presidente Obama chama de irresponsabilidade da Wall Street, o coração do sistema financeiro Americano. Se deseja saber como funciona a economia do casino (jogo), esta é uma monografia boa e muito bem informada para leitura. Localiza as raízes da crise na instabilidade inerente ao capitalismo de mercado livre conduzido ao extremo do fundamentalismo de mercado sem qualquer responsabilidade social.

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No entanto, convém notar que o autor aborda o assunto de uma perspectiva de economia política, vendo a mesma através das lentes da política e dos negócios, impulsionada pela ganância organizada. Nesta abordagem, as questões-chave destacadas incluem:

- A economia de mercado-livre de casino é a última etapa do capitalismo produtivo e a concretização da sua visão de concentrar o capital nas mãos de um número muito limitado de pessoas que depois controlam o sistema político, levando ao desaparecimento dos sistemas de bem-estar social e à miséria da classe trabalhadora.

- O processo de fazer dinheiro com dinheiro através dos ímanes financeiros; desencorajando assim a produção e levando a uma forma de economia improdutiva e destrutiva, gerida em benefício de uma minúscula minoria, independentemente das consequências sociais.

- Como as crises financeiras globais afetam as economias Africanas e como estas devem responder à transformação económica a longo prazo no interesse da prosperidade partilhada e da segurança humana.

Obviamente, estas tendências negativas auguram calamidade para o sistema socioeconómico capitalista porque tanto os trabalhadores como a classe média correm o risco de perder através de um processo de desindustrialização, destruição do ambiente natural e erosão da saúde e riqueza das comunidades de base. Não é de admirar, portanto, que a maioria dos Americanos se tivesse apercebido da "escrita na parede" e tenha votado em Obama tal como um homem em afogamento faz ao se agarrar à palha.

Torna-se óbvio, a partir desta breve avaliação, que logo após o colapso do socialismo autoritário no Leste, a imiseração do capitalismo no Ocidente está num caminho destrutivo. O crescimento imiserizador deve ser entendido como um "fenómeno a longo prazo que pode ocorrer quando o ganho no bem-estar social de um país decorrente do crescimento económico é mais do que contrabalançado pela perda desse bem-estar associada a uma mudança adversa a nível comercial" (Pryor 2007:208). Por outras palavras, um país poderia ficar pior do que antes do crescimento, especificamente se o crescimento depender fortemente de exportações, algo que poderia resultar num declínio do comércio no país exportador (Pryor 2007:208). Daí a opinião de que é tempo para reorganizar a economia de casino, começando com regulamentos socioeconómicos mais sistemáticos relativos ao sistema financeiro, e aos sistemas de apoio à vida que geram serviços reais (por exemplo, saúde, habitat comunitário e gestão ambiental e instalações). O autor revela que a formalização do processo de ganhar dinheiro através da Permutas de Incumprimento de Crédito (Credit Default Swaps - CDS) é o coração desta crise. Outros chamaram ao CDS "armas financeiras de destruição maciça", as quais foram bem sucedidas nos EUA e noutras economias industriais, a ponto de os seus resultados destrutivos terem sido transmitidos à África e a outros países menos desenvolvidos (PMDs).

E o que dizer da economia do dinheiro e do comércio? Porque falhou em prever estas tendências e em informar as autoridades antes que fosse demasiado tarde? De acordo com o autor, a economia capitalista (neoliberal) da classe proprietária/exploradora baseia-se nos interesses sectários da classe capitalista dominante que, na ausência de um quadro económico de boa governação, irá explorar a maioria dos cidadãos (da classe trabalhadora às classes médias inferiores). Qual é, então, o seu impacto nas economias Africanas, que ainda são em grande parte economias camponesas, com um sector urbano em rápido crescimento? O autor responde a esta questão essencial ao citar vários comentadores e ao concluir que irá haver um declínio de muitas fontes de entrada de capital estrangeiro, ao contrário do optimismo preliminar de alguns funcionários governamentais, que na sua opinião, não estavam bem informados. Estas fontes incluem a assistência oficial, orçamentos de ONGs e receitas do turismo, entre outras.

No entanto, as conclusões mais interessantes decorrentes desta leitura correcta das fases finais do capitalismo incluem, entre outras, as seguintes: primeiro, o colapso do capitalismo como instrumento da prosperidade das nações, é inevitável, dado que é impulsionado pela ganância, e não pelo motivo da produtividade social para o bem comum da sociedade (as minhas próprias palavras). Nenhum sistema económico se pode sustentar numa tal situação. Ele terá de ruir e gradualmente dar lugar ao aparecimento de uma nova sociedade; uma comunidade mundial, baseada na solidariedade humana e não no lucro, uma sociedade em que a exploração e as divisões de classe são reduzidas ao longo do tempo. Ou seja, a comunidade global, liderada pelas vítimas do capitalismo possessivo, deve procurar as reformas estruturais dos sistemas socioeconómicos a longo prazo que resultem numa economia de mercado não capitalista que incorpore as ideias de economias centradas nas pessoas, algo que o comunismo autoritário não pôde alcançar, e que a actual globalização capitalista neoliberal não permite aos países capitalistas mais desenvolvidos e aos menos desenvolvidos atingir.

Segundo, os PMDs estão à mercê deste monstro do capitalismo possessivo e não podemos desenvolver um novo capitalismo para transformar as economias Africanas em economias industriais porque somos impedidos pela globalização capitalista. A porta está bem aberta aos especuladores estrangeiros e aos seus parceiros locais para apoderarem-se dos nossos recursos naturais e alimentar a corrupção dos líderes locais como meio de escapar ao seu saque. O autor concluiu que a África deve, portanto, procurar convergência com os modelos pós-capitalistas que os Americanos e Europeus procuram como única via de fuga ao capitalismo de casino opressivo.

Terceiro, a crise económica global, enquanto crise do capitalismo, não pode ser reformada (regulada) com sucesso através do resgate de empresas falidas, mesmo que tal implique um aumento da co-propriedade estatal. Isto porque a raiz do problema reside tanto no fracasso do mercado como na incapacidade política de ligar a gestão do crédito à produção de bens e serviços necessários à maioria da população a fim de viverem uma vida decente. *A riqueza* das nações foi monopolizada por poucos e transformada num sistema de jogatina que permite obter lucros com dinheiro em papéis sem se preocupar com a sua disponibilidade. Assim, o capital financeiro e os capitalistas perderam legitimidade social como parceiros-chave na governação da riqueza natural e na subsistência das pessoas. Esta falta de legitimidade deve-se ao seu crescente impacto negativo sobre as pessoas, bem como sobre os recursos naturais. Por conseguinte, estas falhas do mercado e das políticas devem ser vistas como sendo impulsionadas pelo fracasso do sistema económico do capitalismo de mercado livre.

Daí a inevitabilidade do colapso do capitalismo do laissez-faire (deixa correr) e da necessidade urgente da sua reestruturação e transformação para salvar a comunidade global de uma catástrofe. O capitalismo tem sido desacreditado pelos seus subprodutos negativos e imiscuidores de crises sociais e danos ambientais (ou seja, catástrofes naturais provocadas pelo homem). O autor, portanto, vê a solução emanar de uma governação económica globalizada (emergindo sob a forma de G20 e BRICS, em que os PMDs têm uma voz, em vez do G7). Contudo, a luta é longa, e como produtores, todos os actores a nível global, nacional e local em todos os países têm um papel a desempenhar politicamente, bem como social e economicamente. Resgates temporários, através dos chamados pacotes de estímulo económico dos EUA e dos países da OCDE, são terrivelmente inadequados para reformar o capitalismo sem esforços globalizados para engendrar uma nova forma de "globalização justa", como recomendado pela Comissão Mundial sobre a Dimensão Social do Desenvolvimento (OIT, 2004).

O autor, portanto, apela à reforma do sistema global de governação económica impulsionado pelo capitalismo, o chamado Sistema Bretlon Woods (FMI, Banco Mundial, OMC), como a única estratégia viável a longo prazo para alcançar uma globalização justa e amiga das pessoas. Ao observar a actual agenda de reformas, o autor pensa que a maioria destas é um mero ajuste aos sintomas das doenças, não um tratamento verdadeiramente útil. É necessária uma transformação estrutural do capitalismo a fim de inocular as economias industriais contra crises sociais e de construir economias que cuidem do bem-estar dos seus cidadãos (as economias sociais do bem-estar do futuro). A este respeito, as suas conclusões são coerentes com as dos outros que veem o capitalismo como "genocídio estrutural", ou a crise financeira como uma calamidade do sistema de capitalismo (Leech 2012).

Para concluir esta breve resenha, o autor analisa as crises económicas globais como consequência dos excessos do capitalismo como sistema socioeconómico para uns poucos que perderam a sua produtividade e legitimidade social.

Passou do estatuto de bem público para promover a criação de riqueza para todos, para um estado de mal público que gera miséria e estagnação para a maioria, e ganhos obscenos para aqueles que controlam o capital financeiro. Esta é uma leitura muito correta do capitalismo americano e global que foi recentemente confirmada por outros, especialmente Amin, 2011 (3), e Roubine (4), 2012.

O caminho em frente para a África e os pobres em países ricos é lutar por uma verdadeira "sociedade global" onde o crescimento económico e a gestão económica sejam localizados a nível nacional e de base através de um sistema apropriado de governação económica estatal que seja a favor das pessoas e não a favor do capital financeiro. Precisamos de movimentos social-democratas em todo o lado na luta pelos direitos sociais e económicos de todos como antídoto político e social para o capitalismo de mercado livre desenfreado; por exemplo, os movimentos de Occupy Wall Street (Ocupar o Wall Street). Podemos construir uma nova economia mundial para a segurança humana no planeta Terra através de uma variedade de movimentos sociais.

A Africa necessita de mercados que funcionem bem e que sirvam os interesses de todos os grupos sociais, incluindo os vulneráveis e os pobres. Bons mercados sem a ganância do capitalismo. Boas políticas favoráveis ao mercado determinadas pelas organizações populares; não a parceria global dos capitalistas e dos seus agentes políticos.

Este objectivo, contudo, requer um "novo" tipo de conhecimento sobre como estes mercados funcionam ou devem funcionar; uma nova economia. As universidades Africanas devem, portanto, ser apoiadas na investigação das soluções correctas para os nossos problemas sociais e económicos; contribuir para um renascimento de ideias para a protecção das economias Africanas contra choques globais do capitalismo nos seus longos mas dolorosos e destrutivos dias. A nova economia deve ser baseada na sociedade e centrada nas pessoas, a fim de garantir prosperidade e segurança humana para todos, incluindo soluções eficazes para as alterações climáticas, mitigação e adaptação.

Com esta publicação, o autor contribuiu muito para "abrir os olhos" e a mesma deverá ser lida por todos aqueles (profissionais e indivíduos) que se preocupam com a pobreza, a prosperidade e a exploração do homem por homem dentro de um contexto Africano. Este diálogo importante e relevante deverá continuar; com as partes interessadas a estudar as questões destacadas e a explorar diferentes, e novos, paradigmas no estudo das questões sociais e económicas. Os decisores políticos devem ter em conta que esta monografia sublinha a importância da criação de sistemas socioeconómicos como estratégia para enfrentar os desafios decorrentes das crises financeiras globais.

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